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ABSTRACT
THE TROJAN HORSE IN YOUR HEAD:
COGNITIVE THREATS AND HOW TO COUNTER THEM
Lora Pitman
Old Dominion University, 2019
Director: Regina Karp
Vulnerabilities of the human mind caused by the way it is designed to processes
information have always been exploited in warfare, since the dawn of humanity. History is
marked with frequent use of deceits and manipulations over the centuries, with examples ranging
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e -profiling. While largely used over time,

these tactics, that I call cognitive threats, have not been collectively examined. I hypothesize that
they pose a security issue to which prevention strategies on different levels could be successfully
applied. The research questions that this study asks are what the characteristics of these cognitive
threats, and what specific techniques could be employed to counter them. To respond to them
and to contribute to filling the gap in the literature, I describe four case studies that illustrate
some of the most common types of cognitive threats in the 21st century - the case with Maria
Butina, the case with Russian disinformation, the case with ISIS recruitment, and the case with
Cambridge Analytica. Then I analyze them and suggest different approaches that are fit to
respond to the contemporary political and psychological features of these cognitive threats. The
findings from the study, the policy recommendations, and the additional measures I propose are
grouped into six categories: creating alternatives, narrative change, official government
statements, legislative measures, education, and awareness.
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the minds of his students, mentees, colleagues and friends.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The Trojan War, one of the most emblematic events in the ancient civilization still
fascinates scholars and practitioners. It begins with the abduction of the Spartan queen Helen, by
Paris

a Trojan prince. A a e

e, Me ela , Hele

h ba d a d the king of Sparta asked

his brother Agamemnon, king of Mycenae to join him for a campaign aiming to return Helen to
Sparta and to punish the brazen Trojans. This mission was, reportedly joined by various of the
ancient Greek heroes, including Odysseus, Achilles, and Ajax. Writers and historians in the
antiquity claim that the siege of Troy lasted for ten whole years. Desperate from the lack of
success, the Greeks knew that traditional military means would not ensure completion of their
goal. Instead, they decided to implement a well-developed plan intended to make the Trojans
open their own gates since the efforts to do so with force were hopeless. It is claimed that the
Greeks built a giant wooden horse in only ten days. This creature was left in front the Trojan
gates, with only one person around it, as the Greek ships were seen to slowly sail away from
Troy, leaving their tents surrounding Troy in flames as a sign of retreat. Sinon, a Greek soldier,
who was the only person around the horse, pretended to be abandoned by his people. He
explained to the Trojans that the horse was a gift to the goddess Athena and symbolized entreaty
of the Greeks for a safe return home in an act of remorse for destroying one of her temples in
Troy. Perceived as a truthful story, the Trojans let the colossal horse figure inside the gates
thinking it was a souvenir of their victory. What they did not know was that inside of the horse,
there were 30 of the best Greek soldiers, waiting for the enemy to bring them effortlessly inside
the gates. Not a single casualty marked the penetration of Greeks inside Troy, not a single sword
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or a single weapon was used to get beyond the gates. When the night came, the Greeks returned
with their ships to Troy. In the meantime, the Greek soldiers left the horse and opened the gates
to the Greek army who defeated the Trojans, brought back Helen to Menelaus, and ended the
war.
Some claim that this story is a legend more than a historical fact, although Homer,
Sophocles, Herodotus and Virgil all contribute with some details about the Trojan War that
testify for its potential authenticity. Legend or not, the conflict in Troy ended with the victory of
the Greeks only to open the door to other types of wars

those of the mind. What appeared to be

the key to the Greek success was not military superiority but a simple trick that made the Trojans
welcome their enemies straight into their home. The reason for the defeat was not a lack of
bravery, lack of material capabilities or poor quality of their fortress. After all, they endured a
10-year-long siege. It was something else

a Pandora Box that all humans have in their heads.

The idea that the Greeks acknowledged their defeat, went home and left a gift behind them was
so tempting that it inevitably led Trojans to think that this charming idea was the truth.
Psychological research overwhelmingly confirms the phrase, that people see what they want to
see. In the case with the Trojan War, what the Trojans wanted to see in this giant horse figure

a

triumph of their military superiority - was what brought their defeat. While this ancient story
serves as a proverbial lesson for those who are too naïve, the history before the Trojan War and
after this is full of examples of similar deceptions because an ultimate solution to the problem
was never achieved. Access to perfect information is impossible, and people only have at their
disposal a limited amount of it. In addition, human cognition can further obscure a more accurate
judgment of facts. It is inclined to make deductions in a predictable way when influenced by
certain emotions in certain situations. Such judgment looks objective and unimpeded for the

3
social perceiver. What people frequently are not aware of is that it is quite enough an emotion in
a particular social setting to be provoked, in order the cognition to produce a predictable reaction
that corresponds to this emotion. What is more intimidating is that such barriers to independent
thinking are not only inherent for individuals with medical conditions. They are typical for all
individuals because each person has a Pandora bo that represents how vulnerable our
cognition is when it processes information, as one simple trick of the mind, can always open the
box. Such deceptions and manipulations, I call in the present work cognitive threats.
Centuries after the Trojan Horse deception, the problem with cognitive manipulation in
warfare kept being present even in the 21st century. The issue was the same but manifested
differently, as a lot has changed since the classical antiquity period, but not everything. Wars
were still led, the desire to win them was as high as it once was. In spite of this, there were also
new actors. They had new goals and new ways of using their old weapons

persuasion. The

addictive nature of social networks and the mimicking of an in-person conversation made people
eager to communicate more than ever. The basic human need for maintaining a particular social
image, a distinct identity, made users share a wide variety of information not only with people
with whom they are close but also, sometimes quite unconsciously, with people who they do not
even know. It was not long before power elites started seeing value in social networks as a means
of warfare. The involvement in all sorts of actors in society changed even modern diplomacy and
how it is conducted. Disinformation as an old tool for deception gained new meaning for state
and non-state actors. A rare combination between h ma

c g i i e mechanisms and the

presence of a suitable platform for manifestation of the liabilities of those mechanisms gave birth
to one of the most effective weapons in the 21 st-century warfare - online disinformation.
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The success of social media did not remain a secret for a different, post-Cold War type of
threats coming from non-state actors in the face of radical organizations. The main kind of threat
that they posed was related to their violent means of achieving their goals, but this was not
exhausting all the ways in which they were endangering the peace. Their skillful use of the
online space has become a powerful tool of recruitment of people. They were enticed to join
these radical organizations by allegedly making an independent choice. That choice was,
however, influenced to a large extent by manipulations and in many times by deception. The
promises that the cause of the radical organization will fulfill a longing that the vulnerable target
has was the key to the success of recruitment operations. At the same time, anti-terrorism units
were failing to eliminate the ongoing online recruitment of new members because of the
anonymity for which the online space allows. Only reasonable suspicion of illicit activities
would be enough to restrict some of the online privacy of the users, as an essential human right
guaranteed on both the national and international level in most states. The paradox was apparent:
the more freedom people had to communicate and connect, the less independence they had in
their thinking and decision-making because their judgment was exposed to even more cognitive
threats than before.
Individuals have always been an important factor in the political scene but only if they
had power or were members of collectively expressed interest. Generally, when thinking about
powerful individuals, one would be most likely to imagine state leaders. With the proliferation of
non-state actors, however, leaders of organizations and corporations became just as powerful as
states, in some cases. They have tremendous assets at their disposal including material, nonmaterial and human resources. They also have certain purposes and goals. One of them is related
to profits, but there is also another factor of essence

support of specific policies that will most
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likely lead to even more profits in the future. Especially, with the current level of globalization, it
was inevitable that big corporations stayed immune from the changes on the global political
scene. They embraced these changes and employed them to work for them
ih

cial media. I

ead f le i g
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cial di ac i

as it is in the case

ake a a

he

e

attention from social networks, they were used as an arena for discussing them. Social networks
quickly became new sources of information about events of importance. The media outlets
delivering the information were not the social platforms themselves, however, thus their owners
are still not held accountable for the information that is disseminated through their products.
Consequently, social media are providing only a fruitful environment in which political and
corporate interests merge to benefit from cognitive vulnerabilities in humans. The so-called
super-empowered individuals who own these companies have little to no interest in changing the
current situation. It works for their goals

vivid discussions and exchange of information

increases the popularity of their networks and generates a larger pool of topics for users to
discuss. Moreover, once something is posted on social media, it becomes an asset belonging to
the owner of the platform. This enormous volume of information collected through social media
c ld hel c

c a ma

f a i di id al

ag

f i di id al c g i i

. A ma

ha

could be easily sold to the highest bidder.
With every technological development in human history, there were also notable changes
in society, politics, education, and culture. The changing environment made wars different, some
of which not even real wars at all. The traditional and non-traditional wars required new
weapons. Some of them were intelligence gathering, deception, and disinformation. With the
growing numbers of democratic countries in the world, the meaning of the individual in the
system also expanded. The mechanism for winning post-modern wars, that were not wars by
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definition but merely conflicts, was to know the individuals who create the system. Intelligencegathering has always been a tool for getting acquainted with the enemy with the ultimate purpose
of influencing them. Within the context of expanding democratization, it has the meaning of a
preliminary step for gaining power over the individuals as a way to impact the state itself through
them. In the digital age, the intelligence-gathering means simply the collection of data, most of
which were even voluntarily shared by users on social media. Considering these circumstances,
i

a alm
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i ed. I di id al

e

al i f ma i

was directed against them in the global game of politics in which they were the vehicle for a
change of the status quo, and thus the targets. In the era of democratization and with the
increased importance of the individual, the states retain their role of central units in the system of
international relations but with one limitation
ci i e

efe e ce . Wi h

me e ce i

,

their identities are malleable and a subject to
-modern conflicts no longer lead to traditional

hot wars against the enemy state directly, but against its people. Consequently, the protection of
the individuals, their cognition and their independent decision-making should be a matter of
national and global security. This argument also pertains to authoritarian countries that
intentionally distribute disinformation to their population through government-owned outlets in
order to support the state goals (e.g. Russia). Regardless, democracies are much more exposed
to cognitive threats since, while in autocracies, the perpetrator is only one

the state itself, in

democracies the range of the perpetrators is much wider, due to the transparency and the
treasured freedom of speech.
I designed this study to respond to the following research questions: what cognitive
threats are, and how to counter them. The preferred methodology is qualitative in nature and
includes the exploration of four case studies of cognitive threats. Before directly analyzing them,
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I provide context to the problem by building upon the following three pillars: 1) psychological
studies proving that human cognition is vulnerable; 2) political psychological research that
underlines how internal experiences of humans are exploited for political gains; 3) historical
overview of cognitive threat showing that different conditions matter for the magnitude and the
success of these security threats. My hypothesis is that information always mattered in different
periods of history, all the way to the present days. In order to gather information or/and change
he

e

beha i

ba ed

hi i f ma i , ac

killf ll

k ad a age f he ba ic

information-processing mechanisms inherent for humans. In the contemporary political,
technological and social environment, these threats represent an even more significant problem
that finds expression in a wide range of scenarios in which one actor benefits politically from
triggering a certain psychologically predictable reaction from the victim. This problem, I argue,
is best addressed through prevention strategies based on the individual psychological and
political elements that make the threat possible in the first place. They are inevitably intertwined
in cognitive threats since the latter is a perceptual category that contains an intention by the
perpetrator to inflict damages to a victim. The threat remains as such in the psyche of the
perpetrator and takes the form of an actual attack when the perpetrator acts upon their intentions.
Regarding the perception of the victim, they may have experienced the influence to their
cognition as a threat or not. In the first case, even if the individual perceives the cognitive threat
as such, it is almost always after the damages have been inflicted, which is when the victim
becomes aware of the deception, if it is successful. In some more rare cases, the victim becomes
aware of the cognitive threat before the damages have been inflicted. In other cases, the
individual never realizes that their cognitions have been influenced. They consider their
decision-making process as independent, and not influenced, as this is namely why cognitive
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threats are so secretive, difficult to expose and prevent. Moreover, they could be distributed and
facilitated through various actors, state and domestic or international non-state ones, and
different phenomena with systemic effect (e.g., globalization). Thus, cognitive threats could be
studied on all levels of analysis. The level that always has to be present in every analysis,
however, is the individual level since the threat is aimed at

e

m e e

c g ii

. This

is also the reason that makes findings, derived from level one of analysis - about human
cognition, relevant to all other levels of analysis.
Cognitive threats differ from non-cognitive ones through one essential component that
has to be present in them

the purposeful attempt of a perpetrator to influence he i di id al

cognition through exploiting innate cognitive vulnerabilities in order to benefit politically. They
could be labeled as vulnerabilities, however, only when they are being exploited by an interested
party. Otherwise, they should simply be labeled as the human cognitive apparatus with all its
inherent psychological mechanisms for reaction. That said, cognitive threats exist only when an
actor intends to obtain gains by provoking a change in the behavior of an individual through
exploiting the existing cognitive structures of the human mind. Relevant example would be
instigating fear, stress and anxiety that will make the individual reacting defensively to a
highlighted by the perpetrator threat. In this intentionally induced state of distress, the individual
searches for more information which is typically provided by the perpetrator in the form of a
solution that allegedly resolves the problem. To achieve this goal, very often there are other preexisting conditions of the victim that the perpetrator exploits such as personal loss, financial
need, ontological insecurity, and the immaturity of the victim.
While cognitive threats are not material in nature, but psychological, they may have
material consequences. For instance, global warming is a non-material threat with material
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consequences but as opposed to cognitive threats, it does not involve an interested party that
attempts to influence the victim

che. For cognitive threats to be constituted as such, it is

only needed that the perpetrator (state, non-state actor or an individual) perceives them as
threatening to the victim, who is almost always unaware of the influence that is exercised. In this
sense, the cognitive threat can only disappear when it is not intended as a goal by the perpetrator
who is ready to act upon their intention. Therefore, I argue that the best strategy against this kind
of threats would be strategies such that are focused on prevention.
The study I am conducting seeks to contribute to the security studies literature. In
a ic la , hi

k g al alig

i h the ones that the field of non-traditional security sets

forth. It seeks to introduce the idea of cognitive threats and to fill a gap in the literature about the
applicability of prevention strategies based on the concrete expressions that cognitive threats
have in the contemporary environment. In terms of scholarly agenda, I advocate for the inclusion
of cognitive threats in the security studies field literature, as their effectiveness and the
seriousness of their consequences have been proven continuously throughout the centuries, even
though they have not been officially part of traditional definitions of war. My intention for this
work is to serve the needs of academics and policy-makers, nonetheless, some practitioners who
see hi

d

applicability in their research as well. It is organized in the following way. In

Chapter 1, I introduce the problem. In Chapter 2, I present the idea of cognitive threats and why
they are so difficult to control. To explain why, I provide an overview of the basic mechanisms
upon which the human cognition is built. Then, I outline some vulnerabilities that it has in terms
of processing information. In addition, I follow what possible effects can emotion-inducing
situations have on decision-making and overall behavior. Based on these deductions, I explain
why such cognitive dynamics present threats to independent decision-making and behavior, and
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how this has an impact on political level. Next, in Chapter 3, I describe the evolution of cognitive
threats to explore what factors changed them over time and how. I also discuss the value and the
conditions of previously employed ways to combat them in different historical periods. I
maintain that prevention strategies should be preferred in addressing cognitive threats rather than
focusing on their consequences after they take the form of an active campaign (attack) and are no
longer a just a threat. In Chapter 4, I offer four case studies that illustrate some of the most
common types of cognitive threats in the 21st century. By studying them, I try to identify their
elements, the reasons for their success, their effects and some contextual factors that are of
importance. Chapter 5 consists of an analysis of the described scenarios, as its goal is to produce
strategies that are fit to counter the contemporary features of cognitive threats. Chapter 6
summarizes the findings of the study, outlines policy recommendations, and discusses
implications for the role of academia in studying cognitive threats as a conceptual category.
Lastly, I suggest some potential factors that should be taken into consideration in thinking about
the future of cognitive threats.
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CHAPTER 2
COGNITION AND COGNITIVE THREATS

In Chapter 2, I introduce the idea of cognitive threats as a central element in this work.
Since the focus of the current study is political in nature, I continue by exploring the academic
dialogue between psychology and politics as I seek to identify what psychological concepts
inform political psychology, how they are used, what are the methods and the theories that are
interested in employing psychology in politics. Then, I provide an overview of one of the most
central elements in political psychology the human cognition, how it is constructed, what are
its components, how they function and what is the relationship between them. It has to be
mentioned that the literature on this topic is more than voluminous since it is one of the most
critical questions in psychology. Therefore, I only selected foundational works that build the
understanding of how cognition works regarding information

its selection, interpretations and

reactions to it. Next, I link the cognition to its inevitable interaction with society and revisit the
questions about cognitive processes but this time in a social context. For instance, how people
make inferences and what factors affect them, how important is control for the aggregation of
information and how social judgments and social stereotypes are formed based on the selection
and the interpretation of certain information. After I outline the importance of the individual in
the study of politics, I emphasize the dual role that they have

as an agent that can influence

structures, and as a political tool for achieving specific goals. Consequently, I list some of the
recognized in the literature cognitive mechanisms that make the individual both an influence and
a subjugated instrument to political goals.
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The emerging cognitive threat: a result of political moves and processes
In order to understand how the individual can be used as a tool for achieving political
results, first, I will outline what is defined as a threat in the study of politics and international
relations and what is the place of the individual in it. Next, I will explore how a threat to the
individual can become a collective national and international threat, what are the characteristics
of these emerging cognitive threats and their relationship with two phenomena already
established in the literature such as propaganda and frauds, both possible in the physical and the
cyberspace.
Individual security and national security. Similar to many questions in the study of
politics and IR, the field is not unanimous about its understanding of what security studies
agenda should include and based on this, what concepts are included in the notion of threat.
Threat is defined by Rousseau and Garcia-Re ame

a
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i
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e age

g

has either the capability or intention to inflict a negative consequence on another agent or
1.

g

In the context of politics, this intention could be either explicitly demonstrated or

implied. Stephen Walt2 discusses this question in his work from the early post-Cold-War period
and concludes that security is inevitably and immediately related to the concept of war. He refers
to a definition by Nye and Lynn-Jones3 ha f c e
f mili a

1

he

d

f he h ea ,

e, a d c

l

f ce 4. As the challenges discussed in the field multiplied, it became necessary that

David L. Rousseau and Rocio Garcia-Retamero, "Identity, power, and threat perception: A cross-national
experimental study," Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 5 (2007): 745.
2
Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," International Studies Quarterly 35, no. 2 (1991).
3
Joseph S. Nye Jr. and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "International security studies: a report of a conference on the state of
the field," International security 12, no. 4 (1988).
4
Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," 212.
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new approaches are undertaken. Krause and Williams 5 observed that the discourse about
expanding the security studies agenda either moves toward the study of the individual and human
security, or toward more complex approaches about the global environment, regional,
international security. At the same time, some neorealists6 7 8 remained true to their systematic
paradigm excluding the individual from equations of how anarchy affects the system. Aside from
the realist school of thought, however, the figure of the individual became more and more
important even for h e

i ga i

i

i al

ci l gical a

ach beca e

i h he e d f

the Cold War, the mix of factors affecting national security is changing. Issues dealing with
m , ide i ie , a d c l

e a e bec mi g m e alie

9.

In a chapter about human security,

Fen Osler Hampson10 refers to the definition offered in the report of the Commission on Human
Sec i

ha

a e ha i

le i
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enhance freedoms and human fulfillment. Human security means protecting fundamental
freedoms - freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe)
a d e a i e ( ide

ead) h ea a d i a i
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. When it comes to the cognitive abilities of

an individual, it is important to delineate what are these fundamental freedoms and what these
threats represent. Article 18 and 19 from the Universal Declaration of Human Right underline
ha fi , e e

5
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f eed m f h gh
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Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods,"
Mershon International Studies Review 40, no. 2 (1996).
6
John J. Mearsheimer, "The false promise of international institutions," International security 19, no. 3 (1994).
7
Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies."
8
Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of international politics, 1st ed. (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, 1979).
9
Peter J. Katzenstein, The culture of national security: Norms and identity in world politics (New York, NY:
Columbia University Press, 1996), 2.
10
Fen Osler Hampson, "Human Security," in Security Studies: An Introduction, ed. Paul D. Williams (New York,
NY: Routledge, 2012).
11
Commission on Human Security, "Human Security Now," (New York, NY 2003), 4.
12
United Nations General Assembly, "Universal declaration of human rights," (1948), Article 18.
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That said the

freedoms that human security protects include gathering and processing of information that is not
in any way purposefully obstructed by external influences.
Regardless of the threat that an intentional manipulation of information conveyed to the
individual can cause, there is something more than this being a question merely in the realm of
human security. What if this threat to the individual could also constitute and is perpetrated with
he
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a discussion of these threats targeting the individual but only as means to harm a broader entity
links the human security research agenda to the agenda followed by neorealists who exclude the
study of the individual but are still concerned about the security of the state. A research question
focusing on cognitive threats could bridge the agendas of both divisions in the field despite their
different assumptions about the world of international relations since these kinds of threats
include both the individual and the system as objects of a threat. The direct mechanism that
make he i di id al h ea a c llec i e
c g i i e abili ie a d he ela ed
blic, a d, h ,

li ical
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Cognitive threats. In the past, the field of security studies focused almost ultimately on
military affairs and traditional threats as the extreme point in conflict was thought to be the
beginning of a war. Nowadays, while wars still occur, the liberal order and the democratization
of many countries made it unlikely that states go to war with each other using their militaries.
This does not mean that conflicts do not occur. It does not even mean that wars do not occur.
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Ibid., Article 19.
Emma Hutchison and Roland Bleiker, "Theorizing emotions in world politics," International Theory 6, no. 3
(2014).
14
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They just have different forms and expression in the contemporary highly interconnected
technological world in which ideas could be used as weapons in conflicts. These modern
conflicts and modern wars do not involve casualties in the traditional sense, but they are still not
victimless. However, the harm inflicted to the individuals is not the ultimate goal that these
modern wars pursue. They seek to achieve political goals by manipulating the cognition of a
person who will inflict some harm to others. Based on this, cognitive threats could be
characterized as any type of information, written and/or verbal, in the cyber and physical space,
purposefully conveyed to a recipient(s) with the intent to provoke a certain reaction that will
cause harm to them and another party. This reaction is in nature inherently linked to cognitive
processes, emotions and habits could be expressed in the form of a verbal or physical act or both.
At the same time, the reaction could also be an intentional abstaining from verbal or physical
acts, as an act of a protest, for instance. The recipient of the information could immediately
express a certain reaction as a consequence of the conveyed information, or it could be delayed
with seconds, minutes, months or even years

when the information acts as a trigger to the

recollection of past events and associations. The recipient of the information is in the position of
a victim and a perpetrator to harm to others. They are first and foremost a victim because their
judgment is manipulated. It is manipulated through the delivery of a specific type of information
that the author of the message suspects or knows, and hopes and intends, to enable a chain of
cognitive processes that will make the recipient do something that benefits the cause of the
author. Second, the recipient of the information acts also as an unconscious perpetrator of harm
to third parties that could be another individual, an institution, an organization, a state or groups
of states. The harm could be of physical, emotional, financial or political nature. To illustrate this
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theoretical concept, I would like to point to four examples that elucidate its components and its
meaning.
The first most common scenario in which this concept finds application is the
proliferating cases of disinformation on popular topics for political purposes. The second set of
cases in which cognitive threats are present refers to political espionage conducted through
intentional misleading of the recipient of the information. For instance, numerous cases show
how humans can be exploited to give away secrets of national value and not even through
extortion, blackmailing or other similar practices. Instead, a simple chain of cognitive processes
in the brain of an individual can be stimulated as this could be enough to get results that other
strategies may fail to deliver. The goals that such manipulations can pursue could pertain to trade
secrets, classified/confidential information, passwords or any other ways to gain access to such.
The third cluster of cognitive threats refers to recruiting practices of radical religious or extremist
groups. In such cases, the individual is recruited through the purposeful induction of emotions
and the offer of a powerful solution to various problems. The recruiters, however, do not only
aim

cha ge he i di id al a itude about certain issues or to take them to the extremes but

instead, they seek to provoke a certain behavior

joining the radical organization that aims to

cause harm to third parties. The fourth type of scenarios are related to a new form of power
concentrated in the hands of super-empowered individuals15. Many of them created companies
through which a large amount of information is collected. For instance, in the case of Facebook
and other social media, the users themselves are the ones providing the information. What they
did not know, at least, not until recently is how their information could be used and to what end.
One of them is, of course, profit. However, this does not mean that profit is the only goal of the
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collection of information. Instead, marketing and political purposes were frequently present after
large amounts of information were sold to corporate or political entities. Thus, not only the
individuals themselves suffered from the leaks of their own information, but the consequences
had a much wider range

f m ail ed ma ke i g me age acc di g

e

e

al

preferences to political messages to targeted audiences whose final goal was influencing the
outcome of elections and referendums. Since cognitive threats include only tools for influence on
mental rather than the physical level, they should be compared and contrasted with two similar
phenomena: frauds (traditional and cyber) and propaganda.
Cognitive threats and frauds. In order to discuss how fraud, as a crime, differs from
cognitive threats, it should be first underlined what criteria I will use. Popular definitions of
fraud generally incorporate four major elements: 1) an individual or a collective body presents a
certain information to the recipient that is not true; 2) the information presented to the victim is
believed to be true; 3) the victim perceives the information as true and exhibit behaviors that are
activated by the information; 4) the behavior of the victim causes the latter to endure financial or
property losses as a consequence from the untrue information that was conveyed to them 16. The
following comparison using these four categories seeks to identify to what extent fraud overlaps
with cognitive threats. The first component from the definition of fraud slightly differs from the
one of cognitive threats. While there is certain information conveyed by an individual or a
collective body, in the case of cognitive threats, this information could be true or false. Second,
for frauds, the information should be perceived as true but for cognitive threats it could be
perceived as false and still to trigger some reaction in the recipient that is desired by the sender
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of the message. Third, regardless of whether the recipient thinks the information is true or untrue,
there is some reaction that is provoked in them. Fourth, while for frauds, it is necessary that the
victim suffer some economic loss, when it comes to cognitive threats, the loss could be of any
other kind as well as of financial/property nature. Based on this juxtaposition, a logical question
follows: could a fraud constitute a cognitive threat? The answer to this question is affirmative. In
some cases, the same elements that characterize fraud as a crime could also present a cognitive
threat. For instance, an employee in a company in the defense sector responds to an e-mail
allegedly sent by their supervisor and discloses trade secrets. As a result, the employee is fined or
fired thus suffering financial losses, as well as the company itself. So far, this constitutes fraud.
B
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defense project and the trade secrets were stolen for political rather than merely economic
purposes? In this case and in other similar ones the fraud merges into the broader understanding
of cognitive threats. That said cognitive threats are not necessarily frauds but could include them
in some specific cases.
Cognitive threats and propaganda. When thinking about disinformation, as an example
of a cognitive threat, one can easily confuse it with the notion of propaganda. Lasswell
cha ac e i e he la e a
ig ifica

mb l

17.
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This definition captures a variety of elements that can also carry meaning

for cognitive threats. However, for cognitive threats, only one person can be the target of the
manipulation, rather than a group of people. Regardless, the most significant difference between
propaganda and cognitive threats is that the main purpose and the end goal of propaganda are to
shape particular moods toward an idea or a person. In the case of cognitive threats, shaping
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moods, habits and emotions are not the final destinations that the threat reaches. Instead, it seeks
to go further by making the individual do something more than just changing their attitude about
a particular matter. Propaganda could be used as a tool to manipulate certain judgments and
opinions but only with the aim to achieve another goal. For instance, one of the goals of
disinformation could be the defamation of a particular political party and the reorientation of the
voters toward another

the change of their attitude is needed but only as long as it serves also to

change their behavior when the elections come. It is possible that propaganda is employed
indirectly in this process, but in comparison to cognitive threats, it lacks concrete objectives
different than changi g
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cognitive threat, but it does not overlap fully with it.
Free choice and cognitive threats. Since cognitive threats are so widespread then what is
the place of the free choice considering the politicization of almost every issue in society? Free
choice is a complex category of philosophical questions that will not be by itself an object of
discussion in the current section. Instead, I would like to emphasize that cognitive psychology
has proven that there is a multitude of factors that drive our attitudes, behaviors, opinions, and
habits

a fact that makes it very difficult to talk about an entirely free, independent choice.

However, there must be some free will that is independent of fac

i fl e ci g e

le

judgment. A compromise between the ideal scenario of a free choice and all the elements that
affec

e deci i -making would be the informed choice. In the context of the idea of

cognitive threats, an informed choice would be when the individual is aware that the information
conveyed to them with certain intentions by the author, and with a certain goal. Moreover, an
informed choice should include knowing who the real author of the message is, the intentions of
the author to send the message, and how the reaction to the message is intended to affect the
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recipient and other parties. If the recipient has all this information or a good idea about these
questions, then this could be defined as making an informed choice. An informed choice
excludes the existence of cognitive threats because the cognitive manipulation element will be
substituted by consent to specific consequences that the recipient of the information knows will
or might follow from their actions.

The individual in the study of politics
Whe

hi ki g ab
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mind. That is because politics will be impossible without the presence of people

e

leaders and

followers, and their opponents. While these people all have cognitive apparatuses that are, as
described already, somewhat similar, their behavior can be governed by different rules

the ones

of social psychology. While it is very challenging to construct an exact formula about political
behavior and politically-motivated or driven acts by people, cognitive and social psychology to a
large extent contribute to a deepened understanding of the world of politics. As Rose
McDermott18 underlines, while efforts were made by political scientists to contribute to the field
of psychology, it is to a large extent recognized that it is the psychology field that imports its
theories into the political science realm.
Theories and the place of the individual in them. In order to provide an accurate
overview of the place of psychology in political science and international studies, I will first
outline what place different IR theories assign to the individual, followed by the methods mostly
used in the field. One of the most prominent theories in IR is undoubtedly the realist school of
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thought. Classical realists such as Machiavelli 19, Thucydides20 and Morgenthau21 place an
emphasis on human nature as a source of political conflict. As opposed to this, the structural
realism that later became the more prevalent realist way of thinking made a drastic turn in terms
of the place of the individual in politics. Assigning a great role to the system, rather than to the
individual, Waltz22 divided the three levels of analysis in the contemporary study of politics to an
individual, domestic and systemic. He stresses that it is the systemic level on which scholars
should focus as it carries the most importance for understanding how the international relations
shape the world.
Similar to realists, liberalists23 24 25 look at the system in general but through a different
lens

not how it inevitably hinders cooperation but how cooperation can emerge between the

units in the system. In this theory, states are also seen as the main actors with the only difference
that an accent is placed on domestic politics and their characteristics as well as on the system
itself, thus leaving the role of the individual somewhat underappreciated. Constructivists such as
Wendt26, Kratochwil27 and Katzenstein28, on the other hand, explore topics such as identity,
traditions, culture and any other elements that help the individual to perceive and assess events
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and other people. Katzenstein29, in particular, advocates for an approach that may not necessarily
be limited to one theory or one problem-solving technique thus enhancing the field with a
perspective oriented toward leaving theoretical parsimony concerns aside. A relatively newer
wave in the study of IR has presented the field with contributions focusing on rational choice 30,
psychobiography and social psychology31 32 33. A central element within these contributions is
the attention on the individual and their mental and decision-making processes, values, interests,
and emotions. For instance, one of the scholars who stands out with high accuracy of his
prediction models, based on expected utility, is Bruce Bueno De Mesquita 34. His design rests on
four pillars: 1) individuals interested on the outcome of the negotiations; 2) the initial bargaining
preferences of the participants; 3) bargaining power of the participants; 4) significance of the
issue at hand for the stakeholders. In spite of the success of this model and such that are relying
on rational choice and expected utility theories, some doubt has been cast in regarding their
eliabili
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. As McDermott underlines, in some more complex political
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work, rational choice theories could be of little help. Therefore, to assure relatively broad
applicability of the implications and conclusions of this work I will rely on more general
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theoretical and empirical underpinnings from political psychology than on the assumptions of
rational choice theories.
Methods. When analyzing the relationship between political science and international
studies, and psychology, it is important to mention what are the methods that the former employs
in order to study the latter. The methods established in the literature of political psychology are
mainly five, and they can be used alternatively or jointly to study the research question
interesting the scholar 36. Political psychology finds expression mostly in the literature about
American politics, but there is no reason why the same tools should not be used to extend the
knowledge produced in other fields of IR/political science. The first kind of methods that
scientists implement is the one involving experimentation and simulations. These research design
instruments include an environment that is observed and controlled by the person(s) conducting
the experiment. They manipulate one or more conditions of this environment and document how
other conditions in the environment will change as a consequence of the manipulation of the first
one. While experiments are not so common in the field of political science, they are still utilized
by some researchers and even claimed to be even more and more commonly encountered over
time37.
The second group of methods in political psychology engages with questionnaires
through which a group of random or non-anonymous interviewees offers their oral or written
responses to various questions. Despite the fact that the higher level of convenience and
accessibility to such research designs due to budget and time constraints, as opposed to

36

Ibid.
Ronald Rogowski, "The Rise of Experimentation in Political Science," in Emerging Trends in the Social and
Behavioral Sciences, ed. Robert A. Scott, Marlis C. Buchmann, and Stephen M. Kosslyn (New York, NY: John
Wiley & Sons Inc., 2016).
37

24
experimentation, this method has some downsides underlined by the scholarly community 38. On
the one hand, the interviewee may possess some biases that will inevitably find reflection in the
answers provided. Moreover, it is possible that the responders are oriented toward providing
answers that will, allegedly, be satisfactory to the interviewers. On the other hand, the
interviewees, their preferences and predispositions may be determined by experiences for which
the survey does not account

thus producing an omitted variable that could affect the final

conclusions of the study. As it was outlined previously, a significant problem with this kind of
research instruments is the one related to biases and instability of the provided answers by
respondents over time. Also, in accordance to the implications of the prospect theory, reviewed
previously in this chapter, depending on how the surveyors asked the question, the answers may
vary39.
The third method that has its role in studying political psychology is the content analysis.
This tool employs psychological techniques to understand political processes and political
figures through speech and non-verbal acts. One of the caveats of using content analysis is that
the materials used to record speeches and other public performances are not always reflective of
the persona of the political leader that is being studied40.
The fourth kind of research technique is observer ratings that individuals provide for
politicians. The perceptions include mostly traits and other impressions that politicians leave in
the observers. Similar to the other methods in political psychology this one is not without any
flaws. Observer ratings usually suffer from a high level of biased responses by the observers who
frequently make the fundamental attribution error. They tend to assign to the object of evaluation
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that could change the perceptions if the object was observed throughout a more continuous
amount of time41.
A fifth possible research tool for conducting political psychology inquiries is the use of
case studies

an approach very well established in the field of political science and IR. It is

common that a single case study research designs are employed

through which a higher

number of details is covered but at the expense of breadth of the study. As opposed to this,
multiple case studies allow for a greater breadth of the research conclusions but at the cost of
me de h f he a al i . McDe m
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of a research project, when it is still unclear which aspects of a particular event or problem are
important, what evidence should be sought, and which factors may play a role in explaining
c me

42.

However, she warns that the analysis may be vulnerable to these very same biases

that are valid for other kinds of research designs. They, she underlines, should be overcome by a
number of case studies that are first, more than one, and second, complemented with experiments
that will prove the causation between the independent and the dependent variables.
Having in mind these insights, the current study that I conduct will be based on the
following methodology. First, considering the subject matter, it will rely on case studies rather
than on other research tools since it is a new topic for the field. It also marks a theoretical
contribution that has not been explored to a sufficient extent and aims to achieve at this point of
the political psychology research agenda a certain breadth rather than depth. Regardless, the
number of case studies that will be greater than one will provide some depth of the implications.
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The chosen methodology also will guarantee that the hypothesis will be properly tested in
various case studies whose characteristics differ.
As the individuals are main objects of analysis in this work, it is important to explain
what are the elements of the human cognition, and in what ways it is vulnerable to cognitive
threats by actors intending them in order to benefit politically. The following sections, informed
by the study of psychology reveal that cognition is a very complex structure affected by
multitude of factors whose influence vary in different social situations. Much of the ongoing
processes regarding information storing and aggregation happen also unconsciously

which is

why individuals may not be aware of how a particular inference was made by their cognition. In
particular, they may not be aware what factors impacted their decision-making, and what subtle
influence may have been exercised over them, as they allegedly conducted an independent
cognitive reasoning. Moreover, the information for this reasoning may even be improperly stored
by the mind as the social elements responsible for the memorization could vary, as well as the
quality and the reliability of the memories themselves. Consequently, individuals may not even
have a perception about the threats that actors pose to their cognition and independent decisionmaking. Regardless, the way human cognition operates demonstrates a certain predictability that
is not a threat by itself but only if manipulated purposefully in a direction to benefit a certain
political entity. To trace these predictable mechanisms of information-processing, decisionmaking and behavior, first, I outline the concept of cognition and explain the elements that
constitute it. Then I add the role of the social environment in which human cognition is operating
and its importance for the manner in which people use, produce and exchange information
through verbal and non-verbal cues. In the end of this chapter, I explain how these psychological
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experiences shape the world of politics in which the individual is both influencing the system,
and an actor being influenced by it.

What is cognition and how does it work?
The psychological literature does not offer a unanimous, commonly accepted definition
for cognition. However, scholars unite around what should be understood by this term. George 43
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some information to the brain through specific mechanisms. Many psychologists argue that the
perception of information could be occurring in both conscious and unconscious state, as the
latter is also referred to as a beha i ali ic

a

f
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, which excludes

introspection as a means of inquiring about how cognitive processes work. Behavioralism is
especially valuable in scientific research since humans are not capable of accounting for every
step of the cognitive processes taking place in the brain, why they occur, how and what
influences them45. In a slightly different definition about cognition, Drever46 describes it as a
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rather than on a logical chain of mental steps. As opposed to perception, deception would
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represent an effort to stimulate the creation of a false perception about facts or events in an
individual47. It could be involuntary but also purposeful.
In the following paragraphs, I will break down the study of cognition into different
components that either compound it or have some function that is essential to cognition. The first
element that is central to the study of cognition is the mind. In this section, it will be viewed not
that much in the context of neuro-psychology or philosophy but rather in a psychological context
that supplements some aspects of the political science focus of this work. The mind characterized
a a
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perceive information, and to guide their behavior based on this information. Nowadays, with the
rapid development in the Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies, the mind and its complexity
are discussed in two different types of systems: the traditional cognitive system of humans and
animals (living organisms), and the cognitive apparatuses of AI creations. Garnham writes about
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. The learning process of machines and its continuous enhancement is already a fact in

2019 and not a possibility as it used to be a few decades ago, with all of the upsides and
downsides that this progress entails. While not excluding AI from the study of cognition, the
following sections focus on the individual c g i i

and its elements.

The mind serves as the operator for cognitive processes thanks to its ability to store
information and create memories and a logical chain of steps. This is accomplished through
processing the perceived through the senses information (thinking), then sending signals to other
parts of the body in order to trigger a certain action or abstain from such and to create
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associations between events and notions thus stimulating a learning process and creativity. Three
other factors that also contribute to the functioning of the mind and are included in this section of
the chapter are also the emotions, the feelings, and the language.
Memory. The memory acts like an archive that ensures the conscious revival of old
events, or at least the ones perceived as such by the brain50. A tremendous amount of the
information that is stored and processed by the memory serves to guide human behavior.
However, the memories that represent the information stored in the brain could be conscious and
unconscious as they all create what is called knowledge but in the first case, it will be labeled as
explicit and in the second as implicit knowledge. Regardless of this theoretical division, both
e

f mem

ede e mi e

e beha i . It is important to be noted that memories are not

an accurate and full reflection of the reality but are selective. That said, human behavior is driven
by selective memories that could be both conscious or unconscious. Searching for the
information that these memories represent takes very little time but still longer than it takes a
computer, for instance51. Scientists attempted to model the human memory, and one of the first
efforts in this direction was called the modal model

a representation that accounts for two

departments in the memory. The first one is the short-term memory and the second
term memory. When new information enters the cog i i e b a ch f he h ma

the long-

b d ,i i

immediately stored in the short-term department, and if it is considered that it has to be
memorized for longer periods of time, then the information is transferred to the long-term
memory section. Because human memories are selective and everyday life requires a significant
amount of information in order to ensure proper decision-making, cognitive science considers
the importance of some supplemental materials. Notes, diaries and other written and non-visual
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reality, as the individual sees it, serve as an external memory storage.
Atkinson and Shiffrin52 add one more department to the memory map that other scholars
use, called a sensory register. This department contains short-lived memories that store
information collected through sensory organs

for instance, scholars identify the iconic store of

the human memory that represents the capabilities for recalling a written content. Another part of
the sensory store is the echoic store that preserves for a short amount of time memories about
speech53.
Another distinction of the memory types is the one that focuses on the nature of the
memories created 54. Based on this, the memory could be episodic and semantic. The first kind
represents memories that are related to the recipient of the information and have a distinctly
autobiographical character. The semantic memory, on the other hand, contains information about
the world that is not so closely pertaining to the recipient. This discrepancy also serves as an
answer to the question of why some memories are brighter than others. Wagenaar 55 emphasizes
that it is the emotional element in both kinds of memories that makes them so durable over time.
Eysenck and Keane56 label these memorie a

elf- efe e ce mem ie a d fla hb lb

memories. While both carry some symbolic value to the owner of the memories, the selfreference memories are important for the individual because they store information directly
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pertaining to them. Contrary to this, the flashbulb memories embody information about publicly
relevant events with a significant value to society in general.
Emotions. The em i
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to changes in the environment or within the organism. In other words, they represent coping
mechanisms for survival. A vital part in these coping mechanisms are the emotions that together
with the feelings have a crucial role for reasoning and decision-making. The nature of these
responses to the changing environment could be mental or entirely physical. While there are
cultural reasons that could affect the occurrence of emotions, they still could be defined as
chemical a d e al e
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. The emotions that trigger a certain reaction after signals

were sent to the brain could be divided into three main groups: primary, secondary and
backg

d em i

58.

The primary emotions are an immediate result of an existing

phenomenon, the secondary emotions (guilt, pride, embarrassment), also called social are
chemical and neural reactions that occur after a primary emotion has already taken place. Some
authors attribute the existence of secondary emotions to representatives of in-groups as opposed
to lack of such when it comes to individuals from an out-group59. As for the background
emotions (e.g., love, wellbeing, affection, etc.), it could be said that they are much less
researched and difficult to be described as he
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very subtle way61. The relationship between emotions and cognition could be mapped in three
consecutive steps. First, an evaluation of the change in the environment or within the organism,
second, adjusting the body to respond to these changes, and third, the occurrence of a feeling62.
Feeling. As a part of the emotions, feelings are described in the literature as a perceived
state of the body and the mind at a time at which the brain is processing certain thoughts. A
logical question following the definition of feelings would be how they differ from emotions,
despite their obvious similarities. Feelings are a component of emotions whose ultimate goal is
delivering a report about the state of the body and the mind to the brain. The emotions, on the
other hand, are a preliminary step to the feeling making it possible by sending signals to the brain
in an effort the latter to adjust the body according to changes in the environment and within the
organism. In other words, emotions could be conceptualized as a process that captures external
elements and internalizes them, while feelings are an entirely internal process that provides
information about the body and the mind to another organ - the brain.
Thinking. As evident from the definition provided previously, cognition has a lot to do
with thinking. The latter, according to some researchers63, is built on a perceptual mechanism,
called categorizing behavior that: 1) is intended to simplify the multitude of conditions in the
surrounding environment, 2) enhances processes of identification, 3) sends signals to the brain
for a required action, 4) shortens the learning process, and 5) captures the common pattern
betwee diffe e
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cognition to make generalizations possible in a quick, easy way in order to ensure efficiency.
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Other psychologists call these generalizations mental models that reflect on perceptions about the
world while at the same time they allow for alterations following the ever-changing
circumstances so that they help the brain with problem-solving64.
Thinking as an information handling process is indeed mostly intended for problemsolving which is best accomplished through concepts. They incorporate a specific set of common
elements across material objects or notions. Creating this mental pool called concepts helps the
brain and the body to react to the same phenomena similarly since they fall into one perceptual
group. Davidson65 claims that it is a matter of assessment and beliefs that help the individual
classify objects and other non-material phenomena into concepts. These two mental processes
could be shaped by physical experiences but also by cultural norms and beliefs. An essential part
of the thinking

the reasoning mechanism - is an object of study by researchers as they try to

find what elements could be an obstacle to this activity. Garnham66 lists three situations in which
the construction of mental models could be obscured. In the first case, thinking is related to a
desired abstract mapping of a phenomenon and the concepts that the cognition uses are built on
specific circumstances rather than on general. In the second case, the mental-modeling is related
to instances in which memories stored in the long-term cognitive branch are needed, and some of
them cannot be retrieved or there are no experiences that created them. Thus the necessary
information from the memory is missing. The last problem that can occur when using mental
models for reasoning is that people tend to simplify the models and use one single model rather
than multiple models that could embed applicable information for the decision-making.
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Another aspect of thinking refers to emotions and how they alter the perception of
information. The network theory67 suggests that when an individual is under the influence of a
particular type of emotion, positive or negative, they are more likely to trigger thoughts of the
same nuance. For instance, positive attitude brings associations of other happy events, negative
attitude

of negative events. In addition to this, while there is no categorical proof from studies

confirming the tendency of the negative memory bias in individuals who suffer from depression
and/or anxiety, scholars predominantly support the notion that in according to this bias,
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Series of studies by Eysenck and his colleagues69 70 71 confirmed the existence of

an interpretive bias, stating that people with anxiety are more likely to perceive some signals of
unclear nature as threatening.
An intriguing question is also how people problem-solve and make judgments when they
do not have enough information. A classical study by Tversky and Kahneman 72 exploring
heuristics and biases poses three factors influencing decision-making processes. First, the
decision-maker assigns the object a place in a particular group that will help classifying it and
simultaneously transfer other characteristics from the group to the object. Second, the number of
scenarios and situations to which the decision-maker can relate determines the frequency or
likelihood of an imagined event happening. Third, the starting point from which predictions are
made is also of importance during decision-making. Complementary to these findings are the
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ones refuting the expected utility theory and substituting it with one called prospect theory73.
According to it, people seek to avoid risks when the choice involves guaranteed gains and take
risks when one of the choices likely involves certain losses. In addition, Kahneman and Tversky
outline that it matters greatly how the choice is presented to the social perceivers because their
final decisions, based on gains and losses, may be predetermined by how the question is asked.
Creativity. Another question that deserves attention when discussing thinking is the one
about creativity. Mainly, the issue that I want to address in this section is what is creative
thinking, and to what extent it follows the same rules that are valid for thinking in general.
Scholars overall agree on the fact that creative thinking does not differ substantially from the
conventional thinking that constructs mental models and utilizes them in decision-making. When
it comes to a precise definition of creative thinking, however, such is lacking in the scholarship
on cognition. Responsible for this is the complex idea of creative thinking that will largely
depend on specific circumstances that will distinguish a regular idea from a creative one. Once
the creative idea becomes part of the mental model, future solutions of problems will become
less creative since the creative idea has entered a social realm of realistic and applicable
concepts. This is possible thanks to existing information that could have been previously
considered inapplicable to the problem at hand that was later validated by the creation of a new,
adjusted mental model74. Other scholars categorize creative thinking as a result of cognitive
processes of association and analogy-making75, as the latter c

73

i

e

ma

i g f he

Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Econometrica 47,
no. 2 (1979).
74
Garnham, The Mind in Action: A Personal View of Cognitive Science.
75
Margaret A. Boden, "Précis of the creative mind: Myths and mechanisms," Behavioral and brain sciences 17, no.
3 (1994).

36
conceptual structure of one set of ideas (called a base domain) into another set of ideas (called a
a ge d mai )

76.

Learning. One part of e

le cognitive functions is developed already when a baby is

born, but the vast majority of their cognitive skills humans acquire later through learning. A very
long and vivid debate about the nature of the learning process is one of the core topics in
psychology and philosophy, whose beginning dates back to works by René Descartes and
Immanuel Kant and still continues in the present. The debate offers two opposing
conceptualizations of how people learn. Rationalists maintain that learning is occurring not
through experience but rather through mechanisms that are already in existence in the human
body. Contrary to this view is the one held by empiricists who claim that the learning process is
made possible by experiences that help the brain construct links (called associations) between the
obtained through senses information, grouped into concepts. The repetition of experiences
involving similar circumstances leads to a more manageable process of categorizing information
and building faster both cognitive concepts and the associations between them 77. Both schools of
thought are encountering series of questions that their theory is not capable of addressing and to
this day, neither perspective could be considered more prevalent in the field.
While sharing some similarities, it is important to distinguish between knowledge and
learning, as the latter represents a process and the former

the result of this process. As for how

thinking is different than learning they relate to each other in the following way. In order
learning to take place, thinking has to be present first. However, with the speed with which
human cognition is working, a lot of these processes and the results from them would seem
almost simultaneously occurring.
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Language. One definiti
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a store of specialized information in long-term memory
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information specifically about

This does not mean, however, that non-language-specific knowledge is not used in

utilizing the language skills. A controversial issue in cognitive science that has not yet been
answered is the one asking the question about the extent of language-specific information stored
in the brain and at what point does it mix with non-language-specific information. An insight
with which both psychologists and linguists agree is that languages are means of exchanging
information between individuals that presupposes two conditions. The first one is that the person
conveying information can efficiently express their thought in verbal or written form. The second
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hat is being conveyed to

where words are being searched. An area, regarding the

question of language, in which scholars tend to disagree with each other is if the language is used
independently to convey certain information to the recipient or the message is inevitably
influenced by some linguistic specificities.
Rationality. The concept of rationality is discussed in this essay not only because it has a
significant meaning for the study of cognition in psychology and thus is a topic of a major
debate, but furthermore, rationality is a building block in political science, economics, modeling
and simulation, and other fields. Every science defines rationality slightly different as the goals
that these sciences pursue are not the same, though they are sometimes similar. For the purposes
of this work, I will focus first on its meaning for the study of cognition and will transition to the
implications that psychology provides for the same topic but situated in a political science
context.
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The foundations of rationality in psychology are laid by the Classical Model that states
that rationality is present when desires and beliefs drive actions. These two elements constitute
reasons for controlled by desires actions 80. More recent works dedicated to this problem do not
see desire and belief as the only factors that engender a certain behavior. Instead, they propose a
desire-independent model based on judgment rather than on desires and beliefs 81 82 83. Other
scholars, such as Harvey Siegel84 connect both the assumptions of the Classical Model in terms
of desires and beliefs to judgment.
The same debate about rationality in the field of political science has slightly different
dimensions than the one in psychology. The Utility Maximization Model that political science
borrows from economics underlines the importance of achieving results that will benefit the
individual the most and thus the behavior is oriented toward achieving these goals. Very
frequently in discussions about foreign policy, political rivals whose goals are different than the
ones of the discussants are labeled as irrational simply because of a misunderstanding of their
goals, desires and beliefs and often the ethnocentric thinking of the decision-makers 85. For
instance, Simon86 a g e ha e e
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thinking more or less rational. Furthermore, he claims that the rationality of the behavior should
be assessed based on the connection between desires, beliefs, judgment, cultural norms and the
goal that is intended, because acce
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thinking will only consider the amount of information that they have available. This and other
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reasons make Simon87 conclude that an applicable simplified model of costs-and-benefits
deliberations relevant in a large number of cases would be inevitably flawed without the
necessary empirical research that accounts for all the elements that are present in a certain
cognitive process for decision-making. Recent innovations in neuroscience suggest that instead
of the rationality-bound theories that political scientists use to explain political behavior it is also
the emotions that carry significant meaning for the decision-making and actions, especially risktaking88.
Action. It is also important to explore the relationship between cognitive functions and
actions in their two forms: physical actions and actions that are entirely verbal in nature. For both
types, it is valid that the brain has to send some signals to the muscles in order to perform an
action, even if only verbal. Learning a physical skill such as a particular activity differs from
cognitive tasks as memorizing, for instance. While they both have a particular action as a goal,
they require different kind of knowledge to execute the function. The first kind of knowledge
that is needed in order for an individual to acquire physical skills and perform physical actions is
called procedural knowledge, and the second type

declarative knowledge89. An interesting

question in the field of cognitive science is whether the procedural knowledge helps the
individual to execute specific tasks better with repetition of these acts, having in mind the results
from previous attempts. Scholars claim that while it is possible, this is not necessarily a rule
because people cannot control physical functions entirely. At the same time, repetitive
performance could help the individual become better but thanks to unconscious processes that
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To define the link between actions and cognition,

another component also should be taken into consideration - how the cognition orders actions.
Mental reasons that people have to make verbal or physical acts should be distinguished from the
causes of these actions. While they could match in ideal cases, reasons for actions and causes of
actions could be quite different in practice. Sometimes, when actions are undertaken without a
logical explanation, it is likely that the individual who committed the act tries to reconstruct the
event that happened and to rationalize their actions so that they correspond with the event 91.

Social cognition
In the current section, I will explain how the main elements from the human cognition are
affected when another component is considered

the social one. No cognition exists in a

vacuum. It is always influenced by the interaction between people, or the thinking of other
individuals. It has an important meaning for politics mainly regarding the construction of
identity, social networks, exchange of information (and disinformation), and the perception of
social events and facts delivered to the recipient by a secondary source. Since these factors are
important to politics, they frequently become targets of actors intending to score political gains
by exploiting feelings of fear, anger, empathy, pain, trauma, shame, and habits.
The scientific field studying the social context of cognition is called social psychology.
While c g i i
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wired and what processes determine attitudes and behaviors, social cognition, a branch from
social psychology, focuses on social conventions, rules and norms as people are social creatures
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influenced by the environment in which they live 92. The social component plays an important
role in understanding attitudes and behaviors and, though separate from the study of cognition it
is nevertheless intertwined with it. Thus, psychologists label the research dedicated on cognitive
processes influenced by social factors as social cognition, a category interested in h
make e e f
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acquisition, representation, and retrieval of person information, as well as the relationship of
these processes to judgments made by the e cei e . Both explanations of the term incorporate
many different categories including the study of social interactions, perception, and processing of
information, stereotyping, leadership and other branches. For the purposes of this chapter, I will
focus only on 1) attribution; 2) control and behavior; and 3) social judgments and stereotypes.
Attribution. A central element in the field of social cognition is how the recipient of
information forms causal relationships between the information that was presented to them and
different phenomena from social life. This research question gave birth to the attribution theory.
The latter seeks to explain what factors contribute to a chain of logical thinking that connects a
certain event in the social environment to its cause. Constructing inferences about social events
and attributes of other people is possible through analyses that the recipient of information
creates, in order to make sense of the surrounding environment and to better adjust themselves to
it.
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Emotions, feelings, judgments, and perception to a large extent shape reactions in a social
setting. For instance, when emotions are concerned, a preliminary step to experiencing them is
arousal that should be accompanied by an acknowledgment (cognition) that categorizes it and
sends the necessary signals to the brain. However, as Bargh95 reminds, awareness of the stimulus
is different than the awareness of its influence. In this regard, a study by Schachter 96 concluded
that in order to adapt better to an upcoming phenomenon that brings negative emotions to a
person, one seeks the company of other people who also expect a stressful event in their life. The
explanation that Schachter gave was that people tend to affiliate with others experiencing similar
stressors to adjust to the event better by enriching the knowledge they have about it so that they
can form appropriate reactions to it. A further study by Schachter and Singer 97 highlighted
another finding: when lacking information about the cause of the arousal, people could attribute
it to different factors as that could result in a positive or negative mood depending on interaction
with a person in a positive or in a negative mood, respectively. The test of Schach e
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emotional lability has its limits, however. Scientists tried over time to determine if a lack of
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exposure to social influences of different kind. For instance, Maslach98, and Marshall and
Zimbardo99 emphasize that the lack of information about arousal leads to a negative mood rather
than to a positive one. Regardless of the variations in the exact results of the study of this theory,
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it could be inferred that social influence has a vital role in a state of no information about
phenomena that evoke arousal in the recipient. Furthermore, without social influence providing
attribution cues for the recipient of this information, as Maslach and Marshal and Zimbardo
conclude, it is more likely that the lack of information will entail anxiety and frustration.
While some studies about attribution focus on an ideal situation where people use the
normative cognitive process that interprets social cues logically and unbiasedly, other studies
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process may be disrupted due to disabilities or individual factors. An example that illustrates the
second type is what is known in the social psychology as the fundamental attribution error,
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frequently as objective and not influenced by situational norms and conditions but instead as a
stable pattern of qualities and personality traits. In addition to these findings, studies exploring
defensive attributions emphasize that observers ascribe much higher responsibility to people
whose behavior caused incidents of substantial significance than to those whose behavior
inflicted less significant consequences101 102 103. While this finding has not remained
unchallenged, Shaver104 105 accepts that individual and situational characteristics matter a lot and
can cause variations across studies. However, he accentuates on the fact that the greater the
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similarity between the observer and the perpetrator and the situational factors, the higher the
likelihood of the observer becoming defensive to the behavior of the perpetrator.
Another bias that can distort a normative inference-making process pertains to the
consensus information

the opinions and beliefs of other people. The social perceiver tends to

conceptualize the consensus information not as what other people actually think but what the
perceiver considers to be the case. By doing so, the social perceiver attributes a large number of
their own values and beliefs to others thus thinking that the consensus information is much more
similar to the social perceiver

ie

106

- a phenomenon also known as the false consensus

effect107. Hence, social perceivers tend to accept that others share their beliefs even if they do not
know if this is not necessarily the case108. The self-serving bias, on the other hand, makes the
social perceiver more likely to attribute success, as an outcome, to their own behavior rather than
to acknowledge responsibility in cases of failure. The explanation could refer to the ego-boosting
tendency of people in addition to cognitive mechanisms that perceive expected outcome as a
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which people assume responsibility for a failure, people tend to attribute it to conditions that they
can control in further attempts 109. The self-ce e ed bia , i he e
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explains why individuals are more likely to assume responsibility for positive and negative
outcomes of a collective work. First, human cognition has the ability to remember much more
information pertaining to
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possibility that one has done more amount of work, regardless of the outcome, could be quite
flattering for the self-esteem.
Control and behavior. A central function of the social cognition is constructing causality,
as it was highlighted previously. In order for this process to happen, the social perceiver has to
assume that the observed behavior is a product of controlled mental and physical activity 110.
Furthermore, if the social perceiver is not under the impression that they have control over some
situation, they will be unlikely to attribute any outcome to their own behavior. Instead, they will
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instance, claims that people have the need to believe in a just world where everything that
happens to individuals is deserved. This coping mechanism is developed to protect the cognition
from the stress resulting from the idea that unpleasant events happen to people who did not do
anything to provoke them. A very intriguing question in this regard is what happens with the
human cognition when there is a loss of control. In this case, loss of control means that the
individual previously had control over some circumstances that they have lost. The four major
coping mechanisms that human cognition uses to adapt to a situation, especially a threatening
one on an emotional or/and physical level, are related to the need to obtain more information, the
increased sensitivity to stress, the reactance, and the feelings of helplessness112. Usually, the first
stage after a loss of control by the social perceiver is namely the search for information so that
the individual forms an idea about the appropriate reaction to the event. Two of the most
common consequences in this scenario are the vulnerability that the perceiver experiences to
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social influence and the decreased amount of attention that the perceiver pays to offered
information and alternative solutions when a heightened level of stress is experienced 113 114.
A second consequence from loss of control that follows the lack of information is the
increased vulnerability to stress. An increased heart rate, loss of ability to concentrate, or other
adverse physiological conditions are also among the common symptoms in events that entail a
loss of control in the social perceiver who is exposed to stressors.
Reactance is another phenomenon following the loss of control or a restriction pertaining
to the options available to the social perceiver. It has an emotional and behavioral expression 115.
Emotionally, reactance is very similar to stress. Individuals suffer from increased adrenaline
levels which frequently results in antagonistic and hostile moods that illustrate the behavioral
expression of reactance. These behaviors can be followed by a pursuit to restore previous options
that were available to the social perceiver. If this attempt turns out to be unsuccessful, it is very
likely that the option that is no longer available becomes much more appealing than the options
that were left. In other words, what was taken away attracts the social perceiver to a much higher
level than what is achievable. Another possible behavioral opportunity for the social perceiver is
that they commit an act of protest so that the lost freedom of the individual is, at least partially,
regained.
Another component that gives its reflection on the social cognition when a loss of control
is experienced is the feeling of helplessness. The latter, contrary to reactance, causes anxiety
because of a lack of options available to the social perceiver. A consequence from the
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helplessness condition is that the individual may cease to make efforts in a direction to regain
control because they see the elements of the surrounding environment as impossible to be
managed. A study by Wortman and Brehm116 explored under what conditions reactance and
helplessness will occur, having in mind that they are not mutually exclusive, and they can both
be observed. They concluded that increased perceptions of control in a situation evokes reactance
and then feelings of helplessness while not so strong expectations of control will merely result in
helplessness.
Now that the consequences of loss of control were reviewed, I would like to highlight
what are some of the strategies for reducing the anxiety that the loss of control triggers. Probably
the most effective technique for behavior control is the perceived sense of control that the social
perceiver can construct117. It is especially useful when it occurs before the stressful event
manifests itself in reality118 119. Another stress-reducing strategy is cognitive control. It consists
either of reorientation of
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that may entail a loss of control or of adjusting how one thinks about the event. These strategies
have been proven successful for situations before, during and after situations connected to a loss
of control120 121 122. A third strategy is decision control. This technique suggests that the social
perceiver awaiting a stressful event should make some decisions about it (its length, duration,
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and/or conditions) so that some of the control is regained and potential adverse outcomes of the
event are seen as not so detrimental once a certain choice is made 123. Naturally, the sense of
control that the individual regains could be illusory, but this does not affect the ultimate quality
of the decision control strategy even if the sense of control was not real. Information control, as
obtaining more information about the exact dimensions of the future stressor bolsters the sense of
control in the recipient of the information. In particular, information about how the event will
affect the social perceiver serves as a mechanism to adjust both the body and the cognition to
consequences from the event. Research shows convincing support that this type of technique
alleviates stress caused by upcoming negative events 124. However, it should be kept in mind that
according to the concept of premature cognitive commitment 125, it is difficult for a recipient of
information to use it for different purposes once it was presented to them and thus stored in the
h ma

b ai

i h a a ic la g al.

Social judgments and stereotypes. When it comes to social judgments, while the process
of attribution and causality generally looks the same for all cognitively developed individuals
who reached a mature age, it can still vary across people. This could be due to personal
characteristics, different values they hold and belonging to a particular culture that reflects on the
way social judgments are made 126. In addition, social perceivers select information for the social
judgment in various ways. It is typical that the individual focuses on a certain amount of
information about other people and events thus excluding other types of information that pertain
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to the social perception. The focus of the information selected by the recipient should help them
explain behaviors and occurrences. A study by Dornbusch, Hastorf, Richardson, Muzzy, and
Vreeland127 f
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than the one of the perceived individual. The perceiver seeks to identify a unique set of
categories for which they search in a person. Wegner 128 labels these groups of information as
ge e al a ib e , hile

ecific a ib e , he defines, as a particular type of information

that carries a certain meaning to a specific person. In addition to individual characteristics,
another factor that influences the social judgment involves situational elements. The latter could
not only determine the type of information that is collected but also its amount. For instance, a
research project conducted by Vallacher 129 highlighted that self-consciousness about being
observed makes the observer more likely to use categorical judgments. Contrary to this,
observers who were not self-conscious about being observed, demonstrated a wider range of
judgments on the scale between the two categorical judgments made by the other group of
participants in the experiment who were self-conscious. On a more general level, these findings
point to the following conclusion: the more attention is directed to the social perceiver, of which
they are aware, the more limited the collection of information about the social setting becomes.
Complementary to this contribution is the one that was reached through a series of
experiments: in making judgments, social perceivers tend to assign much more importance on
negative rather than on positive impressions130. Thus, in building an impression about a person, it
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is the negative characteristics that take prevalence over the positive ones and shape the overall
impression. Two explanations that try to explain this phenomenon are present in the literature:
the figure-ground and vigilance explanation131. According to the first one, people are adjusted to
see positive things in life and thus are much more impressed when something negative occurs.
The second explanation accentuates on themes such as jeopardy and survival132. This theory
seeks to explain why people are more impressed by negative rather than by positive
characteristics of the social environment through the vigilance that is required of humans in order
to ensure preservation and wellbeing.
When it comes to making social judgments the amount and the kind of information that
the social perceiver obtains is essential. A logical question is how the information that is
necessary for judgments selected. People distinguish between information that is pertaining to
the decision-making process and such that is irrelevant. In order to do so, they assess the nature
of the information presented to them as either rewarding or punishing, as both kinds lead to the
relevance of the information for its recipient. Through the first impression, the social perceiver
has either a rewarding, pleasant experience or a negative and unpleasant one, based on which
they make further judgments. One of the most central elements of the impression management is
physical attractiveness, as it is highly related to positive qualities such as being smart and kind.
Another element that contributes a lot to forming impressions is someo e

imila i

dissimilarity to the person making the judgment. The more similar the person is to the perceiver,
the more positive the impression, and vice versa. This pattern inadvertently leads to a subjective
evaluation that equals dissimilarity to abnormality. Moreover, there is another component that
adds details to these dynamics:
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Quite often, our attitudes are based on ambiguous or conflicting evidence. On almost
a i e, he e i a
l
f fac
i g c flic i g
i i . Ambig i y and
uncertainty, however, are psychologically uncomfortable; the individual desires unequivocal
e ide ce ega di g he c ec e
alidi
f hi
i i . Beca e he alidi
f e
opinions often cannot be unequivocally assessed with objective evidence, the individual must
judge the correctness of his attitudes by comparing them with the attitudes of others. The
e ide ce ega di g e a i de , i
he
d , i la gel
cial. He ce a
e h e e e
an opinion contrary to that of the individual is in effect providing him with contradictory
evidence. People with dissimilar attitudes thus pose a threat to the validity of our thoughts and
feelings 133.
Very commonly identified as a product of negative prejudices, stereotypes could be
bearing both type of connotations

positive and negative. Prejudices e e e

ha ed belief

about person attributes, usually personality traits, but often also behaviours, of a group of
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judgement such as rendering these individuals interchangeable with other members of the
ca eg

135.

Stereotypes serve as a set of norms within a particular group. The need for

stereotypes in the social cognition lies in the necessity for categorizing phenomena in everyday
life for the purposes of providing simplicity and easier decision-making. As a consequence,
people instinctively look to identify themselves within a social formation after which they seek
information about the valid norms within this group and apply these norms to their own
behavior136 137. The social perceiver feels a need to share the identity of the group with which
they would like to associate and therefore embraces the beliefs and norms of the group itself (the
in-group) and about proper reactions regarding out-groups as well. This process is described by
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Hogg and Abrams 138 as an important example of social influence exercised from the group to the
individual who desires to be a member.
The aforementioned social approval is particularly impactful since researchers recognize
the large

le f he

cial e cei e
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cial a

al139. A question that immediately

surfaces when discussing social influence is the one pertaining to leadership. In a group that
consists of equals, there is always someone who stands out with their unique leadership abilities.
Interestingly, in a series of studies conducted by Mann140 it was the intelligence of the leaders
who constituted them as such among other group members in addition to the determination of the
leader to be perceived as such. Other scholars prefer to focus, however, on more situational
characteristics of leader-selection. Leavitt141 found, for instance, that in network groups
established for executing a particular task, the persons who naturally stood out as leaders were
the ones who had essential functions on the chain of the communication process. In order to
connect the findings from different studies, two central characteristics of leaders emerge 142. First,
the leader in a group setting will be the person who is capable of providing most rewards for the
majority of the group members thus ensuring satisfaction while keeping the dissatisfaction of
other group members to a minimum. It should be noted here that the more deprived the group
members are from particular goods, the more the figure of the leader capable of delivering the
goods becomes desired by the deprived. Simultaneously, a leader in a group will most likely
become a person who benefits from holding a position of power. The leade
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overall role are considered crucial for the survival of the group members. An example of this
dimension is the role of the physician (healers in some cultures) as his function is to ensure
preservation and wellbeing of the group 143. Regardless of these general trends, diverse situational
factors could lead to different types of people and qualities to stand out in terms of leadership.
The members of a particular social group can have different necessities at a given time which
calls for different qualities that they may seek in a leader. This assumption requires a less
parsimonious approach in social psychology that could decrease the value of its applicability. To
compensate for this, Hollander 144 145 proposed a useful concept according to which when the
leader accumulates enough benefits for the group members over time, they may deviate to some
extent from this pattern without to risk losing their leadership position. In spite of this, in the
long-run, the leader is still obligated to provide benefits for the group due to their role, otherwise,
their influence over the group will reduce gradually.
When discussing leaders and social judgments mechanisms, one impressive phenomenon
in social psychology remains to a large extent undisputed over the years

the powerful influence

that the obedience to authority produces. In the seminal series of experiments by Stanley
Milgram146, the latter found that positions of authority and positions implying power are capable
of exercising a tremendous amount of control over the behavior of people perceiving themselves
as inferior in a social situation. In his experiments, the behavior that was required of the
participants was in complete opposition to their views, but still, they obeyed the authority and
strictly followed the instructions given to them

to allegedly inflict harm to another human

being. This study confirmed the relationship between individuals seen as leaders, being in

143

Ibid.
Edwin Paul Hollander, "Conformity, status, and idiosyncrasy credit," Psychological Review 65, no. 2 (1958).
145
Leaders, groups, and influence (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1964).
146
Stanley Milgram, Obedience to authority an experimental view, 1st ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1974).
144

54
positions of power, and followers, perceiving themselves as obeying norms, rules, and authority.
The controversy surrounding the experiments also deserves some attention so that another
important psychological phenomenon is also highlighted. The study resulted in emotional
reactions and potential trauma that the participants suffered during the experiments and after
them. The reason for this was that their moral perspectives and values were challenged by the
need
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feels obligated to do is also known as cognitive dissonance. It illustrates the difference between
attitudes, understood as judgment patterns, and behaviors, as expressions and extensions to these
judgments. When attitudes and behaviors do not overlap and are in conflict, then cognitive
dissonance occurs. Two works, by Festinger alone 147 and in collaboration with Carlsmith148
began exploring the question of how people overcome this cognitive dissonance. They concluded
that people convince themselves in the rightfulness of their actions (behaviors) through altering
their attitudes (internal evaluating processes) so that they avoid the discomfort of having
conflicting thoughts. I Milg am e

e ime , hi

a achie ed h

gh he fi m belief ha he

participants were doing what they were ordered to do by the authority, rather than what they
decided to do themselves.
Another central question in studying leadership behavior concerns the possible ways in
which members of the group get dissatisfied by the status quo 149. First, the need for novelty in a
certain relationship that is constructed by continuously repeating dynamics. In other words,
human beings need to explore and discover thus inviting boredom when these activities are not
present in their life. This does not mean, however, that the group does not need consistency. On

147

Leon Festinger, A theory of cognitive dissonance, vol. 2 (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962).
Leon Festinger and James M. Carlsmith, "Cognitive consequences of forced compliance," Journal of Abnormal
and Social Psychology 58, no. 2 (1959).
149
Gergen, The psychology of behavior exchange.
148

55
the contrary, both tendencies seem to coexist even though the exact extent to which one desires
changes in the environment and wants consistency cannot be accurately measured. Second, nonconformity to the existing norms could lead to complete expulsion of the individual from the
group which is not so problematic in small groups as it is in large groups. Third, the unequal
distribution of goods between members of the groups and leaders, assigned by their social roles.
After some time, these inequalities become commonly accepted and blend into the overall
pattern of the established relationships within the group. Fourth, when certain norms within a
community become stable and fixed, the members will be likely to continue obeying these norms
even though the environment may be changing, as this could lead to social irrelevance of the
entire group.
David Campbell150 documents how the conditions of a changing environment,
conceptualized as a threat, could act as a catalyzer for consolidating and bolstering the identity of
a particular group. Paradoxically, from a social psychological perspective, the refusal to obey to
an altered set of social norms tha
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a marginalization of

the group, in case the environment requires a changed mindset that the members of the group are
not ready to embrace. A historical example of this tendency would be the emergence of the
railroad in the U.S. which some people at the time rejected as potentially being disruptive due to
the increased number of newcomers perceived as a threat. As a consequence, many locations
were left disconnected from the route of the railroad and thus became marginalized. Moreover,
members of a group may have a false perception about the changing surrounding environment
due to the tendency of people to connect with like-mi ded i di id al . Ne c mb
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once a relationship is established, the people in it begin to share the same attitudes. In addition,
the social networks of people consist not only of their closest friends but, instead, of a much
broader range of acquaintances sharing similar beliefs and values152.

The dual meaning of perception, emotions and actions in politics
One of the most vivid debates in the field of international studies has always been the
place of the individual in the system. Some researchers, primarily realist thinkers, consider that
they are merely a pawn in a grand chess game governed by the powers influencing the structure,
while other scholars (constructivists, liberalists to some extent, and critical thinkers) maintain
that they are more than a pawn and possess the strength to change the system and alleviate the
effects of anarchy. Consequently, since the realist paradigms about the IR-world exclude to a
large extent the influence of the individual as an agent, their role has not been studied much.
Alexander Wendt claims that in most social scientific research there are two relationships
between agent and structure that are essential and make them both interdependent: 1) h ma
beings and their organizations are purposeful actors whose actions help reproduce or transform
the society in which they live; and 2) society is made up of social relationships, which structure
the interactions between these purposeful acto

153.

Interestingly, even rational choice theorists

who focus on the individual and their preferences assume that there is a cost-benefits analysis
that is conducted every time a decision has to be made by an individual. Psychological theories
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disagree with this type of modeling, as it was argued earlier. As the role of the individual
becomes more and more important in a political environment where beliefs, norms, emotions,
and behaviors can provoke regime overthrows, significant changes in the political apparatus and
in the institutions themselves, how we study individuals in political science is a topic that enjoys
a revived scholarly interest in the post-Cold War era. Jervis argues that in this political climate
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the focus of researchers should again be placed on beliefs,
values, and biases that trigger reactions, attitudes and behaviors in individuals 154. Much of this
new wave of political psychology research on individuals was dedicated to leadership, leadership
styles, personality traits and disorders 155 156 157 158, and the literature is voluminous. While it is
evident ha d a i g i fe e ce ab

li ic ba ed

e

ch l gical cha acteristics is

understandably difficult, these scholars prove that it is not impossible. A much more complex
research question would be to draw political conclusions based on the individual behaviors,
feelings and emotions of many people that do not qualify for the category of group thinking
because they are relatively independent in their decision-making process. It is true that
individuals differ greatly, but as it was outlined previously in the chapter, there are some general
trends that are consistent and can allow for some generalizations. For instance, the field of
marketing is quite successfully using psychology for the purposes of the discipline. Therefore, in
this study, I will attempt to apply these psychological tools to situations that include groups of
people that take decisions relatively independently from each other. I say relatively
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independently because if individuals are part of the same society, there are some trends (norms
and values) that could be influencing their decisions the same way even if the individuals do not
know each other and are not in any way in communication with each other.
That said it is important to analyze now how the same type of psychological phenomena
can play a dual role in the study of politics, how the individual can contribute to changing the
system with their behavior, and how at the same time the individuals are part of a system that
controls the maintenance of the status-quo element in their behavior.
First, I will briefly discuss the first scenario or how the system affects the individual.
Structural realists argue that the system that is inevitably producing mistrust and uncertainty
affects the units in this system (the states) by making them willing to cheat, and not to comply
and cooperate with other units because of the anarchy. On the other hand, states consist of
individuals that, according to some classical realists 159 160 161, possess the same characteristics as
the states

the inclination to maximize benefits at the expense of moral principles, egotistic

nature, seeking power. At the same time, the system has to govern the individuals and exercise
some power over them. Here comes the notion of authority and its expressions in society. One
crucial way that authorities can use to control individuals is through depicting the contours of
their social environment. Leaving aside merely economic control that authorities have, in the
field of IR, other types of control include securitizing areas of public life and altering the
otherwise malleable identities of people. I use the word malleable mainly because no matter how
strong a particular identity of a group is, it is still vulnerable to mostly negative connotations that
power structures can ascribe to it. I
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arguably represent an important link between the discursively constructed identities of subjects,
on the one hand, and the power exerted h
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163.
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What makes the power of speech and non-verbal acts particularly important

is that it is concealed so well that in most cases its influence is not even recognizable for the
recipient of the information.
As for the second type of control that the system has over the individual, securitization is
another prerogative that power structures have. Thinkers from the Copenhagen School consider
that the way to securitize an issue is for the authorities to assign a place to a problem in the realm
of extreme threats that require some extraordinary political measures that can find expression in
different domains (military, economic, societal and environmental) 164. As noted in this section,
emotions such as fear, joy, grief, passion, hate, shame, pride, anger, sorrow can contribute both
to the securitization of some issues and to the formation and the cha gi g f

e ide i . What

is fascinating about these emotional states is that they are an inherent mechanism for every
individual, and through them, the system affects its human parts through the elites conveying
verbal and non-verbal information that will evoke these emotions in the recipients.
Simultaneously, this cognitive apparatus of individuals could also be an engine for a change in
the system through the opposite process

the individuals reacting to the power structures

because of decision-making influenced by emotions. Examples in this regard are not lacking in
the history
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forgotten, however, that human emotions can also be skillfully used by politicians to achieve or
try to achieve the desired outcome with political consequences by persuading social perceivers
through presenting to them emotion-inducing information. Consequently, a change in the system
can still be achieved by individuals but purposefully manipulated by third parties, a theme that is
central in this work. The field of political science and IR pose an emphasis on emotions when it
comes to outcomes with political significance. The reason for this is that not only emotions can
contribute to decompose the complex process of decision-making, but some scholars 165 166 argue
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behavior.
The literature focusing on this question, as mentioned previously, mostly belongs to the
field of American Politics. It concerns the relationship between emotion and voting, and political
behavior, and democratic processes169. Based on the contributions made in this area,
McDermott170 proposes ten pillars that have significant implications about the relationship that
emotions have with politics. First, emotions trigger a certain reaction regarding an event that
either occurred or existed i

he i di id al imagi a i

in some form. Second, a i di id al

emotions serve as a compass to the judgments made about the expected utility in decision-
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making. Third, emotions experienced by the social perceiver can influence a perceived likelihood
of positive or negative outcomes. Fourth, certain emotions can make the individual more
receptive to some kinds of information, which they will not be otherwise willing to consider.
Fifth, mood as a collective state of the body and the mind has an important influence over
perception and processing of new information, recollecting old one, and making judgments.
Sixth, mood influences the recollection of past events and produce emotions that can affect the
creation of new memories. Seventh, different emotions can make the individual either more
inclined or more skeptical to undertake risks. Eight, forming emotions from non-verbal
information decreases the time necessary for decision-making, as opposed to forming emotions
based on verbal information. Ninth, while emotional cues make decision-making faster, extreme
emotions can lead to biased thinking. Tenth, emotions and intuition are also related, and the
former can shape the contours of the latter thus inviting a biased judgment.
Clausewitz171 underlines in his view about the political philosophy of war that the
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have is crucial. It is evident

from his definition that he sees people as inevitably driven by emotions. The discussion of the
relationship between emotions and politics is particularly importance because, as Neta Crawford
a , i stitutionalization links the pri a e a d i di id al
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Below, I will provide an overview of the most influential emotions that authors document in the
study of politics.
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Fear is among the emotions with the most notable impact on human cognition regarding
decision-making. When a particular stimulus is perceived as a threat, a series of biochemical
reactions are triggered that make the perceiver more alert and attentive to the social situation.
The increased production of certain hormones, such as adrenaline and cortisol, for instance, helps
the brain distinguish between threats and non-threats. After the shocking stimulus ends, the brain
goes back to normal and precludes the production of hormones and sends signals to cease the
state of extreme alertness. However, when the body and/or the mind are exposed to continuous
stress, it becomes very difficult for them to recognize a stressor, and when the stressor is present
and when it is gone. This can result in a lengthy process of being overly vigilant and overly
responsive to stimuli in the surrounding environment 175. As a consequence, this cha ges what
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. Fear and stress also affect how memories are

comprised and recollected. In terms of the former, the way one stores a memory under fear/stress
would not necessarily be accurate since the selection of information at the time of the memory
production will be highly biased and limited. Moreover, the analysis of the options available and
their value cannot be properly assessed under stress. In terms of the way humans recollect events
stored in the memory under stress, they will most likely be effortless to retrieve because they are
bright and influential for the individual.
Empathy, on the other hand, possesses opposite characteristics of experiencing fear. It is
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and why others feel and think the way they do and the capacity to see how our behavior might be
understood by another

175

Ibid.
Ibid., 540.
177
Ibid., 541.
176

177.

Studies show that people are more likely to feel empathy toward
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individuals with whom they have a significant resemblance, the more similar, the more empathic
they are178. Based on this principle, the more emphatic people feel, the more they are willing to
help179. However, when people do not think that they have much in common with another
individual, and there is even some feeling of resentment, this could give room for the emergence
of another emotion
el e

ega i e em i

antipathy. It can even produce positive emotions stemming from someone
(j

f m he

ha

i e

f a person with whom the perceiver does

not feel associated). It is also apparent from the studies described above that stressors can reduce
the feelings of empathy as they disrupt the normal functioning of the brain, as the empathy
becomes an emotion with secondary meaning at the expense of the need to eradicate the stressor
(the threat). For a deeper empathy, scholars argue, it is better if the person imagines what the
others may feel, as opposed to just witnessing it. Through the mental images, the person
empathizing will project their own way of feeling in an unpleasant manner that may or may not
be identical with what is actually experienced by the ones in distress. It is still much more
accurate and influential experience if the empathizer could vicariously experience the emotions
of the ones who provoked the feelings of empathy, even if not utterly accurate 180 181. Antipathy
and fear, as emotions, are frequently used in military doctrines and could sensibly increase the
mistrust and alienation between states thus reinforcing the perception of anarchy. Therefore, it is
crucial that individuals make a difference between reasonable fears and unjustified ones relying
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on techniques like empathy that help them identify a real threat, as opposed to one that was
depicted to them as such and was most likely already institutionalized 182.
Anger. As opposed to feeling fearful, sense of anger increases the chance of the social
perceiver to have positive views about the future. Another effect that anger has on people is that
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A group of scholars explores the effect of

emotions, anger, anxiety and enthusiasm and political information seeking 184. The findings from
their study are consistent with previous research outlining that anger actually reduces
significantly the information-seeking tendencies, as opposed to anxiety that encourages such
behavior. According to another study185, the latter can also downplay the role of habitual voting
for a particular political party, and to orient the voter toward looking for new information, while
provoking enthusiasm is correlated with party identification and reduced need for new
information.
In a more politico-philosophical context, David Ost186 shares an interesting perspective
regarding anger in politics. He argues that it is not only that the power structures in society have
to find an outlet for the anger of the masses, but instead, he presents anger as an integral
component of power
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a tool in the hands of both groups. In fact, politicians and activists
187

this powerful political energy that anger produces through the figure of

the enemy that is portrayed as responsible for certain issues, usually economic. Ost underlines
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that if the politicians/political activists convincingly introduce the enemy to the public as such,
their cause has a significant chance of success, as these dynamics are evident both in democratic
and authoritarian societies. Lyman188 elaborates on this view adding that it is important to look at
how the power structures employ anger. In particular, how anger is transformed to support the
e i i g
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al e i . The a g me
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force, moral indignation,

are four main ways in which anger is subjugated to serve the

power structures and the status quo in terms of the order. The first element - anger is dressed by
the regime as a force that obeys and complies with the rules established by the hierarchy of
command incorporated in a particular structure. The method of transforming anger into force is
the training that the military receives, for instance. The second element, moral indignation is
achieved when the anger alone shifts toward a wave of anger invested into a specific cause or
ideology – which is typically the political regime or other institutionalized values cherished by
the regime. Third, care, as a transformation of anger should be understood as the need to protect
something dear to the individual. An instance in this regard is the feeling of patriotism and duty
to loved ones, groups in society and the state itself190. Fourth, authority requires that anger
provoked by perceived injustice is silenced so that the integrity of the regime is intact. Lyman
suggests as an example the denial of injury and the acceptance of unequal treatment as a
technique that achieves silence as an extension of anger under the influence of the perceived as a
legitimate power in a state or in a structure 191. The fifth element from the proposed model is the
technique. The bureaucratic techniques used to transform anger into non-emotionally charged
outcomes through rules and norms is another way of subjugating anger to power
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and reinforcing the existing order. An empirical study by Small and Lerner 192 investigated the
relationship between anger and sadness, on the one hand, and welfare policy, on the other. They
found that feelings of anger decreased intention of more generous welfare support, as opposed to
feelings of sadness that increased the intention for support. The reason for this finding, they
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that the anger

condition did not require. Another explanation they offer about the results pertains to the
stereotyping tendencies that angry people exhibit.
Pain, trauma, and shame. An overview of emotions and how they influence politics
requires that another phenomenon is included in this work

trauma. Scholars agree that this is a

deeply intimate and private experience that ultimately disturbs fundamental understandings of
how the individual sees and perceives the world. Moreover, some scholars stress the inability to
link trauma to politics because of the impossible task of expressing the feelings coming from a
traumatic experience through language 194. While these characteristics make the study of this
unique phenomenon difficult, its relationship to politics is nevertheless established. One of the
mechanisms through which an inherently personal experience like trauma can enter the domain
of politics is through representation and transforming the personal into collective. Trauma cannot
be described as emotion itself, but rather it represents various emotions that connect the
individual to the community through the emotion of solidarity 195. However, in the process of
constituting the individual trauma as a collective one, it is possible ha
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of trauma tend to pave the way for political responses that define security narrowly and create
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More detailed characteristics of this sensation or feeling are that it is inherently subjective and
individual, it reveals more complicated characteristics than other emotions evoked by visually
perceived events, it e abli he a li k be
feeli g a e
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and lastly, the negative sensations related to pain are constructed through

ascribing meaning to what provoked them 199. An interesting study examining the relationship
between pain and information selection found that individuals experiencing chronic pain are
oriented to seeking pain-related information200. Another research focuses on the information
seeking and the fear of pain. It showed that the higher the anxiety provoked by fear of pain, the
higher the interest toward pain-related information201. While it comes mostly, if not entirely,
from the psychological field, research dedicated on the relationship between information and
pain (and other emotions) has important implications for the study of politics, especially for the
field of security studies.
When discussing pain and traumatic experiences, there is another emotion that also adds
value
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wrongdoing. The role that shame has in constructing identity and sense of community between
its members is similar to the one that trauma has. Shame is one of the most social emotions since
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hat holds true even if the

individual experiencing shame and guilt is alone. An interesting feature of shame - national
shame
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shame is someone of whom the person experiencing the shame thinks highly203. The same goes
for national shame where the sense of pride of the citizens was harmed as a consequence of
wrongdoing that they would like to compensate for
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That said, one of the most

influential findings in the literature about trauma and pain is undoubtedly the fact that the
discomfort and insecurity that the individual experiences in many ways bolsters their ontological
security205.
Habit. While habits in politics and IR are not emotions, they have an important meaning
about political relationships. They represent repetitive acts that include among other things
emotions as well. Therefore, they will also be included in this section. Ted Hopf discusses that
c g ii e e
hi k

206,

l g di c e ed ha

e

le eg la l

e cei e, feel, a d ac bef e he

thus casting doubt in the predominant assumption in IR that actors act rationally,

deliberately analyzing costs and benefits before making a decision. He maintains that social
constructivism exaggerates the unproblematic nature of changes that the individual can bring into
the system, ignoring the powerful influence that habits have. Moreover, socialization eventually
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reaches its boundaries and gives room to the creation of habits that serve as an automated
behavioral mechanism in which attitude and internal assessment of factors are almost or entirely
predetermined by the habitual processes. That could be attributed to the social system that
bolsters and encourages the formation and repetition of manifesting habits as they help the
individual better adjust to the social environment in an easy, efficient manner. Habits, as
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processes governing human behavior

stand in opposition to emotions that require at least some cognitive function to take place before
a reaction is expressed. They are, however, still closely related and comprised of emotions as
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One of the most central questions in the study

of habits and political behavior is whether they can be broken and how. To this, Ted Hopf209 and
Wegner and Bargh210 respond that habits can cease existing over time through a consideration
about the relevance of the habit to the surrounding environment, its compliance to the norms and
the rules or the lack of such. Conditions favorable for the creation and the practice of habits
include situations in which there is little possibility for the social norms to be challenged and
thus there is almost no need for consideration and analysis of any factors that determine
behavior. Hopf211 finds the study of habits especially relevant to topics including cooperation,
security dilemma, rivalries, and security communities. All of them, according to him, can be
easily explained by the existence of the habit as a phenomenon and the security dilemma, in this
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sense, is not a dilemma at all since the parties either see and treat each other habitually as
enemies or as friends.
This chapter highlighted the cognitive construction of individuals. The known
mechanisms of human cognition become a vulnerability if they are exploited purposefully for
gains of the party seeking to exploit them. The way human cognition is built does not allow for
any changes that could be made to prevent its exploitation. However, social cognition, an
apparatus that creates and maintains certain predispositions regarding social phenomena, is much
more susceptible to influence, including one in a direction to limit manipulations and deceptions.
Research shows that among the psycho-emotional areas that are most vulnerable to threats, in
particular, are the feelings of anxiety and fear, the sense of identity, control and behavior, and
habit, as all of them are more powerful than other experiences, and are thus exploited more. All
of them pertain to innate instincts for self-preservation and survival that very often
overwhelmingly predict judgments and decision-making. Advances in the field of psychology,
social psychology, and political psychology highlighted these patterns through numerous studies
over the years and made human cognition a target for different political and corporate interests.
As the research produced on this subject matter provided strong evidence for these cognitive
tendencies, they began being exploited long before this. The following chapter documents how
cognitive vulnerabilities and dispositions were utilized for political purposes over the different
historical eras, and how similar or different they are in comparison to contemporary cognitive
threats.
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CHAPTER 3
HISTORY OF COGNITIVE THREATS

Chronicle of cognitive threats through the ages
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the development of cognitive
threats throughout the ages and to trace the specific components and conditions that had some
meaning for their successful execution. Some tendencies inherent for previous historical epochs
are preserved in present times, and others are a new phenomenon for the 21 st century, as Chapter
4 will prove. In addition, examining the factors that made them possible would inform and
justify a prevention strategy against cognitive threats described in detail in Chapter 5. As this
chapter will demonstrate, advances in technological, political, religious and cultural aspects offer
insights about the level of applicability of prevention as a strategy, in what situations it presents
fruitful opportunities for countering cognitive threats, and when it is severely limited by factors
that are difficult to be altered.
As being central pre-condition for knowing and influencing the enemy, very early in the
history of humankind, intelligence gathering was recognized as one of the most powerful tools
for achieving a military victory. In the fifth century, Sun Tzu underlined that having knowledge
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He also emphasized that gaining leverage against the enemy

without fighting requires elaborated skills but is however a priority 213. The ability to obtain
information from political adversaries or even allies has had many names in history: spying,
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intelligence gathering, diplomacy, etc. One of them that focuses on planting a certain desired
perception about reality that is typical for military settings is reflexive control. It originated in the
1960s and focused on the attempts of both sides of a conflict to impose reflexive control
(cognitive control) over the opponent 214. While it ultimately pursues the end goals of the
aforementioned methods of obtaining information, it is described as being more ambitious in
terms of how it ill deli e he

efe ed

c me. Tim h Th ma ide ifie i a

a mea

f

conveying to a partner or an opponent specially prepared information to incline him to
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A central

element in this concept and in the others mentioned above is power. The immediate goal of
intelligence-gathering and information operations is obtaining a piece of knowledge about a fact
or facts and/or

cha ge he i al beha i . Regardless, the ultimate purpose of this process is

to gain power over them. This is frequently achieved by deception and manipulation a common
characteristic in the skillset of spies216. Their activities could be m i a ed b

g eed,

disappointment, bruised egos, failure in promotion stakes, talents that went unrecognized,
di ill i me
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Needless to say, while the use of spies in

intelligence operations may have decreased in the 21 st century, they still exist but are now
accompanied by technologies that execute the same functions thus saving money, time and
resources. Moreover, the people employing these technologies are motivated very often by the
same ambitions as the spies from classical antiquity to post-modern times. Besides, the
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technologies used to gather information in the 21 st century remarkably resemble cognitive
techniques that were inherent for the first spies known to human history.
Classical antiquity. The need for information, as outlined in Chapter 1 has always been
among the most fundamental human necessities since it is crucial for survival. In most basic
forms, the need for information was met through different types of predictions provided by
sorcerers, astrologists, prophets, fortune-tellers, oracles and various rituals supposed to provide
signs for the future218. In terms of military strategy, the need for information developed from an
initial passive stance of obtaining information from prophets to active dissemination of
information to the enemy intended to convince them to make a certain type of decision favorable
for the former. Deception as a strategy, as opposed to simple information gathering, is a much
more complex course of action. It requires a good perception of he e em

a

f hi ki g

that the deceiving information is processed as being truthful. Therefore, deceit presupposes good
k

ledge f he

e

che as the latter could be delivered by traditional intelligence

gathering. Perhaps one of the most well historically documented manifestations of a cognitive
threat is the Trojan Horse. About the same historical period, the ancient Greek historian
Xenophon stresses three types of groups that were usually trusted with intelligence gathering
outsiders, neutrals, and insiders 219. Outsiders were typically fake deserters who infiltrated the
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plans and strategy and went back to their original camp to report their findings. Another task that
they used to have was disinforming the enemy in a way that the latter would find believable. The
idea behind the fake deserter role is that the spy would otherwise be denied access to the social
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group. However, through a process of assimilation to the new camp, the spy gains access to
information that would be otherwise inaccessible. Similarity between people, as psychological
studies show, has always been a powerful bond between members of a group that builds their
identity. The assimilation, however, could have been time-consuming and intelligence was
sometimes needed urgently. A solution to this problem were the neutrals and the merchants.
Neutrals and merchants gained access to the desired location and social and military circles much
easier than the infiltrators. The difference is that fake deserters have to be trusted that they
actually abandoned their duties and sincerely joined the enemy, while for merchants and
neutrals, the skepticism toward their intentions was much less due to their occupations or the
lack of military background that can link them to the enemy. Moreover, merchants, in some
cases, were warmly welcomed because of the need for the products and the services they were
offering. Namely this characteristic was making them suitable spies that would not raise
ici

i

he e em

cam . In ancient Egypt, merchants traveling from Babylonia to Syria,

and Palestine were also a very significant source of information 220. In addition, native people in
Egypt served as secret agents delivering intelligence to the pharaoh through the commander of
the garrison close to which their villages were.
While Xenophon does not particularly mention the third type of spies

the insiders, it is

well known that they have been one of the most valuable sources of information 221. These socalled agents in place e e i di id al
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were delivering information to their leaders. Since no previous preparation, training or any
outstanding skills were needed for this role, insiders, as opposed to outsiders, were just regular

220

Francis Dvornik, Origins of Intelligence Services: The Ancient Near East, Persia, Greece, Rome, Byzantium, the
Arab Muslim Empires, the Mongol Empire, China, Muscovy (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1974).
221
Russell, Information gathering in classical Greece.

75
people who did not have to convince anyone that they belong to the social group. In terms of
gender, Aristotle makes a very interesting observation. While most historical evidence from this
period does not provide any clues that female spies were employed along with their male
counterparts, Aristotle explicitly mentions female spies in Syracuse. The lack of sources
specifying that women were assigned intelligence gathering missions, as well as men, could be
attributed also to the problems related to translating some texts from ancient Greek. For instance,
Plutarch uses masculine forms to refer to groups including both men and women222. It was
mostly women who were engaged with arts, music, and tasks related to entertainment that were
recruited as spies because of their access to significant events. However, it was not uncommon
for women of noble origin and their servants to also act as spies reporting information about their
husbands or their masters. Another kind of intelligence gathering position was the one of envoys
that were officially assigned a diplomatic office in a foreign country. Among the benefits of this
position was the lack of likelihood of getting exposed and imprisoned since the ambassadors
were in the foreign country in an official capacity. There was also a downside to this position
the common knowledge that the attaché is reporting information to their countries made people
more hesitant to share and entrust sensitive information. However, it was possible that envoys
turned against their sending countries and began delivering information to the rulers of the
receiving country.
The matter of who was providing intelligence was also relevant to the quality of the
delivered information. First, the agents in ancient Greece reported information that they thought
was important as the latter was a purely subjective judgment. Second, it was delivered in a way
that represented how the recipient of the information interpreted it and understood it. Third,
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many of the spies back then were not explicitly trained to execute these tasks, therefore, all
information gatherers may not be equally capable in differentiating the pertinent from the
e i he al

223.

Soldiers, merchants, and envoys all have different perception about what

information is important and how it should be interpreted in a certain context. Ancient Greek
rulers and military commanders were aware of the problem and attempted to resolve it in
different ways. Aeneas Tacticus suggested that the intelligence gathering should be done by men
with a military background who will ensure that the essential information is distinguished from
non-relevant facts that can cause confusion224. The quality of the delivered information was
essential in missions aiming to b c e he e em
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different sources of information have and how they might affect the delivered information. He
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they had no longer interest in the outcome of the events 226. Xenophon and Alexander the Great
sought to resolve this issue by obtaining information for the same fact from different sources
such as indigenous people, scouts, prisoners, spies, envoys, etc. Regardless of the methods
employed by Xenophon, Alexander, and other Greeks at the time, deception by disinformation
remained largely successful and thus frequently used as a strategy in military affairs. Another
instance of successful disinformation practices in the early ages is given during the battle of
Kadesh, in which the Hittite king used deception to mislead the Egyptians led by Ramesses II.
Documents reveal that he
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two agents played their role so successfully that Ramesses II readily believed their story and
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pushed forward with but one division to invest Kadesh, his three remaining divisions straggling
slowly behind

227.

As opposed to the very well-developed intelligence-gathering systems in

Greece and Egypt, in the early Republican period, Rome mostly relied on information shared by
its allies, rather than collecting it on its own228. Another instance of the poor level of the Roman
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There were some exceptions from this rule,

however. Sertorius, a Roman general, from the early years of his early military career recognized
the power of good intelligence and the efficiency of deception. As Romans were fighting the
Teutons in Gaul, Sertorius, dressed in Celtic clothing, succeeded to present himself as one of the
locals, and gathered valuable information for his mission. Despite this ingenious move described
by Plutarch, it is also mentioned that it was very rare for Romans to adopt such deception
techniques230. Another exception from the rule was Caesar in the Gallic campaigns in which he
had to turn to some deception techniques to trick the Gauls. Caesar ordered his army to build a
small camp that implied a sense of fear than such of courage, and force. The Gauls, thinking that
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It is reported that Romans avoided using

deception in their military and diplomatic campaigns in the beginning, but by the time of the
Republic, for them, this has become a perfectly acceptable and useful tool in warfare.
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Accepted as a continuation of the Roman Empire, Byzantium realized that the Roman
Em i e i ellige ce ga he i g eak e e

h ld be compensated. Among other measures that

were undertaken was the establishment of corps of the agents who were carefully selected by
their skills, behavior, social status. They had five years to show evidence of their abilities, and if
approved by the Master of Offices and the emperor, they were accepted to serve for twenty-five
years, after which they would retire 232. Another tool used to gather information was through the
Christian religion of some of the subjects that have fallen under the rule of the Arabs. In
addition, Byzantines used natives acting as spies within the Arab territories that were recruited
most often through money or other specific interests, religious reasons, or dissatisfaction by the
rulers. Complementary to this, information for the people and the lands surrounding the
Byzantine Empire was collected by the Office for Barbarian Affairs from merchants, envoys, and
soldiers. This structure was functioning from the fifth to approximately the eleventh century 233.
Similar to other political formations at the time, in the Arab Muslim Empires, merchants,
travelers, and even elder women were also recruited as spies by different rulers such as AlMansur, Harun Al-Rashid, and Al-Mamun. Archives document that Al-Mamun had recruited
around 1,700 old women among his spies in Baghdad234. In the Mongol Empire, Jenghiz Khan,
wanting to obtain intelligence about the Muslims used merchants as sources. He also paid careful
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State, similarly to the Byzantine Empire and the Arabs, Muscovites used foreign envoys as
sources of information by spying on them while at the same time aiming to withhold information
about their own state from the envoy.
The times of the classical antiquity fascinate with different techniques of information
gathering, resembling a lot these in current times. Ancient Greece, Egypt, the Byzantine Empire,
the Aram Muslim Empires, the Mongols, and the Muscovites all had some forms of postal
services, developed differently. Later, with the technological developments in this regard,
manipulations became much more common as the postal services gained a position of higher
importance. Thus, in the Renaissance and in the early Modernism, the intelligence gathering was
vulnerable to more challenges but at the same time grew into a more sophisticated system. It
even developed into an institutionalized structure through the implementation of regular
diplomatic missions in countries.
Renaissance and Modernism. In the ages of the Renaissance and Modernism
cartography as art evolved sensibly. It became a valuable tool for planning, strategizing and
execution of military campaigns. As a consequence, maps started to invite a more significant
interest by enemies and their spies. People who have seen certain maps of importance and the
plans made from them also attracted much attention as they were perceived as sources of
valuable information. This included merchants, envoys, soldiers, their commanders, sailors, and
captains of ships. Stealing these maps also became a profitable enterprise. One example is the
case with the military engineers Johannes and Cornelis Elandts who threatened to hand the maps
of the Dutch East India Company to commercial publishers unless they pay a significant amount
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of money236. It is documented that this was a regular practice among military engineers who had
access to the valuable information that maps contained. Their skills were highly appreciated by
the royals in Europe. Reports share that Lopo Homem fled Portugal to seek asylum in England
where his cartographic skills amazed Queen Mary who ordered him to prepare an atlas with the
newest geographical discoveries. King Louis XIV also had an appreciation for one of the most
treasured sources of information and continuously sent military engineers to Italy with the
mission of obtaining the plans of fortifications in Lombard. One of the most celebrated French
cartographers, Nicolas de Nicolay, invited by John Dudley, Viscount Delisle went to England
and mapped the location of the English ports with considerable significance. After the death of
Dudley, it turned out that Nicolay was working for the French the entire time, a proof of which
was the receipt documenting the payments made by the French king. Considering all these
circumstances, at the time, ca
e
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Although the methods and the people involved in the process have changed, attempts to

gain access to the plans illustrating locations of important buildings resemble, to a large extent, a
contemporary theft of secrets that, similarly to centuries ago, both private and public parties
treasure greatly.
In the Renaissance and the early Modernism, spies increasingly started to be selected
based on their relationship with the person of interest, as opposed to choosing a person of skills
who was unknown to the target. For instance, in England, circa 1540, among the spies employed
to gather intelligence on suspected traitors of the crown were also scholars 238. During the reign of
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Elizabeth, other tactics were also used to manipulate people of interest. Spies delivered gossips
and specific information intended to persuade the recipient in a certain cause. Rather than money
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in the context of intelligence

gathering as a political activity. An interesting fact for this historical period is that there is no
written evidence about the life of popular spies after they ceased their operations. Sporadic are
the examples of spies who retired after the end of their employment and historians are
speculating that such retirements could have been initiated on behalf of the person who hired
them because the agent was exposed 240. Regarding he

me
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during the Renaissance and Modernism, it is well emphasized and acknowledged, as opposed to
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. This was true because of the social networks they have established with family

members, relatives, friends, acquaintances and other people who were connected to the same
social circles. Since transportation was not very well developed at the time and distances were
long and people

frequently traveling, letter-writing has become instrumental to the

maintenance of these networks through which women regularly received, disseminated and
exchanged news in addition to exercising influence and persuasion.
Especially in England, having a queen, rather than a king made the role of women in
court tremendously important, as Elizabeth herself relied heavily on information gathered by
appointed female servants and members of the nobility. In addition, it was not only information
that was collected by them. They had even more active and responsible roles such as negotiators,
intermediaries, and influencers. Women skillfully used personal contacts to convey political
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messages to their addressees and convince them in a particular cause. These dynamics were,
however, not exempt from the context of power and hierarchy structures that undoubtedly had an
important meaning for the efficiency of the persuasion. The presence of the women in court
brought them quick and easy access to both national and international news as well as knowledge
of the reactions to them. However, it was not only valuable information from home and abroad
that interested women of the English nobility. News about the monarch, court affairs,
negotiations, and any changes in the health, the marital status and the wealth of the powerful
members of the court was also of particular importance. Women were also instrumental in
informing their husbands, fathers, and relatives living away from the court about the latest
developments in politics and social life. While ea i g he Q ee

a
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among the main goals of members of the court at the time, many of the female spies and
informants were also acting as such driven by a longing for financial profit. There are multiple
examples documented in the history of women exercising influence over family members,
including husbands and fathers about important matters for which they were generously
compensated242.
The development of the post office institution in Europe brought new opportunities for an
enhanced and speedy correspondence but also made room for covert operations that challenged
the integrity of the information enclosed in the mail. Famous at the time were the so-called black
chambers ha
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These chambers allowed that letters be copied, altered and resealed within a short period of time
and the skills of the people employed to accomplish these were proficient enough to convince the
recipient of the letter that it was never compromised or even opened. One of the most impressive
black chambers was run by the postmistress of Brussels

Alexandrine (1589-1666) who was

allegedly working for Ferdinand II and Ferdinand III, or, as suggested by some, for whoever was
providing remuneration for her services244. As Brussels was a pivotal point for all the
correspondence in Europe, possible influence over the information flow was an important
acquisition. To alleviate the problem with the monopolization of the mail distribution, the
emperor of the Holy Roman Empire was asked by citizens to grant permission for private
messengers who would deliver regular mail, supposedly without political significance. While the
emperor allowed private messengers, the condition that he set made the delivery difficult,
expensive and without any practical use. This way, the family of Alexandrine of Taxis
established control over all the correspondence coming out and passing through the empire,
which allowed her to exercise power over the political and diplomatic affairs in more than one
state.
Deception continued to be a weapon in the hands of the parties in conflict after the end of
the Renaissance and the early Modernism. A vivid example from the eighteenth century is the
one with the Jacobite rebellion from 1745 against the Hanoverian rule 245. In this case, both sides
skillfully used deception to gain leverage in their battle with the enemy. First, the Jacobite
employed strategic tactics to confuse the Hanoverians about the size and the location of their
forces. Small numbers of troops were sent to different locations that were inconsistent with
where they mapped their routes in reality. This way, the Hanoverians not only made a mistake

244
245

Ibid.
Stewart and Newbery, Why Spy? The Art of Intelligence.

84
about the size of the Jacobite army but also got misled about their intentions in terms of locating
the troops and the routes they were going to use. However, the Jacobites were outsmarted by the
Hanoverians as well. The latter sent a spy to the Jacobite camp who pretended to be a soldier
who wanted to join their forces. Warmly welcomed among the Jacobites, the Hanoverian spy
provided some false information that was perceived as plausible by Prince Charles.
A later example of the art of deception is the one involving Richard Meinertzhagen, a
British Colonel who diligently executed a series of deception operations during World War I 246.
Meinertzhagen prepared a set of British official documents listing their intentions to attack Gaza.
The purpose behind this plan was to mislead the Turks about the British military plans.
Meinertzhagen hoped that Turkish spies will intercept these letters. Previous attempts to employ
such maneuvers, however, appeared to be unsuccessful as the Turks did not seem to get access to
the planted false information. Thus, Meinertzhagen utilized a different strategy this time. He
made the deception scene much more believable for the Turks, as he fired a few shots in the
proximity, leaving some bloodstains on his equipment and his haversack where the letters were
left. The operation gained success as the Turks focused on Gaza thus allowing the British to
invade Beersheba without resistance.
Post-Modernism. The two world wars brought new aspects to the problem of intelligence
gathering. They provoked rapid developments in technology as this changed how it was used to
support the collection of information about the enemy. Deception operations were proliferating.
An integral part of such operations was the outlet through which the information was
disseminated. While in democratic countries the opportunities for purposeful dissemination of
particular agenda-oriented content were somewhat limited, in authoritarian countries such

246

Ibid.

85
actions were much more easily implemented. The Soviets skillfully played with the tools of
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Other outlets of disinformation were also employed. For

instance, archives show that Soviet diplomats were instructed to share a specific piece of
information with diplomats of a neutral country who also had contact with the enemy countries,
relying that the neutral diplomat would share with them this piece of information, as it happened
on more than one occasion. Such strategy was frequently put in action by the Soviet Foreign
Office248. Moreover, there was a special unit within the KGB called the Disinformation Bureau
whose main purpose was to misinterpret and place in negative context policies, statements, and
other official documents of Western governments. In addition to this, this bureau was assigned to
forge documents and provoke tension based on religious grounds, such as propagating antiSemitism. On the other end of the world, the CIA was also busy recruiting different agents to
report to them. They were successful in recruiting Soviet agents who, as reported, were
disillusioned by the false promises of the Soviet political system or particular issues such as the
KGB
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Later, the traitors were captured and executed by the

KGB as the CIA had promised them no protections as voluntary agents. However, in cases in
which intelligence was needed, and there were no voluntary spies, CIA used deception to make
people, unwilling to report to the agency, share information with them through another agent,

247

Dulles, The craft of intelligence: America's legendary spy master on the fundamentals of intelligence gathering
for a free world, 149.
248
Ibid.
249
David L. Perry, ""Repugnant Philosophy": Ethics, Espionage, and Covert Action," Journal of Conflict Studies 15,
no. 1 (1995): 4.

86
typically known to the involuntary informant. For instance, if the unknowing informant harbors
resentments toward the U.S., then the person interacting with them would present themselves as
non-U.S. citizens, typically citizens of a neutral country. Another way of obtaining information
from people unwilling to share it with the CIA was through coercion. The CIA agent would
exercise pressure over the informant through some sensitive, humiliating or incriminating
i f ma i

a d h

e

e he i f ma

c

eai

250.

After the end of the Cold War, the espionage declined in intensity. Later, with the
emergence of the Internet, almost everything changed, including the ways espionage was
conducted. Interestingly, many of the deception and manipulation techniques remained the same,
but they were executed differently. With astonishing ease, a sentence could travel to the other
end of the world, reaching millions of people, in a split second. In 1993, alarming articles
warning people of the beginning of a cyberwar started appearing. Two political scientists

John

Arquilla and David Ronfeldt added that people should prepare for a netwar which includes
actions
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They also mentioned that such manipulation could take place

in many domains (psychological, political, cultural) and take many forms (altering public
opinion or the opinion of the people with power in society). The most important conclusion that
they reached was that such type of deception was going to change both politics and warfare.
In 2003, a policy document from China confirmed the predictions of Arquilla and
Ronfeldt. The Chinese military declared that their strategy is built on three pillars

warfare

understood as a psychological influence, manipulations of legal aspects of international
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agreements, and influence over public opinion252. Fully realizing the growing threat, NATO
created the Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, intended to counter disinformation
and propaganda campaigns on social media. Very soon, the Internet became an arena for battles
of regular people, politicians, celebrities, armies, terrorists, criminals and even entire
governments. The technological advances gave birth to bots and trolls who severely disrupt the
perception of public dialogue, of public opinion. The consequences of their actions went far
beyond a simple disruption, however. Slowly, the disruption started to change the dialogue itself
and to reach matters of highest importance

the U.S. presidential election in 2016. At his point,

it has become clear how seriously the information warfare affects every sphere of the public and
private life of people. As many things changed from the classical antiquity period, other integral
elements of deception remained unchanged
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Bots and trolls mastered the art of disinformation and

misinformation as they changed the public dialogue in the desired way allegedly establishing
social consensus on popular topics among the users online.
Advancements in information science were welcomed in authoritarian countries as just
another way of imposing control over the citizens by monopolizing the public dialogue. Some
states went even further than this. China, for instance, introduced its social credit system in 2015,
according to which the citizens will be assigned a specific score based on their activities thus
assessing their loyalty to the state 254. Establishing control over WeChat

the Chinese version of

an expanded, multi-functional Facebook would feed the authorities with useful information about
he ci i e
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Pan, King, and Roberts (2017) found out that in addition to the propaganda efforts of the Chinese
government executed by people called the 50-Cent Army (based on the payment they receive for
one social media post), Beijing also relies on methods of distraction rather than just
disinformation255. Converting the attention from popular public topics to other topics that do not
attract attention is a strategy that is among the weapons of domestic psychological warfare.
Russians, however, openly employ disinformation techniques, adopted by government agencies,
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emphasizes the increasing role of non-military methods of influence, simultaneously viewing
R

ia eff

a a defensive campaign that is merely a response to information cyber-attacks

by the West256. Some non-cognitive cyber-attacks (such in which a device has been
compromised directly, without manipulating an individual) are prevented successfully by the
computer engineering industry through anti-virus programs, passwords, encryptions, and cyber
security tools. This does not mean that cyber-attacks are not getting more sophisticated and
ceased to cause problems online. In comparison to cognitive cyber-attacks, however, noncognitive ones are much more easily identifiable and are therefore much easier to be prevented.
An instance for this is Mark Jakob who, using access from his former employer

Internet Wire,

issued a fake press release concerning the resignation of Paul Folino, a CEO of Emulex (server
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As a result, stock prices dropped and ultimately led to Mark Jakob profiting from rates that were
lowered artificially after the press release. I
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producing press releases, rather than any technical skills that helped him achieve his goal. The
same rule applies to theft-of-secrets cases in which an employee in a company from the defense
industry is misled to release confidential information, thinking that the person requesting it is
entitled to know it. Rather than old-fashioned hacking and unauthorized access to computers, the
problem here is the human cognition rather than the level of security of a device.

Evolution of cognitive threats: from the Trojan Horse to Facebook
Development of cognitive threats in the classical antiquity. The technological, societal,
and cultural developments in the classical antiquity may look much slower and much less
progressive when compared to further historical periods, but they are nevertheless still
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consensus about reality and truth, and identifying deviations from these, such as deception. In the
21st century, the problem of truth is very complex. For the people in the classical antiquity, the
dimensions of this notion were much clearer. There were figures within the society, outlining the
aspects of what truth is who were trusted and who were enjoying respect and obedience. Truth
was very closely related to the idea of culture. People responsible for cultural norms, usually
men in this era, were i di id al
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Different examples of such people were priests, monks, rabbis, scholars, librarians, educators,
etc. Even as early as in the classical antiquity era, educational materials, such as the Latin
classics, served a powerful political purpose

to unify people, to impose ideas both by religious

and secular authorities. Simultaneously with this, access to knowledge was severely limited and
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considered a privilege. Books were copied by hand and copies were disseminated by
missionaries and pedagogues, traveling to distant locations, teaching pupils reading and writing
in Greek. Literacy was a skill for the elite, not for the masses. Incapable of reading from the
source of information, people were vulnerable to misinterpretations, intentional or not.
Controlling literacy meant control over the truth. Control over the truth meant control over the
population mi d . The agreement with authorities was the prevalent spirit in which most works
were written until the 18th century when authors started disobeying the accepted norms for
writing259. This does not mean that attempts were not made to refute the truths established by the
authorities, but they were quickly destroyed, and their authors sued for treason and either
imprisoned or murdered. Because of this long-lasting tradition of works, embedding moral
norms, political and social attitude, desired by the authorities, later works in 18 th century denying
these principles, became especially appealing to the masses

a tendency that continues even in

the 21st century.
It was also in the classical antiquity when the first archetypes were created
which is still present into the contemporary literature and from there
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embraces different

features, both physical and moral that created standards for generations of people from ancient
Rome to present days. The male hero, muscular and physically attractive shows his strength and
courage mostly in times of war, as the latter started to get perceived as a desirable opportunity
for the hero to demonstrate his exceptional qualities 261. Violence was depicted as acceptable, as it
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served to portray the domination of the hero against the villain, the win of the good against the
bad.
Seen as an ultimate opportunity for bravery and exceptionalism, wars were presenting a
chance for demonstrating personal qualities and superior military thought that was becoming
more and more technological in nature. The invention of the catapult as a powerful tool in sieges
and attacks of fortifications brought an undisputable advantage to one of the sides of the conflict.
As a response to this new weapon, further advancements in weaponry also emerged. For
instance, during the siege of Perinthus in 341 BC, the Macedonian king used archers with arrows
positioned in higher than the catapults towers 262. Later, soldiers throwing stones were also
included in the campaigns during sieges. With these technological innovations, sieges have
become complicated, costly and lengthy operations. While it was obvious that both sides of a
conflict will compete about whose weapons are more effective and have higher destruction
capability, it was in many times wit and resourcefulness that won battles, rather than the
technology itself, even in these early centuries of traditional warfare. Among many others, one
example of human wisdom defeating military technology is the one with Diognetus
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In conclusion, most ancient societies skillfully employed deception techniques, espionage
and counterespionage as conventional weapons in war. Slowly with time, even Romans started to
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use deception in their battles as wars became more complicated and the competition between
new technology, advanced strategic planning and cartography became fierce. Manipulation and
coercion manifested themselves as standard practice in later periods. Moreover, the historical
figures who used them actively in their political careers were among the most successful leaders,
using their intellect to gain and retain power quickly and efficiently.
Development of cognitive threats in the Middle Centuries and in the two World Wars.
One of the most significant changes in terms of military planning was that modern intelligence
institutions have emerged in this period, as one of the first official heads of such office was
Queen Eli abe h Sec e a

fSae

Sir Francis Walsingham264. Some authors share that it is

even possible that the famous Cardinal Richelieu learned a lot from his predecessor about
deception, political maneuvers, and intelligence265. There was a notable proliferation of Black
Chambers across the European states as the need of intelligence, espionage and counterespionage
grew exponentially. However, durable institutions engaged with collecting information over time
both in war and in peace were absent. When the need arose, different political figures were
tasked with intelligence gathering through their networks of spies, including diplomats, who had
their own channels of information266. Diplomacy, at the time, did not have the dimensions it has
nowadays, as ambassadors were acting merely as official spies rather than having a more
independent role than this. Industrial changes brought new opportunities and challenges in
military campaigns for which armies should have prepared - the need for timely and quality
intelligence mainly regarding maps and railways. The first permanent intelligence structures
were established in Britain and in America in the 1870s and 1880s, followed by the British
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Secret Service Bureau conducting operations of espionage and counterespionage in 1909 267.
Among other technological innovations, the radio changed not only the everyday life of citizens
but also military planning and the campaigns themselves. Radio channels also provided ways of
intelligence gathering and deception at the same time. For instance, a captured soldier may have
been kept alive if he had a radio station ensuring direct communication with the enemy through
which deceiving information could be conveyed 268. Aerial photography, and later satellite
surveillance also quickly altered the dimensions of traditional warfare. If this innovation was
used by one side in a conflict, then automatically, ways of deceiving the enemy through this
technology were emerging. An instance of this is the British deception of Nazi bombers during
World War II. The former hid their airfields, masking them as farms 269. A similar strategy was
also used for other targets of significance. It is not clear if technological development in these
decades was driven by military needs only or the military needs changed as a consequence of the
rapid technological developments. Therefore, it could be concluded that they were intertwined in
a way that made a clear statement

technology changes intelligence, its sources, its goals and the

how counterintelligence was conducted. In this case, would it be enough to gather information
only by using the latest innovations in the world of technology? Machines were replacing agents
and other personnel, doing their job faster and without the worries of possible errors. Why did
then the traditional intelligence gathering kept relying on methods different than machines?
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could only be successful as long as they are complementary and not used independently. This
became even more evident in World War II as the notion of total war needed total intelligence,
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While significant, changes in the way military campaigns were conducted was not the
only way in which cognitive threats evolved. Religion and culture were just as important as
technological developments in these periods. The rapid technological developments, along with
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European countries that were behind others or felt like they were soon going to be behind felt
insecure and started questioning their belonging to a particular social entity. As this was
compensated with an attempt by politicians to bolster this sense of identity and unity, some states
started to feel like they were not getting the necessary respect that its citizens thought they
deserved. The most vivid example in this regard was Germany, but similar moods were also
present in Slavic countries, Finns, and Magyars 272. The industrial revolution was understood
differently by people. The first notable crises in religion were in the sixteenth century, as it was
starting to fail to respond to some questions that were gaining popularity among people 273. The
role of religion, at the time and further until the Industrial Revolution, was still sensible but
slowly declining, giving room to blossoming ideologies in the 19th century that were more suited
to explain the changes that were happening during this time. Lindemann274 outlines a few
questions that were taking central place in public debates in Modern Europe. These questions
demanded more specific answers than what religion was capable of providing. Thus, these
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questions were the generator of the prolifera i
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such new ideologies as socialism and capitalism), the Woman Question (feminism, the changing
status of women), the Irish Question (nationalism, racism, imperialism), the Jewish Question
(antisemitism, Zionism), the German Question (nationalism, racism), and the Eastern Question
(having to do with the fate of the Ottoman Empire, especially in the Balkans and the Middle
Ea )

275.

It is argued that in times of uncertainty, people look to attach themselves to a collective

entity that ensures proper confirmation of

e ide i . An amalgamation between religion and

nationalist ideology is found to be particularly successful in reaffirming identities and providing
ontological security in times of intensively changing environment276. As leaders found that
ideology could be a mighty weapon in mobilizing people to do one thing or another, they started
shaping ideologies as antidotes of other ideologies (e.g. communism as an antidote to
capitalism). Part of this discourse were propaganda campaigns with the aim to convince people
in the rightfulness of a particular ideology. In some cases, however, the propaganda went further
than this and employed disinformation to a goal different than just attracting people to an idea.
There are some examples of cognitive threats that aimed to convince people in the superiority of
a particular ideology, but they needed more than just this. They wanted particular actions from
the recipients of the disseminated messages

for instance overthrowing capitalist governments

(communism) or provoking oppression or aggression to minority ethnic groups (nationalism).
Development of cognitive threats in the 21st century. The beginning of post-Modernism
brought tremendous changes in the way people understand warfare. While cultural, religious and
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social changes are still very important in this time period, the progress in technology was the
most remarkable component in studying the evolution of cognitive threats in warfare.
Social media made a big step toward changing traditional perceptions about
communication, interaction, and even politics and diplomacy. The high number of significant
events whose beginning can be traced to a conversation or an initiative in social media is an
example of how successful they were in connecting and uniting people, easily, quickly and
effortlessly. The figure of the individual in political science and international studies gained new
meaning as humans, and their collective actions in social media attracted the interest of many
scholars. It was not only he a ici a

g ill

cha ge egime ,

licie a d

ice

concerns of social significance that brought them to social media. It was simply the addictiveness
of the social media platforms that not only attracted but kept and gained even more users
worldwide. The idea behind social networks was to create an interaction that resembles the
features of a real face-to-face interaction

through emojis, likes, shares, tweets, and other

reactions. Lured into this easy way of compensating for distance and lack of actual
communication with friends, people started to share details of their lives with individuals with
whom they would not even think about sharing in person. Users have known and still know very
little about the huge amount of data that was gathered from them but not for them. Tired of
lengthy legal notices online, users eagerly click agree to anything that could be on these forms.
As a consequence of this and the fact that very little has been shared about what has been done
with the collected information, users consent to participate in a game for which they do not know
much. This could not be labeled literally as deception since the legal notices notified users for
various things. Companies are aware that the vast amount of the users will not read what they
agree to or will not understand the language and the implications of the content. Relying on these
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instinctive human reactions to avoid reading pages of information that they find hard to
de

a d, c m a ie

killf ll gai ed a legal a

f

fi i g f m hei

e

i f ma i .

As opposed to this, some actions of social networks were violating rules and laws, as it was in
the case with Cambridge Analytica, which will be explored in detail in Chapter 3.
The new social setting gave birth also to new conflicts and diplomacy-making. While
both could come from public figures, most voices in these conversations were anonymous which
made traditional understanding of warfare and negotiations disrupted and unclear. In the era of
Modernism, diplomacy was a more secretive enterprise involving meetings at undisclosed
publicly locations between representatives of different governments. Social media changed all
hi , a he e i e
e f ma i e

ce

became le
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lic -oriented and more public and
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. In practice, it was the loudest voice that mattered, rather than the voice stating

the more solid argument. Quantity replaced quality in the online conversations whose main value
was the attraction of attention rather than statements supported by proven facts. One of the
mechanisms for spreading a message was through like-minded people who, due to their
confirmation biases, agreed and shared rapidly the content online very often without even
questioning the source or the truthfulness of the message. In the classical antiquity, Renaissance
and early Modernism, the personality behind the message mattered, as reliability was mostly
determined by the status of the person delivering the information. Commanders, rulers. and
people of power shared information that was rarely doubted. However, even in these periods,
with the creation of deception and disinformation as a military strategy tool, it became evident
that a story that is confirmed by various sources should be accepted as true. As the power
dynamics shifted and the world transitioned into democratic forms of government, the voice of
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the citizens started to matter more. With social networks, the personality of the messenger
became even more loosely associated with the reliability of the message, also because in many
cases there was very little known about the author. Moreover, many people who use social
networks for entertainment and communication are still not fully aware that unknowingly and
inevitably they are part of a much bigger picture

of conflicts, of corporate interests, money, and

power.
One of the most remarkable advancements in technology that reflected directly on many
areas of human life are the neural networks. Simply put, they represent a different kind of
computers that do not rely on a simple mathematical rule to make deductions but use complex
systems of information that build connections between each other and are based on recognition
rather than on a specific command. In many ways, these neural networks are supposed to imitate
a human brain, as it was claimed years ago that machines would never be able to think on their
own unless they start learning. That possibility is no longer theoretical as neural networks keep
evolving in ways that are closer and closer to how human brains function. Among the numerous
applications of neural networks that are beneficial to society (e.g., in medicine, predicting the
weather and financial trends), neural networks started to get utilized in many other ways that are
nowadays considered, controversial, the least.
Interestingly, as social networks took a central place in social life and modern warfare,
the role of the users in these networks also changed dramatically. They intended to contribute
content, exchange thoughts, and other information have transformed partially into observers of
interactions between trolls, bots, chat-bots and other advanced algorithms meant to simulate
human online activity278. The e e al e
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application was oriented to helping people, the users turned out to be the study subjects of neural
networks and AI technologies. This, by itself, does not necessarily entail adverse consequences.
However, in the post-modern era in which corporations with practically unlimited capabilities
were proliferating, money and power have become even more central. The means of obtaining
them in a time period in which democracies are accepted as the predominant political model in
the world is to simply control the demos (the population). Admitting to openly controlling a
population would contradict the principles of freedom of thought and speech in democracies.
Regardless, machine learning and AI made it possible that people give in the control over their
own cognition to others, unknowingly sharing information about every corner of their minds.
What is more problematic is that social media is just one part of the problem. It is also the easy
access to tracking the digital moves of people, that helps corporations and governments collect
so much data. Moreover, technological developments have a very important quality

they are

irreversible. Once they emerge and begin being used, there is no way of forgetting about them.
Even with nuclear weapons and years of international treaties and negotiations, they still exist,
and their creation cannot be undone. The possibility that they are used will always be there.
Another technological development threatening to bring new meaning to warfare is the
so-called deepfake software. What this software does is manipulating video and audio content.
Thus, the face and the voice of a celebrity or a public figure can be adjusted in a way in which
actions, statements, and expressions appear to come from them. An old predecessor of the
deepfake content was the Photoshop software, which started being used to manipulate pictures to
deceive people and institutions to which they were presented. The more advanced the
technologies become, the more real their products look like. Furthermore, while such
manipulations still require skills and access to software that is typically controlled by
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organizations, governments, or super-empowered individuals, specialists predict that these
techniques will rapidly become more accessible to different actors with various goals, some of
which harmful to society279. Strategic analyses outline trends that could create favorable
conditions for the implementation and the intensive use of AI and cognitive threats

a fact that

makes it an even more serious threat to society in the future 280. First, in the political realm,
changes are expected in terms of the increasing role of non-state actors, power-politics, and
distribution of power in the international system. Among the most important elements of some
cognitive threats is also the increasing public discontent with how power is distributed and is
being exercised. As for changes expected with human capital, growing urbanization, the
polarization of societies, and human networking will also create an environment for cognitive
threats. In the area of economics and innovations, the dependence on technology and the
expanding inequality (including gender inequality) is likely to make populations vulnerable to
tools of psychological warfare and manipulations.
All of these conclusions led to several points of consideration. Singer and Brooking 281
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to be present and will even expand its meaning further. Next, they confirm that the cyberspace is
an arena for battles, information is a weapon and should be carefully thought about in such way.
Participants in these battles are users of technologies, regardless if they consider themselves as
participants or have unknowingly become such. That said, governments should urgently adopt
new approaches to fight any harmful practices employed in the cyberspace. Thus, it is crucial
that users have literacy and are educated about the multitude of ways their information can be
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used, and the purpose and the meaning of this use. It should be recognized that efforts at the
governmental level are not going to be sufficient to combat the problem. Technological giants in
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linked to the use of the internet and technology in general. Presented as sources of entertainment,
communication channels, and a non-political space, owners of social network companies can no
longer pretend that their products do not have other applicability and goals. Before all, these
companies are established to make profits, and such are provided through a variety of ways that
obscure the idea of their neutral nature. Bots taking over Twitter, examples of hate speech
remaining unpunished on Facebook are just a few examples of why cognitive threats have
become so prevalent. Bots create conversations and provoke people to be more active online
which increases the popularity and the attention to Twitter. At the same time, Facebook was
incapable of imposing rules condoning hate speech and offensive behavior online. The number
and the popularity of some of the users were just as valuable as money for the company since the
former, in no small part, ensures the influx of financial profits. As any other entity that has
influence over a large number of people, social media quickly became a means to achieving
certain political goals by actors. They used this space to quickly and effectively disseminate
disinformation or to impose targeted political advertisements, both of which for the purpose of
tailoring public opinion in a way favorable to the perpetrators, thus violating the democratic
process.

The fight against cognitive threats
Cognitive threats are a very specific category of military and political challenges that
differ from other types of threats. What distinguishes them from traditional threats is that they
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are not material, in the first place. Thus, it is difficult to know exactly when they reach the
victims and the extent to which they will be harmed. In many cases, it is also unclear how the
damage will be manifested and when. Some of these questions are relevant to other, traditional,
material types of threats, for instance, a nuclear threat but science has good answers about the
predicted effect of these threats. However, similar to them, cognitive threats do not have a
history of being successfully fought once the attack is launched. Regardless, there were many
attempts over the years to combat cognitive threats, even nowadays. These attempts are mostly
two main types

directly fighting cognitive threats that transformed into successful attacks, as

the process of conveying the manipulative information is accomplished already, and prevention
and deterrence

seeking to convince the party responsible for the cognitive threat that the costs

of launching it outweigh the benefits. Psychological mechanisms, increasing the number of
personnel and their preparation, educating users, implementing new secure devices, new
software and policies were implemented to counter the detrimental impact of cognitive threats. In
order to answer the question to what extent these measures were and are currently successful, in
the following sections I will provide an overview of the tools used to counter four of the most
common types of cognitive threats that I previously mentioned: 1) traditional intelligence
gathering and persuasion through deception, 2) disinformation, 3) recruitment practices through
cognitive manipulations, and 4) collection and exploitation of information for political gains by
companies and even governments (e.g., China).
Traditional intelligence gathering and deception is probably the oldest type of cognitive
threats in human history. As mentioned previously, some societies were reluctant to use them in
warfare initially, such as the Romans, but later this changed as this turned out to be a war tool
that is cheap, fast and effective. Examples show that they sometimes outweighed the benefits of
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expensive and complicated machines which could be destroyed with a simple trick of the mind.
The most common scenario in which cognitive threats were present in the classical antiquity is
the one related to fake deserters who gathered information and then reported back to their
command. At the time, the mechanisms that were used to prevent the flow of information to the
e em

cam

e e mainly the experience with previously known cases of fake deserters and the

awareness this brought to future cases. Commanders, politicians, military strategists started
becoming more suspicious of newcomers and strangers and the information they were sharing.
However, the complete isolation from contacts with newcomers or outsiders was impossible for
many reasons including the need for merchandise, especially in wartime. Thus, the previous
experience with deceptive practices, the awareness that it may happen in the future and the
lessons that were learned were the primary weapons against such threats. This, however, was not
in any way a guarantee that they will not happen again. Furthermore, if the very same deception
that was used before in similar circumstances occurred again, there was no guarantee that it
would have been caught even though leaders were aware of similar cases in the past. Captured
spies, especially such from a perceived as friendly, state, were punished severely and the
relationship between the former allies quickly became strenuous. Knowing the possible
consequences of spies being caught, states were sometimes reluctant to proceed with their
actions, especially if there was a risk of starting a war for which they were not prepared or an end
of a diplomatic relationship that was otherwise beneficial in economic and political regard. In a
very elementary form, deterrence against deception emerged as countries were sometimes not
ready to pay the high price of a captured spy or an exposed deception that could be linked to
them thus possibly causing a war.
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Further, in the Renaissance and in the early Modernism, the art of torturing and
questioning, especially in the era of powerful monarchies was proliferating. A wide range of
methods of obtaining information was used. Despite the elaborate mechanisms of making people
report information of interest, in many cases, physical tortures made the prisoners more likely to
deliver information that the torturers wanted to hear, rather than the truth. Torturing also became
a powerful method for political retaliation thus information gathering did not always deliver the
expected results. Monarchical societies after the end of the classical antiquities were more
structured farm workers had their own social circles, royals, and people of noble origin who
were typically present in the court and had their own community. The lower class had no access
to the elite, as the only exception were the merchants depending on their status. The wealthier
and more prestigious merchants had access to court, and the poorer ones were selling their
products and services to the lower class outside of the court. Even with these social divisions,
however, it was difficult to know every single person who resided in the court since the servants
taking care of the nobles were changing frequently. The sanctions for treason and espionage was,
similar to the previous era

death. Even with the prospect of such punishment, a large number of

people were ready to use deception and manipulation to obtain information for the highest bidder
who will ensure money, power or both. Hence, the increased level of security and the relative
isolation from other circles of the society were not sufficient. Without any doubt, such measures
were contributing to some extent to prevent cognitive threats, but at the same time, they just
made manipulations and deceptions more elaborate and thus frequently successful.
In the era of the Renaissance and the Modernism, the possibility of war and an end to
diplomatic relationships with countries whose spies were caught, and their plans exposed also
served as deterrent to cognitive threats. In this time period, even more than in the classical
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antiquity, economic dependence was present and was a powerful reason not to risk war or
sanctions with a friendly or even an antagonistic country. The fear of lengthy and extremely
painful tortures in cases of exposure of the agent was also a significant deterrent for the lack of
involvement in such missions. It has to be mentioned that religion was still very important
component in these societies. The loyalty to the monarch, whose figure was directly connected to
he idea f G d
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deception against the crown. Loyalty, patriotism, and religious piety, at least partially, served as
a barrier to actions involving cognitive threats. Interestingly, sometimes the same political and
religious reasons served to encourage deceptive actions in support of the monarch. For others,
however, money and power were a much more important priority, which is also the most
important reason why even considering these deterrents, cognitive threats were still very
common and once triggered were difficult to be prevented, and their effect reversed. That said
the fight against cognitive threats was not delivering the expected results unless it was caught in
time before it triggers a particular behavior from the recipient. Once the behavior, goal of the
cognitive threat, was present, its mission was accomplished, and it could no longer be prevented.
A very bright example in this regard is Lord Walsingham and his intention to do everything
possible to protect the reign of Elizabeth I from her cousin Mary Queen of Scotts. Walsingham
tricked the Catholic queen in exile to get involved in an assassination plot against Elizabeth. At
the time, even though Mary was a threat to her throne and her lands, Elizabeth I was reluctant to
sentence her cousin to death. Aware of these sentiments, Walsingham deceived Mary to consent
to an assassination plot against Elizabeth. The proof of her involvement was still not enough for
Elizabeth to confirm the death sentence and Walsingham fabricated a few other plots for her

106
assassination with the idea to make her afraid for her life and reign 282. Af e Wal i gham
skillful portrayal of Elizabeth being surrounded by Catholic enemies and traitors, she finally
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283.

Further, during the Cold War concerns about breaking diplomatic ties was not an issue
since the world was bipolar at the time and the connections between the two camps were already
broken. Economic dependency was only present in countries who were satellites either of the
West or the Communist bloc, and they were reliant mostly on their patrons. Security measures
were increased, espionage and counterespionage, deception techniques and intelligence gathering
were proliferating. At the same time, connections of people from either the West or the
Communist bloc with individuals from the opposite side was considered ideological betrayal and
was thus severely repressed. It is paradoxical how in such isolation between the two camps, so
much traditional espionage and deception was still taking place despite the highly limited
interaction between people supporting different ideologies. The political conditions created a
favorable environment for cognitive threats. Severe punishments including death were not
enough to prevent agents from executing cognitive operations against their own countries. As
opposed to nuclear threats whose detrimental effect both sides realized, cognitive threats were
perceived as quite common weapon in warfare at the time. Moreover, since diplomatic relations
were not a concern, states invested large amount of resources in expanding the espionage and
counterespionage units. Deception gained new dimensions, and such operations became much
more elaborate than in previous years. In fact, the ideological competition at the time was so
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The end of the Cold War and the new technological society in the 21 st century marked a
new chapter in the history of cognitive threats. Much has changed since previous historical
periods. First, most of the states are now democratic rather than autocratic even though some
examples with authoritarian countries show how cognitive threats thrive there as well. Second,
diplomatic and economic connections have uttermost importance in a globalized world in which
war is a costly endeavor that the liberal world seeks to avoid at all cost. Third, globalization in its
social, technological and educational aspects brought people closer than ever, even if only to be
able to argue with each other. Fourth, except for a few instances with increased border control
and immigration opposition, in comparison to previous eras, isolation of societies from outsiders
was not so inherent for the 21st century. Instead, the liberal order seeks to remove borders, create
a sense of common identity and bolster equality between people. Wars are far from being an
extinct phenomenon, however. They just gained different dimensions in terms of the actors
involved in them and the entities between which they are led. In this post-modern background,
traditional human espionage through deception has a decreased role. In spite of this, it is still
present. Mainly its underestimated role in a world governed by technologies brings back some of
the simple deception techniques of the past

the figure of the spy deceiving an individual to

obtain information about the enemy, both in the physical and in the cyberspace. Countries still
maintain their intelligence gathering units and are aware of possible deception operations.
Regardless, they know that they are rare because the price if a spy gets caught is higher than ever
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nowadays. Instead, security measures in terms of training of personnel are adopted in addition to
efficient cybersecurity practices. Such mechanisms are not preventing cognitive threats
altogether but just increasing the costs of an eventual attack by enemies in terms of time, strategy
and resources. Furthermore, if exposed, the identity of an agent in the physical space could
quickly be linked to working for their country of origin as this could create a series of diplomatic
problems. Thus, a preferred way for conducting cognitive warfare is in the cyberspace where the
identity of the perpetrator could remain unknown. Among other strategies for deterrence,
adopting general international agreements and regulations decreases the chance of cognitive
threats since they imply free will and voluntary binding. Moreover, the idea of international
society where negotiations and persuasion will occur openly and in a direct manner makes
deceptive operations without much meaning. The world in the 21st century, while resembling
some features of international society, still has a long way to go to fully implement the ideals
proclaimed by the liberal order. Thus, traditional wars still exist but so do unorthodox ones.
Democracies are the prevalent form of governance, but autocracies still exist as well. In this
sense, a transition to the end of history286 but not an arrival to this state still grants many
opportunities for non-traditional warfare, and cognitive campaigns as being the most successful
of them.
Disinformation. Although the importance of disinformation was recognized early in the
classical antiquity period, it went through a fascinating transformation over the ages, mostly
driven by the political, technological and social conditions. Feeding the enemy with
disinformation was established as a very successful strategy in the early centuries. It was not
unproblematic as it seems at first glance. In order to be believable, the person conveying the
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information has to be trusted or at least not distrusted. Second, the information should be tailored
in a way that would be believed by the recipient. Along with these complications, the fear of
exposure, the punishment and the consequences of a revealed disinformation plan also made
disinformation in the early centuries a useful practice but not ideal as its cost was too high
sometimes. There were some measures that ancient leaders were using to identify disinformation,
such as checking the information provided by one source and comparing it to other accounts of
the same event. While practical, this strategy does not come without some limitations. To
attempt to verify a piece of information, first, there should be a suspicion that it could be
possibly untrue. Second, there should be more than just one source available to verify the
original story. Third, there should be enough time for this investigation to be conducted and such
time was rarely available in wartime periods. Directly fighting disinformation was not always
possible because of the reasons I outlined, and deterrence had a relatively limited effect because
of two main reasons. First, war was accepted as a common phenomenon and moreover, one that
was inherent and even a desired option rather than a last resort. Second, there was a lack of
strong diplomatic and economic ties between the entities at the time.
In the Renaissance and the early Modernism, disinformation was also present but again
with limited use in an era with strong monarchies linked to the powerful role of religion. The
application of disinformation was present mostly in military campaigns and political
maneuvering. While for agents without established links to the crown, exposed disinformation
was not necessarily destined to begin a war, for such who were spies of the crown or people in
official positions serving the crown, war was a possible option. However, in comparison to the
previous era, diplomacy was more common through marriages, the role of ambassadors and
other economic arrangements. While wars were definitely not out of the question, frequently
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countries had other concerns that were consuming significant resources and were thus trying to
avoid wars and retaliated similarly with covert actions seeking to destabilize the enemy. It is
important to be noted that disinformation used not against a foreign country but against a
c
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monarchs had on their side religion and tremendous power

concentrated in their hands and did not find disinformation of significance in domestic affairs.
The World Wars changed the role of disinformation as it gained a central place in
espionage. Public opinion started to matter more than in previous centuries, and wars had to be
justified in order to prevent rebellions and other disruptions in the regime as a consequence of
the decision to go to war. One of the most efficient ways of convincing people of the need for
war and other extreme measures became propaganda and in some cases disinformation. As
previously described, the Cold War was the era with blossoming techniques of deception and
disinformation as diplomatic relations carried little significance to the two blocs. Even
relationships between allies in the West were sometimes full of suspicion and mistrust. The
central priority of the time

avoidance of nuclear war and winning the ideological battle made

disinformation an acceptable tactic that was not threatening to escalate the tension created by the
fierce competition.
In the 21st century, disinformation became a regular practice and was thus recognized as a
serious problem that has to be addressed. In comparison to other cognitive threats,
disinformation is the most frequently used, because of the little resources (time and human
capital) that are invested in producing the intended results. Much has been written on the
mechanisms that disinformation uses to persuade its addressees. Less in number are the works
dedicated to battling it. That could be attributed to the quick and easy ways of adjusting
disinformation campaigns to overcome obstacles. For instance, if one website distributing fake
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news is shut down, it could be replaced within minutes with dozens of new websites that have
the same mission.
Efforts are made to combat disinformation operations, but so far there is no ultimate
solution to the issue. Some of the tactics recommended for dealing with this threat include the
role of the military, education practices, and legislation. Among the strongest arguments for the
active role of the military are the ones that underline that information operations typically come
from military units and should be combatted with such, in response 287. For instance, one
successful anti-disinformation campaign was led by the Active Measures Working Group of the
1980s288. Another measure that could be employed in the fight with disinformation is education.
Literature shows that social networks are an excellent example of echo chambers in which
various like-minded users seemingly agree with each other, but in fact, they only confirm their
own opinion on a particular question. As users do this, they reaffirm their own stance and avoid
information that contradicts their convictions

a psychological mechanism that is well described

in the literature. It is argued that in the digital era, education about information, computers, and
the Internet is what literacy meant for society in previous time periods 289. Oliver Batchelor290
suggests that librarians and fact-checking services online are crucial in fighting disinformation.
However, there are various problems with fact-checking as a useful strategy in this regard
d
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overall reach and of sheer response time
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Some computer and social scientists devote their attention to solutions to the problem that
are more technical. A research team developed an algorithm for detecting hoaxes on Facebook
based on the people who like the posts 292. While such detection mechanism is undoubtedly
valuable, even if Facebook has information about accounts disseminating disinformation, the
administrators may still not delete them because of two main reasons

corporate interests and

the right of free speech both in the physical and in the online space. As for the first, some authors
write that social media companies should be regulated and held accountable as traditional media
companies293. In terms of the second consideration, most democratic countries treasure the right
of free speech as essential, and any restrictions to it should be justified. For instance, in the U.S.,
the First Amendment could be suppressed in light of some cases involving defamation. In
addition, in speech acts that involve threats of violence or represent hate speech, the right of free
speech could also reach its boundaries. Even if successful in the long run, such lawsuits could be
not only expensive but also very time-consuming. As a consequence, the recipients of the false
information may have already manifested some behavior that was intended by the entity
spreading the false statements

a fact that no sentence can repair. Such considerations, however,

deserve to be discussed seriously with another purpose

future deterrence - since disinformation

harms the very idea of the First Amendment which is the autonomy of thoughts, attitude, and
behavior. Ma c J
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deceived by false speech, she is doing something that autonomous and rational people never
want to do: build their actions upon confidence in false factual premises. Moreover, where these
false factual premises are fed to her by a speaker who uses them to steer her in ways she would
never move herself, her autonomy is not only left unsupported, it is undermined, making the
listener a tool of the speaker rather than an agent forming and acting on her own rational
deci i

294.

Recruitment practices through cognitive manipulations. One of the most dangerous
cognitive threats is the one used to recruit people for certain political movements through
appealing to their ideals. While not all recruitments for organizations and movements are defined
as threats, the ones who recruit people to use them for political causes that involve violence, or
prohibited coercion of any kind could be definitely labeled as a threat. The mere fact that the
recruiter knows that the recruited will be used as pawns to achieve the goal of the recruiter is
sufficient such practices to be defined as threats

for the recruited person and for the entity to

which harm will be inflicted. In the early centuries, the discontent of the people was skillfully
used as a mobilizing method of the masses. Discontent alone was not enough, however, if there
was no ideal for whose name the future actions will be initiated. In this kind of cognitive threat,
the personalities of the target group members and of the person, who is doing the persuasion
mattered and still matter a lot

from the early centuries to nowadays. In all cases, for a

successful persuasion campaign, there should be an echo-chamber with like-minded individuals
who are dissatisfied by an existing fact that they want to change, and they share the same ideals
that will be represented in a new status-quo after the previous one ceases to exist. The campaign
will not succeed without a motivated and gifted messenger who motivates the target audience to

294

Blitz, "Lies, Line Drawing, and (Deep) Fake News," 92.

114
undertake a certain behavior. In the early centuries, in order to fight such recruitment practices, it
was sufficient that the leader of the movement seeking participants, gets discredited. This was
not problematic considering that much of the power was concentrated in the hands of the rulers
and they could incriminate anyone who is trying to dismantle the regime, as long as they have
knowledge of the movement planning a rebellion. The channels of disseminating a message to
potential participants in the movement were also very limited. They included mostly physical
presence at the time of the speech. Such gatherings of people, however, were closely monitored
by authorities and their leader usually imprisoned, if caught.
In the Renaissance and in the Modernism, the powerful meaning of ideals and identity
became even more important. The channels for disseminating messages for recruitment increased
in number. One of the weapons for fighting such practices was again the elimination of the
leader. In addition to this, the Black Chambers added new nuances in the fight against cognitive
threats in terms of recruiting. Messages were caught, rewritten, resealed and resend back to the
recipients. Black Chambers caught conspiracies and exposed plots against regimes. Some
monarchs and nobles used fabricated evidence of allegiance to rebel movements to eliminate
political adversaries, as was the case with Mary Queen of Scotts and her perceived involvement
in the Babington Plot.
In the era of democratic regimes, cognitive threats for recruiting participants in radical
movements gained new meaning. While old radical formations aiming to achieve state
independence and/or recognition were still present, religion and ideologies gave rise to new
movements, new goals and new type of recruitment strategies with the emergence of social
networks. The most vivid example of such recruiting practices is the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) as they not only considered the Internet as a supplemental source of conveying their
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message but instead, they used it as a central arena for conducting their information operations.
Numerous studies explored the reasons why ISIS was so successful in recruiting new members.
Among the most important ones are economic reasons, including unemployment, discrimination,
a perceived violation of rights, including religious customs and traditions, adventure seeking,
fame, depression, emotional isolation, confusion, loneliness, and others295 296 297 298 299. In most,
if not all cases, multiple factors were present in a decision to join ISIS. As some of them are
micro-level and other macro-level components, they are difficult to be addressed
comprehensively. Societal phenomena such as racial discrimination and government policies
prohibiting displays of religious symbols were also not helping in the fight with cognitive threats
of this kind. It is true that traditional intelligence gathering was successful in terminating some
efforts for online recruitment, but in general, the anonymity, the easy access and the speed of
exchanging information were defeating the intelligence gathering agencies in their attempt to
prevent recruitment. Detection of all online communication, while practiced in some cases, is
still not accepted as a lawful measure against possible recruitment. In fact, as in the case with
disinformation, any restrictions imposed on the right of free speech (and by extension the free
communication), unless specifically proclaimed as illegal, would be a violation of the First
Amendment.
Collection and dissemination of information by companies and governments. Back in
the early centuries, information had a tremendous value that was recognized. The information
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about people of interest was also important. Information about regular people was not so valued,
however, because they had little power to endanger the status-quo. The

e e he

le

subjects, and their voice did not matter as much as in the following historical periods. In the
Renaissance and in the Modernism, the collective opinion of the regular people still did not
matter as much as it does in the democratic era. It could be said that the collection and
dissemination of information by companies and governments is a phenomenon of the PostModernism. The Internet and social media along with the growing need to have an accurate
perception of the political and cultural views of different social groups led to this new type of
cognitive threat. Despite the fact that in the 21 st century most political regimes are democratic,
some remain authoritarian. Even in authoritarian countries nowadays, the collection of
information plays a tremendous role

not for purposes of altering the status-quo, but for

maintaining it. For instance, the Chinese government collects information from its citizens to
construct profiles for them in an attempt to measure their loyalty to the regime. Based on their
individual score, they obtain some privileges or lose them. The construction of the profiles
happens through the collection of information from the Chinese social media monopolist
WeChat. Since it combines a multitude of functions available to its users, it also offers the
government quick and easy access to numerous spheres of the private life of its citizens. Unlike
the goals pursued by companies and governments in democracies, the target of the Chinese
government is to retain control over its population, preserve the status-quo, and motivate its
citizens to be obedient
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i i ie .

In democratic countries, the goal of collecting information from the users is a more
complex phenomenon. First, very often the users do not know that they are being surveilled and
profiled. Second, the desired objective in collection-of-information campaigns through social
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platforms and Internet of Things (IoT) devices is to sell the information to interested parties that
will then convey messages to targeted groups. The aim of the delivered message is to manipulate
people to undertake certain actions or abstain from such. The mechanisms through which the
manipulation is executed is psychological in nature

through the exploitation of cognitive

vulnerabilities of the human mind. In authoritarian countries, the regime does not hide the close
observance of its people and their private information because they have little power to protest
this action. Contrary to this practice, in democracies, companies, politicians and organizations,
while having enormous power concentrated in their hands, are still liable to lawsuits, protests, or
missing election or re-election opportunities. Thus, the collection and dissemination of personal
information of users is a covert operation that in many cases is either on the borderline of being
illegal or is simply illegal. Interestingly, even if users are presented with a statement announcing
how their information will be used, they never have the option to continue using the social
platform without having to authorize their information to be used in the way described in the
statement. Consequently, the addictive nature of social media including peer pressure and
suppressing concerns about privacy make users more inclined to share their personal
information. One study found that if it i ge e
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Similar to disinformation, this type of cognitive threat is also combatted through three
different methods

educational, technical and legal302. The first one is intended to limit the

amount of information that users share voluntarily on social media, the second seeks to
encourage social media themselves to give their users more control over their own information
online, and the third mechanism pertains to legislative solutions to the subject matter. The first
two are in direct conflict with the need of individuals to share information and the need to make
it visible. The third mechanism is in nature deterring than confronting an already emerged
problem. While education and technical solutions are helpful, if the entire issue of stealing
personal information is not addressed, social media will keep collecting and selling data to
interested parties as long as users post it. Moreover, educating users about the risks of sharing
personal information cannot guarantee sharing will not occur since it is, after all, a personal
choice. As for companies forced to provide more freedom to users to control their accounts and
the access to them there are two relevant factors. On the one hand, companies are not interested
in doing so because if the sharing goes down so will their profits, and on the other, even if users
are given more freedom to control how their information is seen and used, this does not mean
that they will exercise their newly gained rights. The latter is confirmed by a study on Facebook
e

e f
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that showed that 80% of the participants know that they could

use privacy setting and gain better control over the information and yet only 40% of them
decided to take advantage of this feature. As similar results were demonstrated by other studies,
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This chapter outlined various mechanisms for intelligence-gathering, deception and
persuasion. All of them continued their existence in later historical periods, but within different
conditions, some of which facilitated the proliferation of cognitive threats even more. Deception
by infiltrating a particular group through a shared identity, known in the early ages through the
cases of fake deserters, still exist nowadays in the form of traditional espionage and even through
social media posts that are not shared by an individual but an entity with political interests,
disguised as a person. As an antidote to disinformation, much like in the antiquity, fact-checking
is still an available tool to people but difficult to be used

in the past, because of the lack of

sources, and in present days, because of the presence of too many sources. The medieval
informants offering their persuasion and intelligence-gathering skills for remuneration and power
resemble closely the companies hired by politicians to collect intelligence to profile and then
influence voters. The role of women also grew gradually through the ages as it is preserved
nowadays through the presence of many female spies, and many female recruiters and
influencers. Once difficult, falsification of official documents and correspondence became easy
with the creation of black chambers and even easier with the digitalization and transparency of
information in democratic countries. The digital information was manipulated and distributed
even faster than in the black chambers due to technological innovations and democratization. In
the post-modernism, the distribution of power was increasingly in the hands of the individuals,
part of a democratic political entity. The lack of established diplomatic relations between
countries, laws and regulations governing those between state and non-state entities and
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individuals made deterrence tactics weaker in previous historical periods but a stronger
opportunity in present days. Innovations were growing in number but so are threats as well. The
high cost of wars made entities reluctant to pursue this option and turned to something that
remained mostly unregulated by states as a battlefield

the human mind. The only possible way

for cognitive threats to fail was for the perpetrator to discontinue pursuing them, or the victim,
being aware of the threat, to catch them in time, before any harmful consequences appear. Is this
possible to be achieved? In the next chapter, I explore four case studies with cognitive threats in
an effort to outline the reasons for their success. Then, in Chapter 5, I propose strategies to
neutralize these conditions and prevent the cognitive attack through deterrence and prevention
tactics.
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CHAPTER 4
THE FOUR HORSEMEN OF THE COGNITIVE APOCALYPSE

Stories about cognitive threats
In this section, I will present four case studies that will help tailor a strategy for
countering cognitive threats in the 21st century. The selection of these cases was made on the
principle of their notoriety in media and in the scholarship, and their recognition by both fields as
a serious problem that has to be addressed. In addition, newer cases were preferred over older
ones, as brief overviews of the latter are an integral part of the context of the former. I chose four
case studies from the past ten years (2009-2019) that all share the main characteristics of
cognitive threats and yet, they are different because they were executed in variety of ways. Their
divergent characteristics will be elucidated through the case studies as this will contribute to a
more detailed strategy that covers more than just one type of cognitive threats. All case studies
represent attacks against individuals primarily. On a broader level, through such persuasion
tactics used against individuals, these attacks aim to disrupt state and non-state entities as targets
as well. The case studies do not focus only on one country but strive to exemplify the diversity of
affected parties. The only exception is the traditional espionage case that was solely directed
toward the U.S. and other U.S. non-state actors. This case was nevertheless chosen despite the
fact that represents a threat against only one state and its non-state actors because the nature of
this kind of espionage imposes a limit of the potential actors against which it could be exercised.
Regardless, it is an important cognitive threat that has to be analyzed as it is also one of the
oldest types that are recorded in the history of humanity.
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In the literature, the type of cognitive threats that enjoys most of the scholarly attention is
disinformation and the recruitment of people for radical organizations. However, as described
previously, the deterrence techniques aimed to eliminate these threats are so far with limited
success. While disinformation is an important cognitive threat, it is not the only one. Much less
attention is paid to the oldest type of cognitive threats

the one involving espionage,

conspiracies, and manipulations, as well as to the newest cognitive threat

stealing personal

information and treating it as a tradable product. A product used as a weapon for persuasion.
In Chapter 3, I present the cases of Maria Butina, Russian disinformation, ISIS
recruitment, and Cambridge Analytica as they were described by the media, state agencies, and
the scholarship. This I do to introduce the cluster of facts that comprise them and to explore their
impact on what happened. I begin every case study with background information that will place a
particular case in a context hence connecting it to other similar cases and underlining the
continuity in the history of cognitive threats. Further, I make an overview of the case as it was
reported by a number of resources, both private and state ones. Next, I track what measures were
undertaken against this threat and how the cases developed further after the damages were
inflicted.

The case with Maria Butina
Background. On July 15, 2018, Maria Butina was arrested in Washington, DC on
allegations of being a Russian spy. In December 2018, she pleaded guilty on charges of
conspiracy to act as an agent of the Russian Federation without prior notification to the Attorney
General305. She admitted she conspired together with Alexander Torshin, her political mentor,
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and her boyfriend Paul Erickson, a gun activist with close ties to National Rifle Association
(NRA). B i a alleged ha dler in Russia
he c

d c me

Alexander Torshin, who was not named in most of

B i a ca e became a e
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Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Torshin as one of the Russian government officials
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Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) 306. On February 7, 2019, Paul Erickson was indicted by a
federal grand jury for money laundering and wire fraud307. While these charges were not directly
ela ed

B i a c

i ac ca e, i

a e ide

ha she had some role in his allegations as

well as he had in hers.
While this case may seem shocking for the 21 st century where everything is digital,
anonymous and the attribution dilemma makes it easy for attackers to hide their actions, it was
not even the first case of this kind in the past 20 years. In fact, in 2010, an operation called the
Illegal P g am c ncluded with the arrest of ten individuals accused of being unregistered
agents of the Russian Federation 308. These Russian undercover operatives called illegals
time sometimes for an extended period

e

living in the target environment and becoming

accustomed to their new surroundings, testing their new identities, and perfecting cover stories.
This time helped them melt into the background and ensure that they could perform their
i ellige ce mi i

ih

ai i g

ici . The f

he legali ed hemselves by receiving

local identification documents, obtaining local employment, and stabilizing their living
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Among the intelligence gathering tasks, other missions

assigned by the Russian officials also included sabotage operations as well311.
One of these ten Russian illegals was Anna Chapman a Russian agent whose story
became especially popular in the U.S. media. Married to the U.K. citizen Alex Chapman, Anna
Chapman is a Russian national, born in Stalingrad (nowadays Volgograd) in the family of the
former KGB agent (later a diplomat in Kenya) Vasily Kushchenko. After her marriage, she also
received a British passport, which citizenship is later revoked by the U.K. after she got exposed
and deported to Russia. Alex Chapman later confirmed that at the time at which they were still
living in London, Anna began meeting with Russians and became very private with her affairs. It
is reported that after a trip back to Russia, and despite her previously stated dislike for
Americans, she suddenly expressed her wish to move to the U.S. where after a few financially
difficult years with her new business, the latter started to flourish, and her living standard
changed sensibly312. During her time in New York, she was caught communicating with her
Russian handler. The FBI suspected that she was supposed to infiltrate the political circles in the
U.S. Soon after that, Russia and the U.S. made a deal to mutually exchange intelligence
operatives in 2010 and among other Russian agents, Anna was also on her way to Russia.
Warmly welcomed by President Putin, Anna was offered a position as the leader of the youth
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When asked about her time in the U.S., however, she remains

silent stating that she is not allowed to discuss it, allegedly told so by her handlers in Russia314.
While the aforementioned cases only outline the features of Russia as a political
competitor sending undercover agents in the U.S., the Kremlin is not the only government doing
so. Other s a e ha a e Ame ica
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Foreign

students are not the only ones who act as spies for their countries of origin, however. A
substantial amount of the individuals who are accused of theft of secrets in relation to their
employment is from China - 84% of the foreign perpetrators of theft of secrets are Chinese
citizens, according to a study that incorporated data from Department of Justice between 2009
and 2017316. However, espionage, defined a
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in the case of Maria Butina, differs quite significantly from the

corporate espionage inherent for Chinese citizens working for the Chinese government. Legally,
even corporate espionage is not as easy to be proven because there has to be a link to the
government that allegedly ordered the illicit activity. However, in the case of corporate
espionage, there is a second option for the offenders to be brought to justice

the theft of secrets

in which the only element that has to be beyond doubt is the unpermitted possession of certain
information, it, being either a physical or digital copy. That said the case of Maria Butina
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presents a lot more complexity and vagueness because at first glance she did everything,
according to the laws. She entered the U.S. with a valid visa, attended meetings and conventions
organized by an organization of which she is a member, then she became a foreign student in a
prestigious university from which she later successfully obtained a degree. The harmful effect, in
this case, is the influence that she wanted to exercise but also another component

the fact that

she was able to exercise it due to her connections. Mainly this influence is what distinguishes
cognitive threats of this kind from other types of espionage and makes it a century-long political
practice with notable consequences.
The thin line between legal and illegal influence in the context of espionage is
demonstrated once again in a more recent case in which there is only the suspicion for possible
espionage but no concrete proof for anything further. The daughter of P i

pokesman Dmitry

Peskov Elizaveta Peskova began in November 2018 her internship in the European Parliament
with the French right-wing member Aymeric Chauprade318. It is claimed that Elizaveta, a law
student in Paris, does not have access to any confidential information but only to publicly
accessible one. Regardless, as a former adviser of Marine Le Pen, Chauprade is a vivid supporter
of the Russian annexation of Crimea. Furthermore, he is currently serving as a member of the EU
Pa liame

Sec i

a d Defense subcommittee and in this capacity he has access to very

important documents that could be classified on different levels of security. Unlike the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union does not screen interns and does not
require them to obtain a security clearance before beginning the internship. Rega di g Pe k a
internship, there was an expressed concern that the European Parliament elections in May 2019
may be compromised by Russia319.
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From the reports compiled during the years about Russian access-agents and spies, it
becomes evident that they sometimes act as sleeping cells but get active when a specific task had
to be accomplished. For years, Ma ia B i a ca e a allegedly building the foundations of a
more significant project that aimed to establish communication between certain circles of
American political life and Moscow. However, while not charged directly with interference in
the U.S. Presidential Elections in 2016, it was established in court that she was receiving orders
from her handler Torshin in Russia even on the election night 320. In her plea agreement, there are
no details about her possible mission to influence the elections, but another case in which 12
Russians were accused of hacking accounts of Democratic Party members brings some context
to her case as well. While there was a lot of tension surrounding the U.S. Presidential Elections
in 2016, for some amount of time, concrete accusations were not made until on July 13, 2018,
the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) officially announced charges pressed against 12 Russians
accused of hacking members of the Democratic Party321. These 12 Russian individuals were
agents working for the intelligence unit of the Russian military division. The indictment released
against them states that they acquired usernames and passwords of various representatives
affiliated with the Democratic Party, hacked their accounts and obtained information that was
later posted on personal blogs and websites that supposedl bel ged
hack i i

322.
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All of those acts were committed with the intention of interfering with the

Presidential Elections, according to the DOJ press release. Days after the indictment, Maria
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Butina gets arrested for her role in a conspiracy to act as an agent of the Russian Federation
within the United States without prior notification to the Attorney General.
Overview. Born in 1988 in Siberia, Russia, Maria Butina becomes one of the most
controversial figures of contemporary espionage. At an early age, she was introduced to guns,
claimi g la e f
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Her early interest in guns evolves into a passion

that will affiliate her with many powerful circles both in Russia and in the U.S. In Altai State
University, she studied political science and education and joined Vladimi P i
United Russia. Later, she obtained a ma e

degree as well. She also established an

organization called The Right to Bear Arms that called f
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-barrelled firearms to
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. Despite some resistance by the opposition in Russia, this

movement quickly developed and added new members, one of which was Alexander Torshin

a

high-ranked official in the Russian Central Bank and a member of the Russian Council
Federation. Mainly this relationship will later be one of the most significant reasons for the
charges pressed against both. It is reported that Alexander Torshin became a mentor for Maria
Butina, encouraging and supporting her political career and sharing her passion for guns. Butina
expressed in an interview for a Russian website tha he d eam
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he

ld, a d i h

advocacy for her cause that is to ad a ce M c

li e i a

e

immig a i

325.

l g- e m

a egic bjec i e

She a

, highl

ecia e T
326.

hi

Torshin

is also a lifetime member of the NRA, as well as Maria Butina who joined in 2012. Interestingly,
before 2013, Butina was refused a visa to go to the annual NRA meetings multiple times,
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according to CNN327. After joining NRA in a member capacity, she began traveling to the U.S.
Prosecutors in her case claim that a Russian oligarch who paid for one of her visits after
obtaining a visa told her: I a

g

k i h he US,

g

a

i

i

328.

In 2018, it is documented that Butina and Torshin organized a delegation to the National
Prayer Breakfast in Washington, DC where Torshin requested a meeting with President Trump
which did not take place after all. However, Torshin previously admitted that he had met
President Trump in the past at annual meetings of the NRA. At the same time, Butina was also
active in her intentions to establish connections with U.S. governmental officials. In 2015, at an
event held by Donald Trump in Las Vegas, she inquired about his stance on the financial
sanctions imposed on Russia329. Her next step, with the help of Torshin, was to organize a
delegation from NRA representatives to travel to Russia for a meeting with influential members
of the Russian political elite. While there is some controversy surrounding the attendance of the
then-NRA president, Alan Cors, to the meeting, he decided not to go so that this is not viewed as
an official NRA meeting with Russian government officials. Even without his presence in
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Regardless, they admitted that they receive money from foreign donors, thus suggesting that
NRA may have been sponsored by Russian oligarchs or directly by the Kremlin itself through
intermediaries.
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Not long after the Moscow meeting, Butina traveled to the U.S. to pursue a ma e
degree in the American University in Washington, DC. Her presence in the U.S. also allowed her
to be closer to her boyfriend - Paul Erickson

a 56-year-old supporter of the Republican Party

and NRA - with whom, supposedly, she was preparing to move in South Dakota before her and
E ick

a e

. The couple met in Moscow in 2013, as Erickson and the president of NRA at

the time David Keene traveled there to meet with Butina - the young activist behind The Right
To Bear Arms. After officially becoming a couple, Butina frequently traveled to the U.S. to see
Erickson, where she was introduced by him to powerful members of the gun-lobby at
conferences and other events 331. At the time, Erickson, in his role of an NRA supporter,
volunteered on multiple occasions, according to reports, to establish connections between
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accomplish during the years of their acquaintance. In the allegedly unrelated charges of wire
fraud and money laundering pressed against Erickson, there were a few transactions in which
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initials M.B.333. While being in the U.S., Butina did not cease her communications with Moscow.
One message via Twitter revealed that the Russian government official with whom Butina was in
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shared with an American politician/activist that she had Moscow a

In addition, she allegedly
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In 2018, this task was becoming harder and harder

as her name appeared in media, connecting her to American politicians and NRA lobbyists,
attracting suspicion and mistrust to her intentions. She started expressing concerns about
returning to Russia, stating that she may not be safe there anymore 336. Rega di g B i a
unusually good ties to Capitol Hill, her mentor, and alleged handler, Torshin noted that she had
aged A a Cha ma

337.

Applied measures against this threat. Maria Butina was arrested in April 2018 and
moved to an adult detention facility in Alexandria, VA. She spent most of her time in
Washington, DC and in Alexandria, VA in solitary confinement for a total of 67 days. On
December 6, 2018, Butina and her lawyers were presented with a plea offer according to which
she will admit she was involved in a conspiracy as a foreign agent without the proper registration
with the U.S. Such crime carries a maximum of five years imprisonment and a fine of $250,000,
and a supervised release up to three years. In exchange for the guilty plea, the prosecution on the
case will not further prosecute the case. The recommended sentence in the plea deal is 0-6
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months of imprisonment (which Butina had almost already spent in detention facilities) and a
fine ranging from $500 to $9,500 considering that she does not have any prior offenses 338.
Following these guidelines, and as a non-U.S. citizen Butina, agreeing to plead guilty becomes a
subject of removal proceedings and deportation. On December 8, 2018, Butina and her lawyers
accepted the deal offered by the prosecution that confirms multiple examples of her
communication of Alexander Torshin, who remained unnamed but described in a way that leaves
no doubt that he is the man in question. The communication, mostly in the form of text messages
shows that Butina was indeed intending to not only influence NRA (named simply Gun Rights
Organization in the plea offer339) but to later benefit from establishing a channel of
communication with Russia. In addition to any other details specified by the plea agreement,
Butina also agreed to cooperate with authorities requesting her assistance. She was questioned by
the special counsel investigating the interference in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Elections.
However, Butina c

eai

was predominantly focused on he ca e ha he U.S. A
Paul Erickson340. Beca e f B i a

office is preparing for her boyfriend

on other cases, her sentencing has been delayed

e

e e ted assistance

a fact that will make her sentenced to time

served most likely if the judge agrees and confirms the sentence recommended by the
prosecution.
As for Paul Erickson, while his name does not appear concretely on the plea agreement as
an accomplice in the conspiracy, it is apparent that the prosecution envisions him in particular
he d c me i g B i a ac i
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he U.S. However, he has not been accused of any other

crimes different than wire fraud and money laundering so far. In the meantime, Alexander
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Torshin, the other unnamed individual that appears by de c i i
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only suffered financial sanctions from the U.S. but has not been so far accused of any crimes
ega di g B i a ca e.
The measures that the U.S. has undertaken so far are mostly legal in nature. Even these
measures were first challenging to be applied because influence is a psychological category
rather than a material one and as such it could not be easily identified. Maria Butina was accused
of operating as an unregistered foreign agent mainly because there were no other legal grounds
to charge her with any other crime

she was traveling to the U.S. with a valid tourist visa to gun-

lobby conferences, after which she obtained a student visa for an education that she in fact
finished. Contemporary law is not evolved enough to encompass modern threats to liberal
societies such as persuasion. It is very difficult to draw a line between legal persuasion that the
law allows, and illegal persuasion that constitutes a crime. Especially in the legislature about
espionage, such offenses are political and as such are described more vaguely than others. They
could include many different behaviors when placed in different contexts. As for the implications
of using legal deterrence against espionage, after the swap of agents between the U.S. and the
Russian Federation in Vienna, one of the returned captives

Anna Chapman was welcomed as a

hero in her home country. After her arrival, she was offered a job and enjoyed status of a
celebrity. That said, if Maria Butina returns to Russia which is more than likely since she will get
deported after she serves her sentence, she may share a similar destiny as her intelligencegathering predecessor Anna Chapman. The deterrence effect that legal measures have in her case
is limited. The sentences themselves are typically very short if there are no prior offenses and
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endeavors. As for the preventative role that a guilty plea has in the context of politics, it also
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does not have a significant role since the agents may be linked to Russian politicians, oligarchs,
and even government officials but it could not be proven legally that there is an intentional statesupported espionage campaign against the U.S. Furthermore, even if the captured Russian agents
give away the names of other operatives, there will be just more sent to replace the ones whose
real intentions and missions were exposed.

The case with Russian Disinformation
Background. In an essay about the Russian (Soviet) disinformation, Herbert
Romerstein341 writes that as early as in 1972, archives show, that there was a special KGB
handbook that contained instructions for disinformation campaigns aiming to produce certain
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the Russian goals, conclusions about facts. Evidence also testifies that within these campaigns,
there were not only guidelines to disseminate disinformation to vilify and discredit the adversary
but also to exercise influence over them in any other possible way.
In order to explain how Russian disinformation works, first, a proper definition for it has
to be introduced. To begin with, disinformation should be distinguished from another
phenomenon - misinformation. Misinformation is defined in the literature as an unintentional
presentation of wrongful information, according to an agreed-upon perception of truth. Contrary
to this, disinformation stems from incorrectly stated source or from an unreliable one and affects
the legitimacy of the information in a purposeful and anticipated manner. Disinformation
practices aim to manipulate the recipient of the message, to provoke them to change their attitude
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in a certain way342. From a social psychological standpoint, disinformation and any type of
propaganda represent echniques which induce the individual to follow non-rational emotional
di e

343.

They include, first, outreach to the collective and individual entities, second, an

appeal for identification with the group identity that resists an alleged enemy, and third, they
seek to conceal the sender of the message as much as possible. That said, only disinformation
could pursue political gains since misinformation is not a deliberate but rather unintentional
misrepresentation of information. It is a non-purposeful, erroneous portrayal of facts. While
difficult to prove, the intent to mislead, in the case of disinformation, could be reasonably traced,
through three mechanisms: the authenticity of the presented facts, the level of impartiality of the
reporting style, and the legitimacy of the sources of the reported information 344.
According to its purpose, the disinformation could be divided into two types: agitative,
that evokes active behavior and integrative, inviting the addressee to get a passive stance about
an issue345. The former aspect finds expression frequently in the form of an appeal to public
opinion which causes political tensions leading to the allegedly logical solution to just follow the
leaders 346. The integrative
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Further juxtapositions could be

made based on the content and the source of the disinformation that identify white, black and
grey propaganda348. The white propaganda reveals an accurate disclosure of the source of
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otherwise reliable information, but the content is still subjectively represented in a way to
convince the addressee of a particular idea. A relevant example in this regard is the propaganda
shaped by the use of patriotic statements. Black propaganda is described as a type of information
c cealed
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349.

As

opposed to this, the grey propaganda does not have a clearly identified source which makes room
for doubts about the authenticity of the reported information 350.
One of the most vivid examples of a disinformation campaign is undoubtedly the period
of the Cold War. Regardless of its end, however, such practices are still actively employed by
Russia in the post-Cold War era even more with the presence of digital technologies that could
easily disperse the propaganda message to broader audiences. In the years after 1989, Russia
aimed to maximize its soft-power through defensive strategies and the power of persuasion about
the positive sides of Russian culture. In 2009, a new mechanism pursuing offensive rather than
defensive soft-power was enabled by the Russian TV-station Russia Today (RT) 351. Along with
this focal point, the Russian cyber-propaganda became a very active weapon in the hybrid war
against the West and some former Soviet countries that lean toward the Western cultural and
economic model352. The 21st-century Russian disinformation could be perceived as a
c
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aga da but adapted to the new information age in a neo-

Soviet manner353. These modifications include a heavy reliance on active measures such as
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intentional placement of strategic content, disinformation, and exercising tactics of influence by
public figures enjoying popularity and trust 354.
Considering this historical context, the main mission of contemporary Russian
disinformation i

de mi e We e
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cultural, religious and political hegemon through the tools of offensive soft-power. More
concretely, the Russia-supported project, Eurasianism, as opposed to Westernization, has a few
distinctive features, according to Aleksandr Dugin, the creator of this strategic vision 355. First,
Eastern civilization does not recognize the liberal values as its intrinsic mindset. Second, the
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. Thi d,

Russia is a defender of traditional values that are in dissonance with many of the new, Western
liberal principles. Fourth, the U.S. is the enemy that stays in the way of the Eurasian project.
Fifth, the Eurasian project should be embracing the former Soviet states along with states that
reach Central and West Asian territories. In that sense, what would be the strategic mechanisms
for fulfilling this agenda and why have they been successful? Van Herpen356 claims that among
the instruments of Russian influence are: direct and indirect distribution of state propaganda to
the West; change of ownership of Western media companies in favor of Russian businessmen;
establishing new social networks and websites that spread messages favorable to the Kremlin;
intensive posting in blogs and forums as well as trolling content undermining Russia or its
interests; subsidizing political parties and political figures; re-installing espionage practices; and
assigning the Russian Orthodox Church a vital role as a promoter of soft-power.
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As for the success of the tools used to disseminate propaganda, Bjola and Pamment357
explain why such campaigns enjoy fruitful results in many countries. The authors stress three
main strategies used to accomplish this goal: 1) he eff
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In addition, some authors 361 point to the high number of sources that

distribute particular news containing disinformation, the alleged diversity of the sources and the
repetitiveness of the message itself, as well as the community of people that have similar beliefs
to the author of the propaganda message which helps spread the news even further. As for the
perceptual mechanisms that increase the trustworthiness of the disinformation message, it is the
familiar appeal of the message and not the reliability of the information that attracts the audience.
Furthermore, readers look for evidence supporting the presented information and evaluate it as
being true if they find any, even if the evidence is fraudulent.
Another element contributing to the triumph of disinformation in the digital age is the
presence of online trolls. Their primary function is
deba e
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la ing the public

and engaging in harassment of users that express anti-Russian standpoints. The

Kremlin School of Bloggers was, in fact, a project intended to undermine critics of the Kremlin,
oppose anti-Russian content online and post messages and videos supporting Russian policies
and interests. The Kremlin trolls are supposedly c
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In a broader

context, in the hybrid war against the West, there is a central place assigned to information as a
weapon. However, as opposed to the Cold War type of propaganda that the Soviet Union used, in
the 21st century, this propaganda is transformed into information warfare that seeks to achieve
goals beyond those of propaganda. These goals assume the use of spetspropaganda (special
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As opposed to the old goals of

propaganda that aimed to attract social perceivers to the Soviet ideology, the ultimate goal of the
new Russian strategy after the fall of the Soviet Union is instead, to
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Overview. While some of the Russian disinformation is focused mostly on particular
populations, their campaigns are widely spread even beyond the borders of the European Union,
beyond the U.S., beyond continents, cultures, and values. The European External Action Service
(EEAS) created a resource called EU vs. Disinformation that tracks disinformation articles,
identifies the target audience and provides facts that disprove the misleading information in the
original pieces. Archives on this website show that the disinformation wave reached even
countries such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Finland, Moldova, and Serbia. However, the Top 3
countries affected by disinformation campaigns were namely the U.S., Ukraine and the European
Union countries 366. Interestingly, a poll in Russia showed that respondents consider these three
countries/entities as its biggest enemies 367. For the purposes of this overview, in the following
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sections, I will only describe the disinformation practices in the three regions where Russian
disinformation is most prevalent

the U.S., Ukraine and EU-member states. Though not

exhaustive, it will give a representation of the political, psychological and social context of
disinformation threats.
Some of the disinformation campaigns could be easily traced back to Russia but others
cannot. In fact, some of the disinformation, especially in social networks, is disseminated by
users that do not e e k

ha a e c
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amel

what makes disinformation so dangerously powerful and the cognitive threat it represents - so
detrimental.
Many were skeptical that the Russian disinformation practices of coercive influence
could be successful in the U.S.

there is not any particularly large ethnic or religious minority

that Russia can easily appeal to, nor is there any close relationship that could justify potential
benevolence of a large amount of U.S. people to Russia. On the contrary, both countries have
portrayed each other as villains for decades. Yet estimates show that this influence-campaign
reached approximately 126 million users 368. Considering this historical background, it was
indeed shocking for many to find out that Russian disinformation had entered the U.S. borders.
This campaign overwhelmed the online space with fake news and ad
chaos, inflame emotions, and polarize a divided public
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to discredit Hillary Clinton, whom

President Vladimir Putin expected to win the Oval Office

369.

The various advertisements that

Russians bought include pictures promoting anti-Clinton, anti-immigration, anti-Muslim
messages and such that directly try to provoke a clash on topics on which public opinion is
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strongly divided (e.g., Confederate flags, police brutality, and the Black Lives Matter
movement)370. The disinformation was in these cases mixed with strong messages seeking to
influence the social perceivers in a certain way. Among all online media, Facebook and Twitter
appeared to be a central arena for the disinformation campaigns in the 2016 U.S. Presidential
Elections. The majority of websites reporting false information was housed by Facebook and
used as a political clickbait371. Facebook was also the generator of more partisan propaganda and
disinformation than Twitter and other websites. The highly partisan-charged content is also
de c ibed a

he

i ci al i c bator and disseminator of disinformation

and Facebook-

empowered hyperpartisan political clickbait sites played a much greater role on the right than on
he lef

372.

That said it was established that both sides of the political spectrum were using such

strategies to engage their already committed voters and gain new ones.
Through circles of allegedly different networks, the same political narrative was
distributed, confirmed and validated to feed into the agenda of either the left or the right. As
Facebook contributed significantly to the success of the disinformation spread, Twitter was also
an accomplice but with a different role. Facebook was a fruitful domain for a variety of external
websites, but Twitter was a welcoming host to further discussions on political matters presented
by Facebook. Twitter enjoyed the attention of a variety of users ranging from the far-left to the
far-right. They were not the only ones commenting on popular topics, however. The Kremlin
employed numerous trolls and bots who not only increased the popularity and supposedly the
attention to a particular issue but also disseminated false information and ungrounded
accusations. If the dimensions of the disinformation attacks against the U.S. were only outlined
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by the increasingly populist media and their profiting from sensational headlines, an eventual
solution to the problem would have been much easier. However, domestic political trends,
values, and interests of various actors in the U.S. matched the Russian ones. And as Moscow
attitude proved on multiple occasions: The enemy of my enemy is my friend
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those of the traditional political parties. This complicated scenario identifies a few actors and
relationships that contribute to disinformation campaigns - first, online media. Second, the
catalysts that make online media accessible and even imposed on users (e.g., Facebook, Twitter,
Reddit, and Google) and their interest in profiting through their existence. Third, the reputation
and the accessibility of established news outlets to readers of all economic backgrounds. Fourth,
political actors whose interests match those of Russia in one or more than one area. Fifth, the
readers and viewers of information distributed through traditional and online media that
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373

and thus validating choices

that users make, typically in an effort to reaffirm their identities.
Another political adversary of Russia, and thus a target of fake news and attempts to
exercise coercive influence, is Ukraine. The history of Russian disinformation in Ukraine after
its independence is most intriguing in the period of the Orange Revolution (2004-2005) during
the disturbances surrounding the election of the pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovych,
whose victory was claimed to be fraudulent. This particular event marked the beginning of an
intensive post-Soviet Union disinformation campaign that coincided with an increase of Internet
users particularly of those using social media. At the same time, re-oriented toward a pro-EU
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path, Ukraine was still struggling with some domestic problems. One of them was the high
number of oligarch-owned media. Shortly before the Orange Revolution, a new outlet gained
popularity Channel 5 and rapidly became one of the most reputable sources of information. It
is claimed that this channel had an essential role in constructing the narrative that helped Viktor
Yushchenko defeat Viktor Yanukovych in the third stage of voting that took place374. The
medium is currently owned by Petro Poroshenko Uk ai e

e ide

i ce 2014. This

tendency is not rare in post-communist countries, however, and its influence is proven by studies
to be decreasing the level of freedom of speech.
In this political climate and skepticism toward the mainstream media, the digital ones
emerged as an alternative to the politically tailored by media truth. Somewhat instinctively, the
people turned eyes toward the digital media as it implied some more objectivity due to the lack
of control over the distributed content. During the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, the new online
newspaper Ukrayinska Pravda accumulated nearly 700,000 new visitors375 376. While true, such
digital outlets also have owners and invested interests in the particular representation of facts.
Moreover, the effortless dissemination of digital information and the numerous potential
addressees of this information made the solution of the old problem

a new problem. In times of

societal anxiety caused by popular events, disinformation is used as a weapon mostly because the
targets are very vulnerable in their thirst for information. Disinformation is not a new
phenomenon, but the digital media with all of their positive ide

ed
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propaganda machines capable of spreading disinformation, paranoia and ha ed

374

377.

i

Moreover,

Ulises A. Mejias and Nikolai E. Vokuev, "Disinformation and the media: the case of Russia and Ukraine,"
Media, Culture & Society 39, no. 7 (2017).
375
Ibid.
376
Sergii Leshchenko, "The Media's Role," Journal of Democracy 25, no. 3 (2014).
377
Mejias and Vokuev, "Disinformation and the media: the case of Russia and Ukraine," 1032.

144
there was another political detail that contributed to the intensified disinformation campaigns.
After Yanukovych fled the country, the interim government decided to change the law
guaranteeing the Russian language a status of a regional language, a law adopted in 2012 378.
This way the Russian-speaking population in Eastern Ukraine was left dissatisfied not only by
the turn of events in terms of the president they elected but also in terms of their own language.
In this polarized environment in Ukraine, social platforms and online media became outlets for
the concerns of a very politically divided population. This politically-divided population believed
and was telling different narratives about the events on Maidan Nezalezhnosti and what followed
after379. These narratives were not monochromic though but had many shades as the people
supporting them were influenced by different factors
others as lies

some of them they perceived as true and

regardless of what was actually accurate and what was a fabrication of the media

and the powers behind them.
In the light of these events, the attention to online media did not eliminate the influence
of traditional media and the disinformation that it produced. Instead, the disinformation became
even stronger as traditional media started referencing and thus confirming false facts from online
media and vice versa380. This was true for both Russian and Western media. Referring to the
quickly escalating situation in Crimea, Western media claimed ha a immi e

ac al
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embe

e a a e cca i

f m 2 Ma ch

12 N

381.

The political environment was so heated at the time that reporting of false news by the West
contributed to the spreading cracks of the very fragile peace in the region. Russian
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disinformation campaigns were not lacking either. For this pattern testifies the following case
from 2014. The Russian Channel One reported a story of a woman from Slovyansk who was
grieving her 3-year-old child who was allegedly killed a d

ailed

382

a b a d like Je

by Ukrainian soldiers in order to keep the local population in fear. The authenticity of the story
was never confirmed, and no evidence proved that the story was real. However, it first appeared
in a blog post of Alexandr Dugin, the ideologue behind the Eurasianism project and a vivid
supporter of Kremlin

licie .

In addition to these practices, another tool in the arsenal of disinformation is the
intentional misplacing of content. For instance, a picture of a young Syrian boy with an open
wound was presented as a boy from the Slovyansk region, allegedly wounded by Ukrainian
troops383. It was later confirmed that the picture originally appeared in an article about the war in
Syria.
Another problem regarding the false information distributed through traditional and
digital media are the paid trolls that generate thousands of comments with explicit content
typically confirming the authenticity of an article and expressing outrage or refuting some
content tha i

i e f idea a d al e

fa

able

R

ia

lic . As outlined

previously, evidence shows that the troll factories not only exist, but verify various speculations
surrounding their functions, funding, and overall mission. Infiltrating a troll factory in Russia
hidden under the name Internet Research Agency, Lyudmila Savchuk admitted that she and her
co-workers were supposed to follow guidelines in their postings defaming Uk ai e
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Western government and condemning the violence that Ukrainian soldiers were allegedly
exercising over the population in Eastern Ukraine 384.
Among other reasons, the annexation of Crimea was a result of Moscow i e i
protect its Russian- eaki g

la i , li i g

ide f he R

ia Fede a i

b de .

Russia was never hiding its ambition to serve as a leading nation uniting the Slavic countries
under its wing. Therefore, similarly to the Russian-speaking population in Crimea, other regions
are also hot points of the Russian geopolitical interests. Some of these countries are now part of
the EU, others are not. While the EU-alliance has always been seen as a competitor by Russia,
the treatment of the countries that sustain it is different. It is evident that while the former Soviet
countries that are now part of the EU, and the Western states are all targets of the disinformation
campaigns, they are executed very differently due to the way Moscow sees them. The Baltic
countries, similarly to the Crimean population have a high number of Russian-speaking
population. It is no surprise that the disinformation campaigns there are particularly intensified.
In Estonia and Latvia, for instance, they compound more than 25% of the population385. The
Northeastern region of Estonia with the largest amount of Russian-speaking population is also
ig ifica l le
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ia a e age
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However, if compared to the economic conditions that the same

population will be having if potentially this territory becomes Russian, it will turn out that they
would be worse off than in the conditions they are living under currently. Despite these reasons,
Russia still appeals to the Russian-speaking population in Estonia in numerous ways. As for the
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politicians and the people opposing the Russian politics, the Kremlin pressures them with a
powerful argument their gas dependence. The unrests related to the Bronze Statue in Estonia in
2007 and the followed after Russian cyber-attacks also showed that every action that is
undertaken, consciously or not, against Russian interests will be punished in one way or another.
In its disinformation campaigns, Moscow seeks to underline the oppression by the Estonian
government to Russian-speaking population and the attempt to destroy and diminish the legacy
of Russia in the country. Another focal point in the narrative distributed in Estonia pertains to the
alleged deg ada i

f

cie

m ale a d he fail e f he a e

ide acce able elfa e

conditions to its citizens. The goal of the disinformation is to cast doubt in the Estonian
g e me

abili

e

e b h he m al a d he ma e ial ellbeing to the Estonian

people387.
Somewhat resembling the Russian view of Estonia is the one that it has of other former
Soviet countries that are EU-members currently. Among the most serious vulnerabilities to
disinformation in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland is the education
system. Researchers focusing on this issue point out that the education systems in these countries
are based almost entirely on memorizing facts rather than interpreting them through a critical
lens. Moreover, the history books themselves do not contain moments from the world history
whose importance is widely recognized (e.g., the Cold War)388. Through online media and other
sources, Russia seeks to convince Eastern- and Central European countries that
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Additionally, the success of disinformation is bolstered by factors such as weak civic society,
ethnic and linguistic ties of Russia with some of the population in former Soviet countries 390.
Moreover, Russia has local military dominance over these countries that cannot engage in any
campaign against it without a NATO intervention and such is hard to trigger because of the
unidentified legal status of cognitive threats, understood as warfare.
Another element that carries meaning in the context of disinformation in Central and
Eastern European EU-states is the non-decisive standpoint of politicians. While some of them
show a friendly attitude toward Russia, others are very reluctant in labeling Russia as an
aggressor and the mastermind behind the disinformation campaigns 391. This is especially true
since there is a confirmed pattern of Russian financing for right-wing parties, radical parties
expressing supremacist, Nazi, anti-globalization, anti-multiculturalism anti-immigrants, anti-EU,
anti-NATO and anti-U.S. beliefs 392. Consequentially, Russian trolls support the agenda of such
parties that in return support the Russian political goals393.
Due to the lack of common religious and ethnic background that Russia shares with the
Eastern European states, the features of the disinformation campaigns in Western Europe are
different than in the countries with Russian-speaking or strongly pro-Russian population. While
propaganda and disinformation operations are not missing in other times, they are manifesting
themselves mostly before important elections in Western Europe. Considered as the heart of the
E
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attacks. In terms of propaganda, the three central news outlets in German are RT Deutsch,
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Sputnik Deutsch, and NewsFront Deutsch, as the first two are state-owned and the third one is
allegedly independent, but with suspected strong ties to the Russian Secret Services 394. While
sensibly less than in the Baltic countries, the population of Russian descent in Germany is
approximately 2.5 million people and is among the main targets of cognitive threats 395. Other
Ge ma ci i e , h a e affilia ed

ha e he idea

f Ge ma

fa -right party Alternative

for Germany also become victims of both propaganda and disinformation due to their
predisposition to anti-immigrant and anti-globalization rhetoric. Among the disinformation cases
that gained the most popularity in the media is Our Lisa

a story about a German girl of Russian

origin who was allegedly abducted and raped by men of Middle-Eastern origin. The news
provoked protests in different cities in Germany in a time in which the question about refugees
was severely dividing the German public opinion. In 2017, news about German soldiers raping a
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An intensified disinformation campaign was triggered also in France before the
Presidential Elections in 2017. A study confirmed the presence of bots that were employed in the
U.S. Presidential Elections in 2016 and then re-used in the French ones. In addition, it provided a
potential answer to the question of why the disinformation campaign against Emmanuel Macron
failed. The results of the project showed that most of the audience for Twitter content with the
hashtag #Mac
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a pattern that was in opposition to the general political discussion in which

mostly French voters were involved and e e

i e f Mac

Russian disinformation spread even to Sweden

ca didac .

a country that has not been in the

eyesight of the Kremlin as an important target in the post-Cold War period or at least not until
2014, as some authors argue399. With increased attention toward the Baltic region, Sweden
became a zone of deployed active measures by Russia. Similar to other countries where
disinformation is spread, in Sweden,

he openly pro-Kremlin elements in the Swedish far right

include the fascist organisation Nordic Resistance (Nordiska motståndsrörelsen). Nordic
Resistance has cooperated with two Russian organisations, the Rodina party and the Russian
Imperial Movement; their international network is the World National-Conservative Movement,
which has also donated an unspecified sum of money to Nordic Resistance

400

.

Official Swedish documents are also a subject of manipulations by the Russians. Online
media report the existence of certain documents supposedly prepared and signed by Swedish
politicians. Such forgeries often include even a letterhead that gives the document authenticity.
While they circulate mostly in less-known websites in Russian or Swedish, research shows that
at least on one occasion a forgery reached the traditional media that reported it 401. In the case of
Sweden, since there is no ethnic and religious background through which Russia can appeal to a
large number of Russian-speaking population, the target becomes the Swedish public opinion
and the decision-makers, mainly regarding he c

ela i

hi

i h NATO. An instance of

this is a host agreement from 2016 for easier access of NATO forces to Swedish territories
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including times of training and crises. Attempting to prevent the ratification, an anti-NATO
narrative started dominating the disinformation campaigns. It was depicted in the news
announcing NATO submarines i la i g S ede
c ce

di g he a ifica i ,

e i

ial waters

402

and some legal

ch a ha NATO will be allowed to place nuclear

weapons on Swedish military bases, use Swedish territory to launch a first-strike attack on
Russia and enjoy legal immunity for crimes committed by NATO troops on Swedish
territory

403.

Applied measures against this threat. Beginning to realize the seriousness of the
problem with Russian disinformation, states affected by these campaigns launched a series of
measures

some to deter future threats, others to combat their consequences. These measures

could be conceptually divided into four groups: legal measures, the establishment of new
agencies and units, creation of new media channels to prevent disinformation, and drawing
awareness to the issue.
The legal measures that are undertaken are dependent upon multiple conditions since
disinformation is not a crime, and, in the online space, the attribution dilemma makes it very
hard to establish a connection between content and a user, especially if the user is acting on
behalf of the government. That said legal measures against disinformation are only possible
when they are combined with another act that actually constitutes a crime

for instance, hacking

and posting false statements on social media, as it was in the charges pressed against twelve
GRU officers 404. Even if the offenders are indicted, the chance of bringing them to justice is
minimal because, if they reside in Russia, they will not be extradited to the U.S. Some of the
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tactics used in such cases are that the defendants are manipulated to visit a third country with
which the U.S. has an extradition treaty. Once they visit, they can be captured and extradited.
However, such scenario would be highly unlikely. As evident, legal measures are severely
limited to a narrow circle of cases, and even they have a very low likelihood of concluding with
a sentence because disinformation, by itself, does not entail legal liability unless it pertains to
cases of defamation.
Other measures used in the fight against disinformation include the establishment of new
units and agencies intended to control the spread of fake news and propaganda (e.g., the
European External Action Service East Stratcom Task Force). In Central Europe, the Czech
Ministry of Interior presented a new unit that will handle the cases of disinformation and will
train professionals to combat such threats. A year later in 2017, Slovakian Ministry of Interior
announced that online media and their content would be monitored by twelve newly added
officers employed in the Computer Crime unit. Similar statements came also from Hungary and
Poland. Other government efforts include the Inter-departmental task force at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs in the Netherlands, that was launched in November 2015 405. While this is a step
forward toward recognizing the magnitude of the problem, such measures and their effectiveness
remain out of the sphere of competence of the law enforcement. There are no laws against
disinformation and taking down websites containing such may clash with laws protecting the
freedom of speech and the right of information (even if it represents disinformation rather than
information). In May 2008, NATO created the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence
in Tallinn, Estonia. It was created shortly after the Russian cyber-attacks in Estonia that followed
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after the Bronze Statue demolition in 2007. The ce e

is responsible for identifying and

coordinating education and training solutions in cyber defence for all NATO bodies across the
Alliance

406.

Some NGO efforts to combat the problem are also documented. In Armenia,

Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Netherlands, Hungary, Poland, Moldova, Slovakia, and Ukraine NGOs
use as weapons against disinformation fact-checking websites and resources, and identification
of tools used by Moscow as disinformation tactics 407.
Potentially much more purposeful and productive is the measure that Estonia adopted to
deter disinformation. Recognizing the similarities between Estonia and Ukraine in terms of the
pro-Russian population that resides within the borders of the country, Tallinn decided to deal
with disinformation not by taking something away, but by offering something new. In September
2015, he l cal
ETV+

kee

blic b adca i g ha
he R

e ed a e , R

ia -language TV-channel called

ia -speaking minority in Estonia informed about local and international

issues (two one-hour programs per day and regular daily news in Russian) and to provide the
audience with entertainment (such as shows and film purchased by ETV+, such as the TV and
web programs of Deutsche Welle in Russian)

408.

The third measure used against disinformation is the awareness of the problem. A study
of EU-countries exploring three variables - political acknowledgment of the threat, government
counter-activities and counter-intelligence activities - identifies the level of awareness of the
disinformation threat and how much is currently being done to counter it 409. Its results show that
most awareness and efforts dedicated to the problem are made in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia,
406
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Sweden and the U.K. Some but less awareness and efforts are registered in Poland, Denmark, the
Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Romania, France, the Netherlands, and Spain. Hesitant to
recognize disinformation officially as a problem and therefore to combat it actively are Belgium,
Slovakia, Bulgaria, Ireland, and Croatia. Among the countries with least awareness and adopted
measures against it are Italy, Slovenia, Portugal, Malta, Luxembourg, Austria, Hungary, Greece,
a dC

, a he la

coefficient is zero, implying that no political acknowledgments of

the threat are made, and no measures are undertaken to combat it.

The case with ISIS recruitment
Background. One of the most popular examples of cognitive threats is the one with
adical

ga i a i

member recruitment. While the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria does not

exist anymore, at least not territorially, such organizations existed long before its emergence
(e.g., Al-Qaeda) and will surely continue to exist in one form or another. In this section, I outline
the background of the problem with recruitment in terms of its targets and the factors that
facilitate this process.
Among the main targets of the ISIS recruitment were men, predominantly foreign-born
such as Saudi Arabian students, Tunisian workers, and European adolescents who have quit
attending school410. Most of those people did not have military expertise but some recruits such
as ba le-tested Cheche

a d U bek

411

were compensating for the

he

lack of skills in

combat. In 2014, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi appealed to men and women, of all background to
travel to ISIS and help develop the newly declared caliphate 412. Especially valued were
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preachers, doctors, engineers, and of course, soldiers. Children and adolescents were also viable
targets since their psyche was still vulnerable to ideological influence. The main part of the
young recruits was child e li i g i
supervision or neglectful parents

i gle famil h

eh ld

who have less adult

h e e ie ce d me ic ab e, e c.

413.

Moreover, they

were valuable recruits, treasured for the long-term plans of the caliphate. The steps of the child
recruitment process were first, earning he child
hile a he ame ime

h

e i g he

, then acting as a mentor figure to them,

e ial ec i

i h a e i , gif , f d, a d m e

414.

Another example of this tendency is that at the end of 2014 and the beginning of 2015, six
Spanish girls of Moroccan origin and between the age of 14 and 19 were arrested for attempting
to join ISIS415. European teenage girls and young women from other countries are also among
the ones who wished to join ISIS after they radicalized

they typically come from the United

Kingdom, Germany, Austria, and Belgium 416. However, not small is also the number of women
who with their children, left for Iraq and Syria to join their ISIS-husbands.
Among the main factors that contribute to radicalization and recruitment is the
marginalization and the isolation of many immigrants, or citizens whose parents were foreignborn or they were foreign-born themselves. Some were citizens of the country against which the
acts of violence were committed and were representing the concept of homegrown terrorism.
The latter envisions the residents of a certain country who get radicalized and recruited while
being in their home or host-country just to return and commit acts of terrorism against this very
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same country later. It is possible that the notions of immigration and homegrown terrorism
overlap since many of the citizens of a country, if foreign-born or born by parents who are or
were non-citizens, are perceived as they do not belong to the community and are therefore
rejected and marginalized politically, economically, culturally and socially. The rejection turns
into alienation, alienation into a vulnerability that gets skillfully exploited by radical
organizations.
In a social context, the process of acceptance of an immigrant to society goes through an
assimilation period in which immigrants have to prove that they belong by giving up their
otherness and by embracing the qualities prescribed by the society as signifiers for sameness.
However, some authors argue that for effective integration in the era of transnationalism, it is no
longer mandatory for immigrants to abandon their previous identities and cultural beliefs and to
replace them with the ones in the receiving country417. Instead, they could preserve their selfidentity and embrace the shared values of their new home country.
Regardless of the approach to the issue, the premise of geopolitical and mental migration
of people assigns a pivotal role of the media, the education system, and the state itself to create a
framework of openness and inclusiveness to the newcomers

418 419 420.

However, societies are

reluctant to welcome foreigners 421. Their fear of a particular problem becomes highly
generalized when it flows into the mainstream narrative opposing immigration altogether
factor that reflects
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immig a

identity and culture continue to be perceived by some as external to the identity that

the citizens of the home-country aim to maintain. The multitude of terrorist attacks committed by
ISIS in 2014-2016 raised attention to immigrants and entailed a rapid securitization of
immigration, even though some of the perpetrators were born-and-raised citizens 422. This
resulted in suspicion, mistrust, and skepticism to the mobility of people across borders that in
some cases was even equalized to invasion423. As a consequence of the increasing politicization
of the debate some anti-globalization parties and organizations advocated vigorously for the
threat that immigrants, in general, are posing to be eliminated through closed borders policies.
While proponents of free migration strongly condemn terrorist attacks and designate such
violence to belong in the realm of securitized problems, they still maintain that immigration, as a
category not equal to terrorism, has to remain in the non-securitized realm.
The contrast of identities of individuals that belong to the community, and others, who
are perceived as external and delegitimized, has transformed into a battle for electoral votes on
the political scene. These so-called policy narratives succeed to gain followers due to three main
criteria: plausibility, appealing to the audience tone, accordance with perceived national
interests 424. Accordingly, the narratives for immigration distributed by nationalist, far right-wing
and populist parties consist of similar elements of emotionally appealing binaries that only
increase their impact through continuous repetition in the media. Regardless of their
patriotically-charged tone and their attempts to create a connection between economic instability
and increased crime rates, these grand narratives are doomed to fail eventually, according to
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some authors, due to inability to rationalize the fear from the assumption that everyone different
is a threat425.
By securitizing immigration, far-right parties not only create a sense of fear through
speech acts and the power of language but also support discrimination on a racial principle in
their attempt to mask their unease of the fact that they could not combat terrorism when it comes
from within the state426. Therefore, voices in these political circles do not only reject the notion
of belonging to the community of racially-diverse immigrants but also reject children of
immigrants that were citizens since their birth. Only exclusive citizenship that originated
generations ago is perceived as a sign of acceptable relationship to the state, and only a shared
identity in terms of race, culture, language, and ethnicity could entitle the newcomers to truly fit
into the nation427. Consequently, many of these patterns could be found in speeches and
proclamations of nationalist leaders, thus making the immigrants feeling marginalized. The
former endeavor to conceptualize the threat as a more simplified category that could be easily
eliminated by creating stereotypes for the immigrants and thus delegitimizing them, instead of
recognizing the complexity of the issue. Although the populist movements are not only strong
but also represented almost everywhere in the world, some countries remain much more willing
to accept immigrants than others. Therefore, nationalist moods in their political climate are either
not significant or almost missing. However, the ones with a visible presence of nationalist/farright party/parties create a dominant narrative in terms of the immigrants, despite the fact that
they do not even hold majorities in the national parliaments. The member-states that do not
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perceive themselves as countries of immigration see immigrants as foreigners, and even after
they enter the borders of the state, they remain assessed mainly through their otherness428.
According to such narratives, immigrants are perceived simultaneously as a h ea

he a e

physical and economic security thus justifying discriminatory policies and oppressive behavior
towards them429.
After leaving their country of origin and settling into the host-state, many families are
struggling to find employment and means to support themselves. Experiences of ethnically
different (than the majority) groups in the workplace frequently entail suppression,
unemployment and underemployment practices that inevitably result in discrimination in terms
of the economic opportunities for them430. Monetary rewards and other financial benefits for
joining ISIS were pointed in studies as important reasons mentioned in recruitment and its
success

the remuneration of an ISIS fighter is approximately $1400. Moreover, fighters are

predominantly from low-income families, typically earning not more than $200 a month, and
non-college educated431. Paradoxically, economic privilege understood as affluence, access to
good education, and technology could also be among the reasons for radicalization, especially of
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Mainly young women are among the recruitment targets to whom financial rewards appeal the
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least. Many of them are from wealthy families, living in the West, well-educated and having a
promising future433.
The component of acute sensitivity, and longing for adrenaline and adventures, especially
of adolescents, also facilitates the radicalization and recruitment of ISIS members.
Vulnerabilities in a mall

mbe

f M lim

h ca

fi d hei

a to belong to society, feel
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434

are crucial to

ide l g becomes such an attraction to young people. Among the

appealing reasons to join ISIS is also boredom that is eliminated by subscribing to the exciting
alternative that the life as a member of the radical organization presents to the recruit. In
addition, some women left their countries with intentions to contribute to a humanitarian
mission. Frequently, such women did not plan to participate in battles 435. Others were interested
in helping the wounded but did not mind being included in combats as well.
Another important reason for radicalization is the exploitation of religious grounds for
achieving ISIS political goals. Radical Islamism has been the engine of the terrorist attacks
committed by members of ISIS both inside and outside of Europe. While the implementation of
ideas of the Salafism has been different across the various terrorist groups, its main goals have
not changed since Sayyid Q b, Sa

id Ab d A la Ma d di a d
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developed them. The end-goal of jihadism is the establishment of an Islamic order that should
replace the existing Western civilization that is perceived as impure, corrupt, and decadent436.
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The original objective was to create a new Islamic regime after the fall of the Ottoman Empire in
1924, the Western order had to be destroyed first. ISIS declared the establishment of the Islamic
State before completing the mission of taking down the existing Western culture as their former
leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi planned, unlike Al-Qaeda members who preferred to follow the
original order of tasks, prescribed by the jihadist literature437. Regardless of the particular
sequence of executing the different parts of their strategy, the continuing attacks of ISIS show
support for the fact that they still adhere to the two central tenets of the jihadist school
eliminate the old order and establish the Islamic one. In order to execute its main goals, ISIS
recruited members through, among other things, the religious appeal of the utopian narrative that
jihad offers 438. Interestingly, when it comes to women who radicalize, typically he

d not

come from particularly religious families, but are students who want to go to Syria to marry a
devout Muslim or provide humanitarian aid. As a rule, young women are radicalized outside the
home, due to peer group influence, a preacher in a mosque (masjid) or through religious schools
(mad a a )

439

. Moreover, the jihadist ideology is appealing to women, especially to the ones

experiencing insecurity, because of the following reasons - first, the communal conditions
offered by ISIS. Second, the chance to contribute to broader goals, such as working to create an
Islamic caliphate. Third, the predictable nature of the patriarchal order, that even if entailing the
loss of some freedom, would be preferred than the uncertainty of life outside of a strong
community united by shared goals and identity440.
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recruitment strategies was always

present, but online space made them much more impactful

they became more appealing, and

their message was reaching much more recipients than before. ISIS

e e ce

cial media

was evident in Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram, Tumblr as well as in communication
channels that included Telegram, Signal, WhatsApp and others 441. The es e ce f ISIS
propaganda is in the dualistic nature of the content they distribute. On the one hand, it is violent,
brutal, merciless, and unapologetic, appealing mostly to people who crave excitement. On the
other, appealing to a different kind of audience, mostly professionally-oriented, it is also
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Propaganda videos were typically representing the Islamic caliphate as a heavenly
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to anyone who is interested in joining the caliphate. It was not only

what content they were using and through what channels but also how they were reaching such a
b ad a die ce. The media
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were generating a large number of retweets. Once they got the attention of the Twitter audience,
they were free to incorporate their own message in the tweets. An example of the skills with
which they were operating in social media is the case with World Cup 2014, in which hashtags
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Overview. The following case study was selected to represent ISIS recruitment because
of its unique characteristics. First, the targets were women, instead of men, as the latter are more
likely to be recruited and join the organization. Second, the recruits were not the stereotypical
vulnerable targets, according to most risk factors such as isolation, low performance at school,
lack of social contacts, lack of prospects for better life and poverty.
The story I am using for this case study describes the path of the then 16-year-old
Khadiza Sultana and her two school friends

Shamima Begum and Amira Abase who traveled

from their homes in London to Syria to j i ISIS. De c ibed a
ki d

445
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a d

Khadiza Sultana pretended to go to school one day and got on a flight to Turkey from

where the girls took a bus to Syria. When she did not come home after the end of the school-day,
her relatives started worrying about her. Not suspecting any reasons why Khadiza would like to
become a member of ISIS, her mother and sister found out that she was reportedly in Turkey,
with her two friends

a fact of which both women were made aware by the Metropolitan Police

unit that deals with terrorism. Khadi a fa he had a sed away, but unlike other cases with
personal tragedies, the girl was not introverted and isolated from the world. Khadiza was
described as very intelligent, very gifted girl who was not only exceeding the expectations of her
teachers but was also tutoring students having troubles with their school preparation. Another
evidence for her social environment is that she was having a sleepover with her niece and a
friend at her house, right before she departed for Syria. The latter could not have been attributed
to some whim, however, but to a carefully executed plan for which the following facts testify.
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First, Khadiza did not take all of her clothes, but most of them, leaving some, as to look like she
has not left at all. Moreover, she used tote bags instead of suitcases to gather her belongings in
order to avoid suspicion. Second, she told her relatives she was going to school, as she usually
does. Third, when she left, allegedly for school, she only took a small backpack with her, as she
would have if she had actually gone to school. The overall purpose of the trip was to join ISIS,
but it is not entirely clear what particular goals she had in mind for her life in ISIS. Some of the
girls who left for Syria state that they were looking to join a cause, to discover meaning in life
and to reconnect with religion and spirituality. As women are generally not allowed in battles,
they a
i le ce

me he
446.
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If there is any stereotype surrounding the male supporters of ISIS, indicating a low

educational level, this is certainly untrue for the women who join the organization. They are
typically much more educated than men, much more goal-oriented, as this is found to be true for
various women who traveled to Syria across economic class, ethnicity, and nationality.
Khadi a friend Amira was also an example of these characteristics

she was very intelligent,

an advocate for Muslim women, a gifted athlete and public speaker with a vivid interest to
reading. She mentioned before her departure that she feels like she does not belong in the
conditions that the West offers. The decision to abandon their life in the West and join the
caliphate is perceived typically as an example of a rebellion, engendered by teenage impulsivity
and immaturity, a result of oppression of Muslims, anxiety about arranged marriages from a
g age,
left.
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conditions and cultural norms, there was also another factor that probably contributed to the
g

me
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e. Khadi a cl e f ie d, Sharmeena, then 16-years-old, also left for

ISIS after experiencing a personal tragedy
in her views a

he a g

the loss of her mother from cancer. She radicalized

i g m e a d m e eligi

af e he dea h. Sha mee a fa he

remarried after the death of her mother and she then began to visit the mosque regularly and to
defend ISIS in class, sometimes passionately and relentlessly. A change in Khadi a beha i
also was noticed before she left for Syria. She began covering her hair, sometimes at school but
also at home. Her brother remembers a conversation with her about Syria in which his younger
sister asked him about the political situation there. His response was that it seemed that most
people were against Bashar Assad

egime. Sha mee a de a

e for Syria influenced Khadiza

and the other girls to do the same, even though, officially the girls did not disclose anything
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her disappearance. The original plan was that Khadiza and three more girls, not two, travel to the
caliphate. Allegedly, the fourth girl decided to stay because her father had a stroke. Soon after
the police discovered the note suggesting the planned trip of the four girls along with a few items
he

a ed
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meantime, be ee Sha mee a di a

, a j dge c
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a

. In the

ea a ce, and the time the other girls left for Syria, their

school work became delayed and worsened
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a sign that both parents and school staff missed.
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American flag was burnt, surfaced. Amira was sometimes accompanying him at these rallies,
organized by Anjem Choudary, a British Islamist, known for his hate-speech and his allegiance
to ISIS.
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Perhaps among the most important questions in this case is whether the girls received
some help in fleeing the U.K. The fact that the plane tickets themselves, along with the other
expenses that had to be made for the trip were beyond what the girls could have saved or
obtained, makes it very likely for them to have been recruited and even sponsored financially for
the trip. Khadiza, allegedly, had not have taken the necessary money from her family as she only
took some jewelry that was not of high value. As for Sharmeena, she had received an inheritance
af e he m he

dea h, possibly enabling her to be able to travel to Syria. Another fact

suggesting the girls had an inside help was that a Turkish network reported that a man was
waiting for them by the Syrian border and giving them passports. The footage showed him
l adi g he c

e

f hi ca

k and saying something to the girls. Even before they

reached Turkey, their lawyer suggested that they may have been a target of a recruitment
network that operates in their London neighborhood

a conservative Muslim community

which is why the network potentially enjoys the protection of some of the locals.
Shortly after their arrival in Syria, allegedly in Raqqa, Khadiza got in touch with her
sister to tell her she is safe, they are eating pizza, French fries and fried chicken and are staying
at a place that had chandeliers, supposedly a hostel for single women in Raqqa. While not
explicitly stating her intention to get married, Khadiza shared with her sister that she considers
doing so. She also indicated that further communication should be initiated by her, a detail,
suggesting that her external communications may have been controlled. After some time passed
from he gi l fi

each to their relatives, they got married to Western men and have moved

out of the hostel to begin living with their husbands. One of them, Amira, became allegedly, a
recruiter as well. An undercover journalist posed as a potentially interested in joining ISIS girl.
Amira recommended that the girl should tell her parents that she will attend school activities in

167
the day in which she plans to flee, and then fly to Turkey from where she should be smuggled to
Syria. There was also mentioning of a person who would help her start her journey in London,
e idi g a a cl e di a ce f m Ami a f me ch
the third girl who traveled with Khadiza and Amira

l

the Bethnal Green Academy. As for

Shamima, she married a Dutch citizen,

Yago Riedijk, shortly after the girls arrived in Raqqa447. Allegedly, she requested an Englishspeaking husband between the ages of 20 and 25. The couple has three children, two of whom,
died. The third one was born in a refugee camp in northern Syria after she left ISIS. Shamima
British citizenship was revoked, as government officials in the U.K. stated that she would not be
stateless as her mother is Bangladeshi and she is entitled to citizenship in this country, a
possibility that was later denied by the Bangladesh Foreign Ministry. While Shamima
husband is still technically allowed to return to the Netherlands, he may face a long sentence for
his involvement in ISIS. Moreover, the Netherlands already revoked the citizenship of a person
who was an ISIS member. Considering these circumstances, it is unclear where Shamima, Yago
and their newborn baby would live and whose citizens they would be.
Applied measures against this threat. Politicians, practitioners and law-enforcement
officers from all over the world are puzzled by how to successfully counter recruitment for
radical organizations. Since such organizations are a threat themselves, the easiest solution to the
problem would be to destroy the organizations. However, especially, with the case of ISIS,
radical groups merge, split, join efforts or differentiate from each other but they never disappear
entirely because their ideology is still alive, as well as their ideas and goals. The defeat of AlQaeda did not prevent the emergence of ISIS, nor the end of ISIS will probably eliminate
cha ce
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rise. Realizing this, Western governments developed
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measures to combat the war for minds. Overall, they could be divided into three different groups:
disruption, diversion, and counter-messaging strategies448. The first set of methods include
cyber-operations that seek to take down accounts of ISIS-member that contain propaganda. In
2013, Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter started deleting and blocking such accounts 449.
Regardless, the nature of social media allows for a quick generation of multiple websites,
multiple accounts, hashtags, posts and tweets for every single one that has been deleted.
Moreover, the use of bots that could further facilitate the spread of a message leave efforts to
disrupt ISIS online agenda without the anticipated results. Some scholars even argue that such
strategies could push the ISIS digital recruitment and propaganda to the darknet which will
make di
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Another campaign aims to redirect potential ISIS-recruits to other community-significant
tasks to divert them from the appeal that the broader goals of ISIS pursue. In 2012, the State
Department launched such program intended to prevent young people in Southeast Asia from
radicalizing451. Similar efforts were devoted to the American youth but in the physical, rather
than in the online space.
A third measure to combat and deter the aggressive persuasion tactics of ISIS is
countering their messages through counter-narratives that are mainly two types. The first sends a
message through Imams and other scholars interpreting Islamic religion properly, highlighting
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downside of this approach is that many ISIS recruits do not interact with Imams, they do not go
to mosques, and may not be religious at all. The second narrative distributed as a countermeasure to ISIS propaganda is debunking the myth that life in ISIS equals life in paradise, as its
supporters promise. Instead, through videos depicting the violence, the brutality and the
bloodsheds of the terrorist organization, the social perceiver should get convinced that the life
described by ISIS members is an illusion. As this could potentially serve as a strong deterrent to
ISIS recruits, a notable issue in such campaigns is that the number of Muslims involved in these
efforts are not high. In addition to this, the anti-Muslim environment in some Western countries
could devalue the message of inclusion and support for diversity that is in the core of the
counter-narrative strategy453. I
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e
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e ed

by the tension between rhetoric and practice in the US War of Ideas should serve as a cautionary
example for Western governments seeking to address ISIS social media recruitment of their
d me ic

la i

454.

In terms of military measures, it is evident that physically defeating the radical
organization is a step forward toward future deterrence. Punishing its members too. However, the
legal measures aimed at deterring future threats are minimal. The numerous ISIS soldiers, who
are detained in Iraq, are a subject of vigorous international negotiations. The question that is in
the center of these negotiations is what to do with the prisoners. Iraqi prisons are claimed to be
full455, and other countries are reluctant to take the prisoners for their due process. That said,
concrete legal measures undertaken to deter this threat in the future, are subject to disagreement
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between the different stakeholders in this issue. Therefore, implications for deterrence are with
limited potential.
Another suggested measure of punishment and future deterrence for being associated
with a terrorist organization is the stripping of citizenship that some countries, such as the U.K.
have already enforced. Other countries, such as Sweden, have discussed the measure at a
government level but it was concluded that the cumbersome legislative process of implementing
this measure would take years and is therefore considered to be inapplicable 456. Germany is also
planning to introduce measures for stripping ISIS fighters of their citizenship in case they
possess dual citizenship 457. This consideration is engendered by the principles of the
international law according to which people cannot be deprived of citizenship in case they will
remain without one and will become stateless. Therefore, stripping of citizenship would only be
legally supported if the individual is a citizen of more than one country. The American President
Donald Trump, for instance, declared that he will oppose the return of people who have been
involved with ISIS, and will revoke their citizenships of naturalized Americans, even if they
resided in the country their entire life before they pledged allegiance to ISIS 458.
When it comes to child-soldiers and children of ISIS-members who started returning
from Iraq and Syria, there is not a large number of measures that are supposed to reintegrate
them into society. Moreover, placement in a Western-system that is foreign to them after years in
the ISIS-environment proved itself to be even counterproductive. The characteristics of the
ISIS educational system would make their adjustment to a secular, Western environment
particularly difficult and traumatic. This experience could potentially result in depression,
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isolation, and even more radicalization. The following sections identify why and provide an
example of the consequences that the lack of awareness of the problem brings.
In 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi established a new order in the ISIS schools that
underlines three tendencies. First, the female students and teachers were divided from the male
ones as the former were obligated to wear a mandatory niqab. Second, classes in arts, social
sciences, music, philosophy, and philosophy were eradicated from the curriculum 459. Third, new
classes such as Islamic jurisprudence and Biography of the prophet have been implemented 460.
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reasoning for these actions was that the (+) sign indicates the cross, which is used worldwide as a
symbol for Christians: using a plus sign would be imitating infidels, and was thus forbidden461.
In addition, these new subjects and the alterations of the commonly accepted scientific
language along with the overall atmosphere in the schools of the Islamic State resulted in
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propaganda disseminated there as this could easily lead their children to become fighters in the
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traditions of hatred and aggression. Outside of the school doors, public executions were a
common practice that children observed as well. After the age of nine, boys had to start military
training and girls were considered old enough to marry.
Considering this background, placement in a completely different school environment
than the one that students used to have in ISIS, could be confusing, frustrating and full of
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uncertainty and potential for further radicalization. Charlotte McDonald-Gibson describes an
instance in this regard, depicting a case of a boy trained in the ISIS culture of violence: The 9year- ld b
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Much criticized but offering an utterly different approach to the problem of radicalization
and re-radicalization is presented by the reintegration programs in Denmark and Belgium. Both
countries offer resources to help former jihadists with job search, integration, and inspiration for
getting education464. While some see such treatment of former ISIS fighters that returned to
Europe as full of reasons for skepticism and suspicion, others emphasize that this approach is not
applied without the necessary screenings and conversations initiated on behalf of the authorities.
A reintegration strategy could only benefit he a e s security in terms of the threat that former
ISIS members pose when they return home. Regardless, its current outreach remains highly
limited since approximately two countries in the EU are offering such programs. Furthermore,
while a potentially positive influence over the lives of former jihadists is possible, the social
stigma and the rejection, the lack of inclusion and the still powerful narrative about immigrants,
Muslims and terrorism could play a significant role that may outweigh the efforts of the
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reintegration campaigns. To that conclusion contributes the following relationship as well: the
higher the antagonism against Muslims on a neighborhood/community level, the higher the
likelihood for support for ISIS expressed on social media 465. Clea l , ISIS

li e recruitment

operations turned out to be a very successful tool in the arsenal of weapons that the organization
has on its disposal. Being aware of this, Western governments have been facing unusual
difficulties combating the propaganda spread by ISIS. The main reason for this is the problem of
limiting such content distributed online since the freedom of speech is one of the most celebrated
and fundamental tenets of democracy. Thus, restricting the online access of ISIS and other
groups suspected to have connections with terrorist organizations could have damaging
repercussions on the right of free access to information a paradox that poses an important
dilemma466.

The case with Cambridge Analytica
Background. Ever since its creation in 2004, Facebook was becoming more and more
popular to users. It kept adding different features, along with a messaging function and at one
point even other, third-party applications started being offered through the platform. The core
idea of Facebook was for people to share information and connect. And this is what they did.
Various elements such as convenience, desire for developing and maintaining relationships and
enjoyment467 contributed to posting large amounts of personal information with, supposedly
friends. What users did not know was that they were sharing and connecting (or being
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connected) to a lot more people than just their friends. They did not know, because they were not
asked. Users unsuspiciously shared more and more of their personal information and
increasingly with people who they do not consider friends or even acquaintances. Moreover,
unknowingly, they were sharing locations, feelings, experiences, hobbies, and stories with
complete strangers as well.
Facebook was not the first social media with millions of users, and it probably will not be
the last. In fact, neither social network was the first place from which personal information of
users was stolen, used without permission or even manipulated. The case with Cambridge
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used by political entities to gain leverage in elections. While there are numerous examples in the
U.S. about deceased people surprisingly voting on elections 468, this tendency is global, especially
in countries with authoritarian regimes or countries with high corruption levels 469. Clearly, it is
not the deceased who vote but someone using their personal information, typically, to support a
particular political party. Fraudulent use of personal information always existed. With the
emergence of social media, it only became more common online than in the physical space,
because of the favorable digital conditions for personal data collection.
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was on display. Users were outraged and

began joining groups opposing Facebook. To prevent users from leaving the platform, Mark
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Zuckerberg explained that the information that was displayed on the News Feed section was
public anyway. What he missed to say was that it should not have been displayed without the
e

e mi i

at all. However, a compromise was reached and in further Facebook updates,

News Feed no longer contained that detailed i f ma i

ab
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f ie d . Thi did

not mean it stopped existing, it stopped being public or that it stopped being collected. It was just
not on display. Users, on the other hand, were happy that their personal information no longer
appea ed

hei f ie d Ne

Feed which was, at the time enough for their relative sense of

privacy on Facebook. One study found that users on Facebook do not even realize how their
information is exposed and what consequences this may have for them471. In addition, another set
of findings points to the conclusion that even when given more privacy settings control, the users
are not always sure how to use them accordingly because they are simply not designed in a userfriendly manner.
In 2018, with a new privacy settings update, Facebook allegedly allowed users to have
more control over their information on the platform. It gave them the chance to opt-out in case
they do not want their information to be collected by third-party applications and companies.
This opportunity not only intentionally skipped to resolve the big problem with data collection
and data selling but was, in addition, unnecessarily tedious, time-consuming procedure in which
users have to uncheck all of the boxes of the applications/companies collecting their information
one by one472. Also, every time Facebook identifies a new interest of the user, the latter should
go to the privacy control menu and opt-out. However, Facebook does not provide an indication
of when a new interest is added
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their information is started being shared so that they can discontinue this process. A corporation
with that many resources and employees as Facebook should be able to offer a more userfriendly way for users to opt-out from personal data collection all at once, but it did not, leaving
the impression that the option to opt-out has been made so difficult only to make users not take
advantage of it. In fact, such universal opt-out option existed in the past but for a very short
amount of time because it was removed by Facebook, just to be replaced with much more
restrictions on the u e

c

l

early versions of Beacon Faceb

e hei
k

i f ma i . Thi

i e al

la f m ha ge e a e a d

-out existed in

ad e i eme

ba ed

on items a user purchased or browsed on the websites of some forty-four partner sites and shared
this information with a user's friends via the News Feed

473.

Later modifications of the platform

in favor of more privacy were implemented in Beacon, but the platform ceased existing
altogether in 2009 after a class action lawsuit for $9.5 million.
F

he

da e i cl ded

cial l g-ins (which added "like" and "recommend" buttons

to third-party websites without clearly indicating to users when and how their profile information
migh be ha ed i h he e eb i e ), a d instant personali a i

( hich all

ed a fe select

partners to personalize their web pages by using personal information that Facebook disclosed
without a user's explicit consent)
e

474.

After targeted advertisements started being posted on the

Timeli e , as a consequence of tracking the

e

click

he Like button, another

lawsuit followed, and another settlement, this time with the U.S. Federal Trade Commission
(FTC). Zuckerberg declared that Facebook would i

d ce m e mea

e

ec

e

information. What he missed to say was that Facebook also created even more conditions for
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digital entrapment of

e

personal information. Facebook has a long history of promoting

digital marketing on its platform whose initial motto was to bring people closer together. At one
point, it started bringing marketing content closer and closer to the users, at the expense of their
privacy. It was just a matter of time for political marketing to enter the Facebook scene as well,
again, at the expense of he

e

privacy, their independent choices and the democracy, as the

case with Cambridge Analytica showed.
Overview. In the early months of 2018, news outlets broke the story of Cambridge
Analytica and its collection of personal informa i

h

gh e

le Faceb

k acc

.

Questions started to arise as the most central one was whether Cambridge Analytica violated any
rules, or it was Facebook that allowed the controversial data collection. As Cambridge Analytica
was not a well-known company, at least not to most people, including those whose data was
collected, the case became even more confusing and shocking

it was revealed that it gathered

information from 50 million Facebook users. Cambridge Analytica was a political firm engaged
with collecting data for companies, aiming to influence public opinion and behavior. One of the
owners of Cambridge Analytica was Robert Mercer

one of the most generous donors of the

Republican Party. Another stakeholder was also Stephen Bannon D

ald T m

li ical

advisor in his 2016 election campaign. Allegedly, the firm offered its services to a variety of
companies including Mastercard, the New York Yankees and Joint Chiefs of Staff475. They were
also involved in the campaign advocating for Brexit
Cambridge Analytica claimed that it collected

Leave.EU.
e

i f ma i

i a eff

c

c

psychological profiles that consider patterns of what they like, who do they communicate with
(based on their friends on social media) and identifiable personal information, including the
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e

l ca i . Then, it would use these profiles to make marketing more efficient by designing

advertisements and other online content tailored specifically to the target audience. As the
company was not able to accomplish this mission on its own, it sought to collaborate with some
psychologists from the Psychometrics Center at Cambridge University. The latter developed in
2014 a study in which Facebook users were asked to fill out a survey about themselves and then
to download an application that handed over the information from their profiles to the
researchers. This process was something that was not forbidden by Facebook at the time, as it
claimed users were informed about their data potentially being used for academic purposes.
However, the official position of the Center for the potential partnership with Cambridge
Analytica was to decline the offer. This was not the end of the story, though. Aleksandr Kogan, a
Russian-American psychologist at Cambridge University, agreed to work with Cambridge
Analytica on this project. Previously, he has been receiving grants from the Russian government
to study psychological states of users in social media 476. He designed an application for
Facebook, executing similar functions to the one built by the Psychometrics Center and together
with Cambridge Analytica began collecting the data of the Facebook users.
From the beginning of this partnership, it was clear that the gathered

e

i f ma i

was not going to contribute to any academic agenda, or at least not only, as Cambridge Analytica
is a firm whose main service is to use data for profit, selling it to clients for marketing and
political marketing purposes. The users, both those who took the survey and consented to their
information being used and those who did not, were told, that the data will be used for academic
purposes. That led to the accumulation of massive amounts of data that totaled approximately 50
million users, only 270,000 of which, consented to their information being used for academic

476

Ca le Cad allad , " I made S e e Ba
Guardian 2018.
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(but not other) purposes 477. Violating the social platform

lic

ha he

sold to for-profit organizations, Facebook announced in 2015 ha he

e

e

da a must not be

i f ma i

a

deleted by Dr. Kogan and Cambridge Analytica. In the meantime, however, it became clear that
Dr. Kogan could not discuss any details of the case as a clause of a non-disclosure agreement
with both Facebook and Cambridge Anal ica. Sh

l af e Faceb

ka

ced ha he

e

information was deleted, it turned out that copies of this information were still in existence.
On March 2018, Alexander Nix, the CEO of Cambridge Analytica was fired. His
suspension was, among other things, a result of a story that the British Channel 4 News aired
earlier in 2018. One of their reporters posed as a potential client to whom Nix, through
Camb idge A al ica

b idia

c m a

SCL G

, offered variety of techniques that would

win an election, including hiring Ukrainian women to seduce the opponent and to extort them for
the footage, or simply videotaping them in a compromising scene in which they allegedly take a
bribe478. Nix was also caught discussing that among the clients of the firm were politicians in the
Ca ibbea a d Af ica c

ie

where privacy rules are lax or nonexistent and politicians

employing SCL have been happy to provide government-held data, according to former
employees

479.

Additionally, Nix mentioned that some of their clients were reluctant to hire a

foreign firm as a consulting agency for elections, thus they could pose as students, tourists, and
he

le he c

you think ha

ld a

me

ai e

ici

beca e, a he him elf aid: he m me

aga da, the next questions is, Wh

ha

?

480.

Nix also declared that the company does not possess and use data collected through
Facebook. Directly confronting this statement is a dossier, presented to the National Crime
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Agency in the U.K. by Christopher Wylie, a Canadian who was at the time involved in the
Camb idge A al ica da a c llec i . The d

ie e ealed a la ge am

f Faceb

k

e

data, belonging mostly to U.S. registered voters 481. Regarding the main focus of the company,
W lie ha e ha he

e

l i ed Faceb

k

ha e milli

f e

le

file . A d b il

models to exploit what we knew about them and target their inner demons. That was the basis the
e iec m a
R

ia

il

a b il

482.

Some of the Camb idge A al ica b i e

d ce L k il, h e CEO i

e

cl e

a al

li ked

Vladimi P i . Lukoil, the second

biggest oil producer in Russia, is also popular in other parts of Europe, typically used to spread
Russian influence in gas-dependent countries. Records show that Cambridge Analytica has been
a ked

li e h

hei me h d c

ld

k

a d L k il age da. The presentation that

was prepared by Cambridge Analytica was almost entirely focused on election disruption
techniques483 through psychographic messaging 484.
Applied measures against this threat. The measures undertaken as a result of the
Cambridge Analytica case could be listed in two groups: legal measures and policy measures. In
May 2018, Christopher Wylie was questioned before Congress. He has been cooperating
previously, providing evidence to both the U.K. and the U.S. regarding the case, the former
through its National Crime Agency and the latter through FBI. Most of the questions during the
hearing aimed to explore the relationship between the disinformation that the Russian
government agencies were spreading in the U.S. before the 2016 Presidential Elections and the
data collection of U.S. voters. Witnesses in the hearing were also academics that testified that
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even if Cambridge Analytica had some effect on the results of the election, it is still unlikely that
their actions pre-determined them entirely485. Regardless, in his previous interviews, Wylie was
convinced their psychological profile-modeling had a e i

im ac

e

le

e ce i

a d

decision-making. In addition, he admitted to another controversy that was officially
acknowledged also by the U.K. electoral commission
electoral laws in the country as i

that the Vote Leave campaign broke the

a fi a ciall li ked

e f Camb idge A al ica

subsidiaries in Canada. However, Wylie underlines that despite these revelations, there were
ab l el
c

486.

c

e e ce f

hi illegal cha ge
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i

i al e leme

f he

Interestingly, while the companies and the people involved in this conspiracy could

be liable, Brexit cannot be reversed based on the fact that the Vote Leave campaign broke the
law by exceeding the spending limits determined by the Electoral Commission because the
referendum had merely advisory character 487. Moreover, it would be very difficult a causal
ela i

hi be ee

he

e

elec

al beha i

a d he cam aig

be e abli hed, e e if

reasonable suspicion of this effect is beyond doubt for many people, scholars and politicians.
Similar to the other cognitive threats discussed in this study, it is almost impossible to prove that
ce ai ac i

eeki g

i fl e ce

me

e beha i

e e ac all

cce f l beca e f

these actions, and not because of an allegedly independent decision of the social perceiver.
At the same time, changing its position multiple times, Cambridge Analytica accused one
of their contractors for stealing the Facebook data in question but firing their CEO, Alexander
Nix in the meantime488. In the second half of May 2018, they filed for bankruptcy. Facebook was
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the next in line for hearings. Mark Zuckerbe g

e im

before Congress did not deliver the

expected answers. Moreover, the evidence made it clear that Facebook knew about the privacy
breach and did not notify the users whose data were stolen. Instead, they decided to conduct their
own investigation not informing the authorities and the affected users. The initial statement of
Facebook was that it requested ha he

e

i f ma i

be dele ed immedia el , but later it

turned out that the information in question had other copies that were still in existence.
Z cke be g

e

e

C ge

ee

blema ic i a

he

a a

ell:

me f hem

were statements contradicting some of the evidence. Zuckerberg claimed that Facebook provides
f ll

e hi

f

e

c

e

li e to the users and the company did not and does not sell

their information to anyone. Contrary to this, Facebook permitted variety of companies, whose
mbe

a m e ha 150 allegedl ,

ie

i ae

e da a, i cl di g

i a e me age

489

.

Among these companies were American ones (Amazon, Microsoft, and Spotify), but also a
Chinese one (Huawei) and a Russian one (Yandex).
While digital privacy protection remains a grey area for the U.S., mostly due to extensive
lobbying by companies, the EU took decisive measures even before the incident with Cambridge
Analytica. Regardless, the legislative measures were adopted after the scandal broke out so the
fines that Facebook had to pay were much lower than what it would have, had the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) been adopted earlier than May 25, 2018. This way, Facebook was
only fined £500,000, which was the highest possible fine that the previous data regulation act
from 1998 set, instead of the roughly £1.4 billion that GDPR stipulates for such violations 490.
After the news about Cambridge Analytica became public, Facebook tried to bring some clarity
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to its users about how it collects information and for what purposes. In April 2019, it introduced
its updated policy that was supposed to be understandable and accessible to users. Despite the
efforts, the policies remained lengthy, inaccessible and incomprehensible to many users.
Moreover, Facebook still preserves some of its rights to share

e

i f ma i

ihI

ag am

and WhatsApp, and other apps as the account-holders have two options, as a result: they can
either accept this or just leave the social platform to avoid future unpermitted data collection.
While the popularity of the case when the news about Cambridge Analytica and
Facebook first made the headline was high, it slowly started to fade away. The same happened
with the investigations in the U.S., and in the U.K., except for the fine that the latter imposed on
Facebook, as it violated an EU-regulation. In both countries, strong political campaigns (Donald
T m

cam aig a d he U.K. V e Lea e cam aig )

k ad a age f Camb idge

A al ica algorithms and the data they obtained from Facebook. As Donald Trump is now the
U.S. President and the U.K. chose indeed to leave the EU after its referendum, changing the
status-quo will be undesirable for the people and institutions with interest in preserving it.
However, there are some efforts by senators to alleviate concerns about privacy491. They are
preparing a bill that will enhance the privacy protection of users. It is unclear, however, if it will
pass, considering the strong lobby of social media and companies collecting and using personal
data. While changing the current situation is not impossible, the attention to the issues at hand
has

g

back, a i i c

e l l

af e he Camb idge A al ica ba k

c a d he

relative loss of trust in Facebook. The case with both, while unique, is just symptomatic of a
bigger problem in society that is still unresolved

the lack of regulation for coercive persuasion

attempts, especially in the online space.
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As the issue seems mostly related to corporate and political interests, headlines fail to
underline another tendency, inherent for the academia, for which Vito Laterza is alarming. In his
testimony, Ch i
f

da i

he W lie c

f he me h d ha

fi med ha a l
e he

ed

f he a e

all came

hat eventually became the

f e ea ch ha

a bei g d e a he

University of Cambridge, some which was funded in part by DARPA, for example, which is the
US mili a

e ea ch age c

492.

As Laterza states, a significant amount of the researchers and

professors who are relatively new in their academic positions are required or strongly
encouraged to secure external funding for their projects. Even for senior professors, seeking
grants outside of their i
fe

ii

a df

i

i
e

i a ig

f i fl e ce a d

fe i al de el me

e ige

i de e de

493.

However, when a
e e al f di g, he

seek to secure it, regardless of the potential application (and its ethics) of the e ea ch results.
Laterza advocates for a conversation among academics regarding the integrity of research
produced with external funding, as the latter appears to be almost mandatory element in the
reputable academic

e me.

The four case studies described in this chapter point to different actors who intend the
threat. They also show a variety of political reasons that give room to psychological ways of
executing these threats. The perpetrators in these scenarios view differently what they have to
gain and lose, and so do the victims as well. The case studies reveal a range of conditions,
relevant for all three levels of analysis, that makes the cognitive threats possible. What unites
them is that they are all pertaining to the human psyche as an engine for certain changes in
society and its political life. They also demonstrate that the existing measures aiming to prevent
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future cognitive threats are with limited significance. Therefore, in the following chapter, I offer
a detailed examination of the factors composing them, and how they can inform various
strategies designed to counter the threat.

186

CHAPTER 5
CONNECTING THE DOTS:
STRATEGIES FOR COUNTERING COGNITIVE THREATS

As evident from Chapter 4, fighting cognitive threats after they produce their adverse
consequences does not generate meaningful results. Considering this insight, another option to
confront them becomes more promising. As opposed to fighting the threats, attempting to block
the threat before it occurs or before it delivers damages, appears to be more viable strategy. It
consists of some elements of deterrence as a state policy, and some other complementary
elements that serve the same goal but are instead focused on actions by individuals, the
community and non-state actors of significance. As a state policy, deterrence is fit to counter
elements of cognitive threats that are made by state actors and to a lesser extent by non-state
actors, as the relationship between state actors and non-state actors is not regulated as well as
those between two or more state actors. State policies would be more efficient against another
state-actor sharing the same political mindset as the deterring entity, and less effective against
those that do not share the same democratic values. In addition to this, deterrence state policies
aimed at non-state actors over which the state actor has control are more productive than those
aimed at non-state actors that are outside the scope of control of the state actor. State deterrence
policies have some effect on the psychological experiences of the individual, but there are other
measures with a deterrence effect on individual and community level that are better equipped to
influence the human psyche. This is true especially since the impact on individual and
community level will be more direct as the democratic state cannot enforce limitations on some
channels that are facilitating cognitive threats. Such measures by individuals and the community
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could be complementary to the state policies as their meaning is underlined through the close
connection the individual has with others, first, and second, as they are all part of a collective
entity that state policies can influence on a broader, more abstract level.
The following sections analyze the characteristics of the case studies described in Chapter
4 in an effort to construct deterrence strategies for a variety of cognitive threats. It will also seek
to capture common deterrence techniques for all of them if any. The analysis is divided into two
sections for each of the case studies. The first cluster focuses on the actors and the factors that
are part of the cognitive threat. Mainly, who is the perpetrator, who is the victim, what is the
relationship between individuals, state- and non-state actors, what is the perpetrator winning or
eeki g

i a d ha i he ic im l i g/ha e

l e, acc di g

he ac

perception, is anyone else involved in the case and how, and what are the factors influencing it.
The second set of questions that will help elucidate characteristics of a prevention strategy
pertain to the nature of the problem and the suggested solutions. In particular: does the threat
represent any potential for war or not, does the threat entail rules and weapons inherent for wars,
what is the political mechanism/explanation for the threat, and what is the psychological
mechanism/explanation for the threat.

Countering cognitive threats in Russian espionage cases
In the case of Maria Butina, the direct perpetrator is Ma ia B i a he self. To some
extent, her handler Alexandr Torshin could also be counted toward the direct perpetrators since
he was actively involved in the mission to influence U.S. politics. As the case study revealed,
Maria Butina is not the first female spy, who gained popularity for her espionage missions. Anna
Chapman, among other men and women acting as sleeping cells, was also a spy in the U.K., and
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in the U.S. While undoubtedly, among the Russian agents, there are many men, women are
particularly influential and successful in their missions as they raise less suspicion and their
intelligence-gathering can go undetected for years. As for the victim(s) in this case, the
persuasion was mainly directed toward members of the gun-lobby in the U.S. as well as toward
some other influential politicians from the more conservative political circles. However, they
c ld be c

ide ed ic im a l g a he had

k

ledge f Ma ia B i a allegia ce

work as a foreign agent in the U.S. on behalf of Russia. There are some indirect perpetrators and
victims in this case as well. Maria Butina would not have been acting as a spy, perhaps, if she
was not stimulated, recruited or even ordered by Russia to do so. While difficult to prove, it is
also likely that except for Vladimir Putin, Butina and Torshin, other people also knew about her
mission and contributed to making it successful. In this group of people would also fall
Americans, if any, who knew and supported Butina in her task. The list of indirect victims in
Ma ia B i a ca e i l g. I

ld ha e i cl ded e e

ha e bee affec ed b B i a a em

e

ade

ci i e a d U.S. resident who would
ef l

li icians in becoming closer to

Russia, complying with the interests of Kremlin and implementing them in the U.S. in various
ways. The immediate target of Butina mi ion was he di ec a ge

cognition, particularly its

decision-making mechanism.
As for the relationship between perpetrators and victims, it could be described as existing
on multiple levels. The first relationship is the state-state one in which the antagonistic
relationship between the U.S. and Russia underlines the desire of each actor to influence the
other in a manner beneficial to their own goals. Had these two countries not been rivals, the
intensive espionage campaigns would not have been that common.
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Probably the most important relationship dyad of all is the individual

individual

relationship without which the entire cognitive threat would not have been possible. Maria
Butina actively interacted with other individuals conveying her ideas and making room for even
more influence in the future. Presumably, her boyfriend, Paul Erickson also did not know about
B i a

eal i e i

, as she was c

i ci g him g ad all

k

a d he a d R

ia

cause. It is also likely that Butina only simulated a romantic interest to Erickson so that she could
benefit from his contacts and his own influence in the gun-lobby circles.
Another interesting set of relationships is the one between individual and state
e ha d, Ma ia B i a

ela i

hi

on the

i h he U.S., the country that she was spying, and on the

other hand, her relationship with Russia, the country on which behalf she was committing the
espionage. Accepting the risk of being caught, Butina probably sees the U.S. as an enemy, the
same way Russia views it. At the same time, her actions and the communication she maintained
with her handler showed that she had a strong sense of duty to Russia and its political interests.
In addition, her strong sense of identity and loyalty to Russia was questioned when she started
wondering whether she will be able to return and live safely in Russia after her mission was
about to be exposed. That could be attributed to the fact that the disruptions in the individualstate relationship also brought ontological insecurity. It is not quite clear by the evidence what
a B i a c ce

ab

Moscow

eac i

to her potential exposure, but evidence suggests

that she was feeling afraid of negative actions against her. Another relationship between
individuals and the state is the one between he di ec

ic im

fB i a

e

a i

with Russia,

and with the U.S. For Butina to penetrate so deeply into the political circles in the U.S. meant
that the politicians with whom she was interacting were not suspicious of the fact that she was
Russian, even if officially being in the country as nothing else but a Russian student with a
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boyfriend who was a U.S. citizen. However, despite the dividing factors between the politicians
that Butina was seeking to influence and Russia, they still had a very important common interest
the gun laws, their expanding use in both the U.S. and in Russia and the increased profits that
would logically come from this. Considering this component, for the politicians to be open to
B i a a g me

, he f c ed m e

hei c mm

i ee

a he ha

he a ag

i ic

and full of mistrust relationship between their two countries.
Non-state actors, while not completely recognized as influential entities in international
relations, carry the meaning of a catalyst in this case. Not directly named in court documents,
though evident that the described facts pertained to them, the NRA played a key role in the case,
as an intermediary between Butina and the conservative U.S. politicians supporting the gunlobby on one side, and between the U.S. and Russia, on the other. Undermined by IR-scholars,
non-state actors, in this case, made possible all the other interactions in this scenario

on an

individual level, on a state level, and on an individual-state level. The NRA goals were the
overlapping point for the connection between all of the parties involved in this case. Regarding
its own relationship to Maria Butina, she was a vivid supporter of the organization, being a
member herself, making possible multiple meetings between them and high-ranked Russian
politicians. Simila

a he NRA

ela i

hi

hei

e i

he U.S. a

ell. I

em

f

their relationship with state entities like the U.S. and Russia, it was a little more ambiguous than
their relationship with individuals from these countries, mainly because they interacted with such
who

NRA g al . NRA

ela i

hi

i h he U.S. i

e

c

e ial. While he

organization has multiple supporters and a very strong lobby that earns policy-make
f

NRA i e e

a d g al , he

ganization also has fierce opponents - citizens, activists,

organizations and politicians. Its relationship with Russia makes its position in the U.S. society
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even more criticized. NRA

ela i

hi

ihR

ia i al

i e e i g beca e a a

-state

entity, NRA is driven by profits as a main goal, rather than by concerns typical for states or
individuals. Therefore, what is most conducive to NRA

e l f ie dl , b

not unfriendly

relationship with Russia is an interest, expressed in terms of profits. Evidence for this is the
meetings that NRA members attended in Russia. Ambiguous was the position of the thenpresident of the organization, as he was possibly concerned that the closeness with Russia would
inflict a serious harm to their reputation in the U.S., which is after all the core market and the
core reason, through legislation and culture, for the profits that their products bring.
Considering prevention strategies, it is essential to outline what the sides involved in this
case have to win and to lose, what they perceive as a win and as a loss. It is essential to mention,
however, that wins, and losses cannot be identified categorically, as there are different levels that
could be reached in both categories. A win, in its entirety, may not be achieved, but there may
have been steps toward it that brings benefits which could still qualify as gains. Then this would
be if not a complete success, then at least relative one. The same goes for losses as well.
Russia has been unequivocally described in the literature as interested in weakening the
enemy, as opposed to the ages of the Cold War when their tactic was to defeat the enemy
altogether. This intention has changed ever since, and it now reflects Moscow

f c

disruption and controlling the adversary through cognitive mechanisms, rather than through
traditional military force. Therefore, for Russia, a win would be to manipulate U.S. politics in a
way, favorable to them. In the case of the 2016 Presidential Elections - against Hilary Clinton
and supporting Donald Trump. Another important threat in the Russian espionage plan is to gain
information that they can further use to manipulate certain people of power to serve Russian
interests. While it remains unclear how much leverage Russia accumulated against U.S.
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politicians beca e f Ma ia B i a ac i

, i i clea ha he m e fa

able

R

ia

candidate won the elections, and to that extent, Russia scored a win. A loss to Russia would have
been exposing Maria Butina long before she connected to Paul Erickson and high-ranked U.S.
politicians. However, the meetings between Russian officials and NRA members have taken
place, a fact that testifies for another win that Russia scored

establishing a relationship between

the countries, one that was carrying the potential for even further influence over the U.S. political
life. F

he e ec

fR

ia

la , Ma ia B i a, i di id all , hi g

ee

black-or-

white. While she succeeded to make connections and potentially persuade U.S. activists and
politicians to be more favorable toward some of the Russian interests, even if they have not
realized that these interests are Russian, she was exposed and convicted. It is still unclear, as her
sentencing is still pending as of April 2019, whether she will return to Russia as a hero or will
have another fate. Considering the example of Anna Chapman, it is likely that Butina will follow
her steps, and will be warmly welcomed in Russia.
In terms of what the U.S. has to lose, the answer is clear

democracy and independence,

both political one, and one pertaining to choices. Russian campaign against the 2016 Presidential
Elections was conducted on multiple fronts and the extent to which the particular case with
Ma ia B i a i fl e ce affec ed he ge e al

c me f he elec i

is not entirely clear.

However, if there was any influence at all, this should be perceived as a loss for the U.S.
democracy even though she was exposed and brought to justice. This assumption is supported
by previous cases of Russian espionage in the U.S. in which the agents were caught and
sentenced but the information they reported back to their handlers, the influence their exercised
could not have been reversed. Besides, more spies were sent, with new missions, bringing new
ways of disrupting democracy. The politicians, through which Butina was exercising influence
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known about them, they would have also risked a trial and a sentence for helping her with her
plans.
Va ie

f fac

al

la ed hei

le i Ma ia B i a ca e. Fi

a d f em

,

culture. The American openness to the world, especially in terms of education kept Butina out of
suspicion initially, as she was a student in a prestigious university from which later, she
successfully obtained a graduate degree. Other countries, mostly authoritarian, are much more
suspicious of foreigners, regardless of the occasion on which they are traveling. Another element
in the U.S. is the gun-culture that opened the door to an intensified communication between
Butina, Torshin, and other Russian politicians, on the one hand, and Paul Erickson, NRA, and
members of the Republican Party in the U.S. The support that the gun-lobby enjoys in the U.S.
both by politicians, and people, made the interaction between Russia and the NRA and their
supporters, somewhat permissible from both political and moral point of view. Ma ia B i a
attachment to guns is also an indicator to a broader phenomenon. In one of her interviews, she
admits that growing up in Siberia, guns were an absolute necessity for survival. As this is most
likely the case indeed, it is intriguing that Butina sees herself and other people from the region as
solely responsible for their own survival, not mentioning

ec g i i g he a e

conditions. Many residents of democratic countries would try to require the g
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actions to ensure safe living conditions. At the same time, the Russian identity is very strong as
one of its main characteristics is the responsibility of the citizen to the state, as opposed to the
he

a a

d. Thi c l

e ha ed Ma ia B i a

hi ki g a d, to a large extent, her

determination to execute missions assigned by the Kremlin, even if they pose a severe risk of her
being incarcerated, if exposed.
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Another component that has its place in this case, is profits and power. For the
relationship between Butina and Russia, and NRA and conservative politicians supporting it,
there has to be a mutual interest. The NRA saw an opportunity for market expansion in
collaborating with Russian officials, and the latter saw a possible way to influence U.S. politics
through the NRA. The tripod profits-power-i fl e ce i

a ic la l i he e

f

Ma ia B i a

case. Other espionage cases, while similar, typically do not include intermediaries that are, on the
one hand, a

f he ad e a

li ical life and on the other, maintaining open channels of

communication with entities perceived by the state as enemies. Interestingly, he NRA

le i

the U.S. regarding the Russian interests resembles the one that far-right political parties have in
Europe. Through them, Russia attempts to influence adversarial countries, especially in cases of
disinformation.
Espionage is a traditional practice during war; it being hot or cold. After the Cold War,
the Russian espionage did not disappear, it simply continued in the form of sleeping cells and its
mission transformed into exercising influence to change the political course of the adversary.
Despite Russia executing espionage-campaigns in the U.S. and in other countries in peacetime,
even when exposed, such cases do not raise concerns about any potential war actions but instead
just reaffirm hostility that has always present between the two countries. This fact is a doubleedged sword, however. On the one hand, politicians feel certain that even if espionage cases are
revealed, this will not escalate into a war. On the other hand, this is very bad news for deterrence
f he e em beca e he la e k

f
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ill be

de ake e e if a

identity is exposed. The rules inherent for this peacetime conflict resemble the ones in wartime,
mainly regarding the exchange of prisoners, as the one in Vienna between Anna Chapman and
the other captured Russian agents, and agents captured by Russia proves. Other than the
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exchange of prisoners, another reaction to exposed espionage is political signaling through
judges, U.S. attorneys, politicians and activists that aim to convey to Russia that their campaigns
failed. The truth is, however, that, as I explained earlier, a win in espionage cases is a flexible
notion because every intelligence-gathering task reported to handlers constitutes a little win for
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terminated, and they were sentenced this does not mean that harm has not been inflicted by them,
even if it ended, eventually, with a court ruling, prison time and extradition, in cases in which the
spy is a foreign national.
From a political point of view, the influence that Butina and Russia exercised could be
attributed to a few reasons. First, the antagonistic relationship between the U.S. and Russia.
Second, the state-supported espionage campaigns of the latter and the f me

overall openness

to foreigners, especially for educational purposes. Third, the overlapping points of interest
between Russia and U.S. entities mostly related to the gun-lobby and the conservative circles in
the society.
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mechanisms that made the espionage and its success possible. The factor that probably unites all
the agents working for the Kremlin is their identity. The Russian identity before and during the
Cold War was predetermined by imperialistic ambitions and thus having an imperialistic
character494. After the end of the Cold War, Russians underwent a new identity formation that
could have either assumed imperialistic characteristics from the past or reorient toward a more
liberal understanding of the world in which Russia would have had its place among the other
nations, brought closer by international institutions and norms. In 1996, Chafetz wrote that if the
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statist and authoritarian powers in Russian politics take prevalence over the more liberally
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will reduce Russia's dependence on the West and

deprive the West of leverage against possible Russian violations of international norms. Moscow
under the statists, for example, is far more likely to intervene unilaterally against its neighbors to
protect the Russian Diaspora than it would be under the leadership of the liberals

495.

As this

vision in 1996, becomes a reality in the two decades after this, central to the Russian identity
remain imperialistic longings, also supported by the rhetoric that a key-influencer of the Russian
identity has

the Russian Orthodox Church496. According to its narrative, traditional values have

to be preserved at all cost, especially in times in which they are so severely endangered, mostly
by the West, seen as an enemy bringing decay to the morality of all Slavs that Russia seeks to
protect. Such narrative patterns, while not identical to the ones that the Soviet Union distributed,
still strongly remind such ideas. Therefore, generations of Russians, either born in the Cold War
era or afterwards were a product of identity formation that to a large extent retained the
dimensions of the one inherent for the years of the Soviet Union. An example of this is the fact
ha A a Cha ma
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a a f me KGB age , a d Cha ma he elf a a Russian spy.

Among the central elements of this Russian identity are a i i m a d l al , a
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tradition, the notions of state and civil consciousness do not match, therefore a civil identity
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497.

Evidently, the idea of the state in the mentality of Russian

society has a very important role and is placed on a pedestal. Considering these insights, it is no
wonder that so many young Russians are willing to put themselves in service to the Kremlin as
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spies, risking exposure, being brought to justice, and sentenced in a foreign country. For them,
this is simply a patriotic duty, an honor, part of who they are, in some cases, part of who their
parents and relatives are. I Ma ia B i a case, there was also another element that contributed
to her mission

her persuasiveness that helped her avoid suspicion for a long period of time.

Additionally, from a social-psychological standpoint, there was something about Butina

a ge

audience that facilitated her mission. Mainly, it was an element of a sub-identity that Butina and
her targets all shared

the support of gun rights.

Measures toward the indirect perpetrator – Russia. The first and the potentially most
effective and invasive mechanism through which the Russian espionage could be countered
pertains to a campaign that the U.S. can launch as a form of potential retaliation that could deter
Russia. It should seek to inform Russian citizens about opportunities for civic engagement and
actions to make the state itself more involved in domestic issues. Moreover, in some
impoverished Russian regions, it is evident that the Kremlin has not done much to assure its
e le

elfa e, i

e ms of socio-economic and political conditions. As the Russian espionage

is an old strategy from the Cold War that just adapted to the new environment in the 21 st century,
the U.S. can also successfully employ some of its old weapons against the Soviet Union,
weapons that led to the end of the Cold War with the symbolic victory of the U.S. What led to
this victory was the collapse of the Soviet Union, which, among many other reasons was caused
by e

le de i e

bei g isolated, economically, politically and informationally. Offering

Russian people information that will empower them to be more politically and civically engaged,
and to advocate for improvements in their welfare will be a step forward toward less
authoritarianism.
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The brutal repression of the Russian opposition and violence used against political
protesters, especially in urban areas 498 is a clear sign that while Putin does not seem intimidated
by many things, including the financial sanctions of the U.S., he fears a strong, active society
that demands changes and a better future. The information campaign could be implemented in a
variety of ways including VKontakte

the Russian version of Facebook. It is important,

however, that the language used in the campaign is Russian and not English because the
information may be regarded as false just because of the source, allegedly a foreign one, since
the used language is not Russian. Once the U.S. shows Russia that such campaigns can be a
credible threat, they could be used as a deterrence against future espionage cases, assuming that
Russia unambiguously understands that the campaign is a result of another wave of captured
Russian agents in the U.S. In terms of any concerns that this campaign may violate international
law, the official UN language used to regulate interventions in foreign states constitutes that UNmembe

h ld

of any state
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intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
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. A non-coercive influence as a result of an information campaign could not be
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formation of civic position does not fall under the Russian jurisdiction. Moreover, an information
campaign, c
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m , is not a crime. Instead, it is an

expression of the democratic right to receive, send and exchange information. Even the proven
Russian cyber interference in the U.S. Presidential Elections in 2016, for which Russian officers
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were indicted, is unlikely to have any consequences, mostly because both U.S. and Russia have
repeatedly interfered in foreign elections during the Cold War 500.
Measures toward the direct perpetrators – the Russian agents. A second mechanism is a
variation of the one described above, but its target will be the Russian people, convincing them
in that while they are loyal to the state, the state also has some responsibilities to its citizens that
it does not execute very successfully. The reason for the poor welfare conditions should be
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which will bring prosperity and solution to internal state problems. Thus, the goal would be that
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political maneuvering against the U.S. It is true that people
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ide i ie are difficult to change but

they are, nevertheless, not perpetual but a subject of possible alterations. An example of such
identity changes are the events that led to the Jasmine Revolution 501.
Measures toward the direct victims – the individuals. A third mechanism that considers
the direct victims of espionage

the targeted U.S. individuals should envision the expansion of

the awareness of the problem. In particular, the media have to pay more attention to summarizing
cases of Russian espionage, the success of women who conduct it, as well as cases involving
men. Another component that Americans, especially those assuming a public office or having
political influence over the government should be vigilant for are foreign nationals, especially
such from Russia, who are either too observant and silent or too active and engaging. Lastly,
such U.S. politicians, activists and people of influence should be aware that even if they share
some common interests with foreign nationals, seeking to establish friendly relationships, there is
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a caveat. By working toward the common goal that Americans and Russians have in mind, the
former may not be aware that they will unknowingly fulfill a lot more than just the agenda of the
collaborating individuals but the one of an entire country seeking to destabilize another.
Measures toward the indirect victim – the U.S. A fourth mechanism with a focus on the
U.S. will be to change the narrative about Russia in an effort to stop vilifying it and therefore to
present itself to the Russian people not as an enemy. Another long-term option will be that the
U.S. attempts to change the antagonistic relationship with Russia. Regardless, considering
decades of antagonism and the current political climate, the best course of action could be
changing the narrative about Russia, rather than the relationship itself. Changing the relationship
with Russia will be better than changing the narrative but very unlikely if the political status-quo
in Russia and in the U.S. persists. In addition to this, the U.S. should be aware of potential points
of contact between U.S. entities and Russian ones as it is evident that Moscow uses
i e media ie f m he ad e a

d me ic

li ical ce e ha d

mi d c mm
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and collaborating on shared goals with Russia.

Countering cognitive threats in Russian Disinformation cases
In terms of the perpetrators, similar to the case with Russian espionage in the U.S. is the
one with the Russian disinformation campaigns. As these operations were supported by Russia,
through the creation of the Internet Research Agency, the number of the state-actor victims from
this campaign is much wider. Russia is the power behind the operation but the people executing
the orders were not volunteers, but instead, paid to spread disinformation through social media
and websites posts. According to former employees in the Internet Research Agency, located in
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St. Petersburg, more than 600 people were engaged with the spread of disinformation502. They
worked 12-hour shifts, as the related duties were continuing for the full 24-hour cycle of the day.
Their mornings began with an e-mail with links leading to websites where the disinformation
was supposed to be placed. Some of the employees were incentivized by the relatively good
salary and the fact that they would have been, otherwise, unemployed. While the U.S. was
among the main targets of such campaigns, it was not the only one. The EU-member states were
also targeted. The countries in Eastern and Central Europe are more vulnerable as they still have
some Russian-speaking population within their borders or a significant population that has proRussian political views. The Russian disinformation campaigns were tracked even beyond the
EU and the U.S. as they reached some other countries as well such as Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Finland, Moldova, and Serbia. Despite that state targets are the main actor that Russia intends to
harm in the disinformation campaigns, the direct victims are the individuals who read the
disinformation content and react in a certain way, typically in a manner that Russia intended
behaviors that express protest, anger, sadness, division, and exclusion of particular groups of the
population. An interesting paradox is the dual capacity in which individuals who perceive the
disinformation act. On the one hand, they are victims but unconsciously they also act as
perpetrators themselves, spreading the disinformation, not knowing that it falsely represents
facts.
The relationships in the cases of disinformation are mainly three, one that concerns the
state-state ties, another that pertains to the one that individuals have with a state, and a third one
that represents the one between the different individuals involved. The relationship of Russia
with the countries in which it disseminates disinformation is generally antagonistic, though, there
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are various degrees to this. The most intensified campaigns were conducted in the U.S., Ukraine,
and in the EU, as these three entities were also outlined a R

ia bigge

i al , acc di g

a

survey conducted in Russia503. When it comes to the EU, not all of the member-states are targets,
but only the most influential states that have a greater role in maintaining the EU itself, and the
ones in which Russia has geopolitical interests at stake.
In terms of the relationship between individuals and states, it should be mentioned first
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, and also what

is its relationship with the ones for which the disinformation was intended. Information from
former employees in the so-called Troll factories in Russia shows that among the most important
reasons for people to seek employment in the Internet Research Agency was the lack of
sufficient financial means or unemployment. Some of them were not aware about the nature of
the job and quickly became disappointed by their daily duties. As opposed to the case with
Russian spies, who were motivated among other things by patriotic duty and sense of identity,
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strategic goals but were inclined to participate purely for the monetary compensation. As for
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elationship with the people to whom it was conveying the disinformation, it could be

claimed that the Kremlin sees individuals living in political rival countries as targets, vehicles for
a desired change of the democratically established status-quo. As for the attitude of victim stateactors, such as the EU and the U.S., they treat the individuals posting disinformation posts in a
dehumanizing way for which the multitude of articles repeating the noun trolls testifies. While it
is true that these individuals are indeed doing a lot to make the disinformation campaigns
successful, they also undertake these functions because of their employment, their need of
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income. Many of these individuals quit working for the Internet Research Agency after they find
out about the nature of their duties. At the same time, while they are harming states with their
online activities, it should not be forgotten that it is not volunteering that drove them to the
Internet Research Agency, but financial incentives. The relationship between the direct victims
of the disinformation operations and Russia also deserves some attention. Many of the social
perceivers of disinformation are predisposed to trust such content because their own beliefs may
overlap with the values that Russia seeks to promote

anti-globalization, a comeback to

traditional values of the Orthodox Church, anti-immigration and anti-liberal values. Some
victims of disinformation content do not share these values but may believe in the accuracy of
the claims simply because a friend of theirs who happens to have views identical to those in the
article shared or liked it in the social media. That said, individuals who have pro-Russian views,
or interact with people with pro-Russian views may be much more vulnerable to disinformation
and thus the main targets of these campaigns.
The last relationship that is going to be explored in this section concerns the individuals
in this case

the ones who are victims of disinformation and the ones who disseminate it. Since

the employees engaged in disseminating disinformation execute their tasks, as assigned, it is
likely that they do not realize the full effect of their actions. Moreover, since their job is mostly
in the online space and they do not see the recipients of their messages, their reaction and the
broader effect it has, this anonymity helps them detach from what they are required to do and to
depersonalize their victims 504. At the same time, many of the disinformation recipients are not
aware that what they read is not produced independently by journalists or independent bloggers
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but instead is manufactured by a state-sponsored disinformation/propaganda factory seeking to
polarize societies.
Analyzing what the sides involved in this conflict have to win and lose in the
disinformation campaigns, it is easy to discover similarities between the case of Maria Butina
and the disinformation ordered by the Kremlin against the Western allies and some Eastern
countries with geopolitical significance. In particular, Russia seeks to destabilize these countries,
weaken them and ideally, when the disinformation operations are conducted during important
elections, to bolster the candidate that is friendly to the Russian interests. Moreover, in countries
with a large Russian-speaking population, there is also another factor that was already mentioned
previously the attempt to erase their history and to convince them that Russia has a major role
in it. Through the narrative change, the Kremlin seeks to expand its influence in Eastern and
Central Europe but also to undertake even further actions, if possible, as the case with Crimea
showed. In this context, since Russia seeks to destabilize, a win marked by the disinformation
campaign will indicate varying degrees of weakening the rival, as an ultimate victory could be
identified only in cases in which the disinformation helps the pro-Russian candidate in an
election win. Another possible scenario of an ultimate win would be a civil war to break out in
one of the countries with Russian-speaking population thus opening space for Russia to intervene
in other ways, including militarily. The losses of countries - targets of the Russian disinformation
could be derived by what Russia has to win with this approach. It should be underlined, however,
how a win looks like in the eyes of the affected by disinformation countries. This would be a
situation characterized by lack of disinformation campaigns or lack of effect of the
disinformation campaigns on independent decision-making, on the civil peace, and on important
elections and state affairs. As mentioned, there are also varying degrees in winning the conflict,
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as well as there are in losing it. For instance, a decrease in the number of fake news or in the
successful Russian influence over independent decision-making will also mark a win, even if not
an ultimate one.
Next, I would like to dedicate a few sentences to the effect of disinformation to the direct
victims of it the individuals who perceive it. Probably the most serious caveat hidden in
disinformation is that the recipient of the message thinks that the newly perceived information
actually benefits their decision-making by enhancing the amount of information that they have
on their disposal. Contrary to this, it clouds the independent decision-making by imposing a view
on a particular topic. This view is, in fact, the view of the sender of the message as the latter has
the clear intention to coercively influence the perception of the recipient, thus making their
judgment anything but voluntarily and freely formed. In an ideal scenario, a victory for the
individual decision-maker would mean access to perfect information based on established facts,
without external interpretations that inevitably reflect a particular point of view. While difficult
to prove if this is the case at hand, an ultimate loss for a social perceiver would mean that they
formed a decision that was expressed through their behavior only on the basis of the
disinformation planted in their cognition.
The last section discussing the wins and the losses for the participants in the
disinformation conflict is focused on the direct executors of the disinformation program. As the
situation could be described in more concrete terms for other participants, many of the
employees in the Internet Research Agency felt ambiguous about their activities, thus what
would constitute a win for them is difficult to be defined. However, as the central incentive for
what they are doing is money, a win would be to perform their job duties and receive the
promised payment. That is valid only if the employees do not realize or are not concerned about
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the damages that their posts inflict. If they realize them and from this realization sense of guilt
surfaces, then the win will be mixed with some moral losses as well.
While it is evident what is the chain of actions and results in cases of disinformation,
somewhat peripheral remain the intermediaries that make the disinformation so successful. To
some extent, it is known that websites, social media companies, and online search engines, have
a crucial role in making the disinformation process possible. However, legally and morally, they
mostly remain blameless because first, they do not want to exercise censure over content, and
second, are not legally responsible for the type of information shared through their platform.
Gradually, with the spread of disinformation, public opinion and policy-makers forced social
media to enforce some limitations to the spread of disinformation. There were some boundaries
to these restrictions because the central premise of creating a company is so that it can make
profits. The e
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economy where the most valued content is that which is most likely to attract attention
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Therefore, it could be reasonably argued that disinformation was not hurting social media but
just the opposite

it entailed more clicks, more attention, more shares, more likes, more

discussion, and more profits. Having these facts in mind, while social media and the websites
related to it are definitely part of the problem, they could be difficultly influenced as part of a
solution. In the market economy, they are allowed to seek profits, the same way that public
opinion and policy-makers seek restrictions to the spread of disinformation. These conditions
shape a dilemma that makes any deterrence strategies focused on the intermediaries in
disinformation cases likely to fail because of the conflicting interests of the actors involved. As
f
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culture that slowly established itself as the dominant culture in the free market countries. As even
reputable media started using more and more alarming and attention-provoking articles, the
readers were paying less and less attention to headlines that merely stated facts without any
implicit emotion-provoking agenda. This led to even more profits generated by the use of
emotion-inducing headlines and entailed a decreased awareness of disinformation-disseminating
articles that have almost the same alarmist character as the mainstream media.
Disinformation being one of the oldest weapons in warfare, it is not surprising that is still
used in present days, even in peacetime, as channels and opportunities for communication grew
exponentially in the past few decades. As an ancient and already known weapon, disinformation
does not carry a risk of retaliation involving military means. Moreover, disinformation does not
even constitute a crime, unlike espionage, for which the perpetrator can be punished, unless the
disinformation opens the door for a defamation lawsuit. The process of Russian disinformation
typically exploits the freedom of speech and of free information exchange through channels
offered mostly by private companies, supposedly with no political interest invested in the
opinions shared through them. As opposed to the years of the Cold War, when some of the most
common sources of disinformation were the government-owned media, in the post-Cold War
period, the disinformation spread by the Kremlin relies on the exploitation of democratic
freedoms with the goal to make them work for an undemocratic agenda. While disinformation is
not a crime and it is not a reason for war actions by itself, it is not considered unproblematic
because it utilizes allowed means to achieve a forbidden result

interference in the domestic

affairs of a foreign country. Considering these characteristics, the rules inherent for conflicts
caused by disinformation campaigns should not be the same as those inherent for war conflicts.
That said the only reasonable means to deter these operations should be actions permitted by the
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international law that will not lead the antagonistic relationship between Russia and its
disinformation victim-states to escalate into hostilities.
The political mechanism that makes the Russian disinformation operations possible is the
inimical relationship between Russia and some countries (such as EU-member states and the
U.S.)
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Eastern Europe and Asia, envisioned as part of the Eurasian project), on the other. In the
disinformation campaigns, Russia sees the readers of disinformation content as a means to an
end

to disrupt independent decision-making and influence the public opinion in a favorable to

Russia manner. Disinformation is also made possible by the difficult economic conditions in
Russia and the fact that many people do not have sufficient means for survival, which turns them
to seek employment by the Internet Research Agency. Highlighting these circumstances, the
following chain of actors and their actions becomes evident: Russia hires employees
disseminating disinformation, they use social media to spread it, readers perceive the
disinformation from social media and subsequently demonstrate attitudes consistent with Russian
foreign policy goals. While influencing the outcome of elections in rival countries are among the
most central goals in M c

strategic plans, disinformation is not and should not be

perceived as a phenomenon that is only limited to such events. Disinformation seeks to cast
doubt in values, to discredit politicians, to alter the course of decision-making on significant state
problems, to polarize societies and plant the seeds of mistrust and contempt.
The three main mechanisms that could best explain disinformation are persuasion tactics,
the confirmation bias and the preference to social networks constructed of like-minded
individuals. The first mechanism is a broad category that includes the psychological tools to
make the disinformation trustworthy. Namely, they evoke strong emotions that cloud the
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mind. In this crisis state induced by the alarming headlines, they look for more information,
typically found in the article itself, thus automatically considering it as more trustworthy than it
actually is. Moreover, the disinformation articles, in order to appear more credible, have some
evidence supporting the inaccurate facts presented in the text. In the previous chapter, it was
mentioned that, according to studies, even if false evidence is provided to support a particular
false claim, the claim immediately becomes more reliable in the eyes of the reader. The topics
that Russian disinformation exploits are proven to have a more notable impact on audiences that
already have a predisposition to believe in the facts offered in the article, which tendency could
be attributed to the confirmation bias

the inclination of people to interpret new information in a

way that simply confirms their already formed views on a particular issue. Research also
provides an evidence for another component that makes disinformation possible and rapidly
expanding across social media
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manner that seeks to create relationships with like-minded individuals. A reason for this is the
inherent desire to avoid cognitive dissonance (the opposition between attitudes and expected
behavior). Thus, individuals seek to create social networks in which the members of the group
typically share similar views, or at least for the most part in order to avoid cognitive dissonance.
Therefore, if one of the group members perceives disinformation as reliable information and
shares it with like-minded group members, it is likely that the latter will consider the information
as reliable. This phenomenon occurs because first, the secondary recipients learned the
information from a person who they trust, even if this person is not the original source, and
second because the information overlaps with previous knowledge that the individual holds in
their cognition.
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Measures toward the indirect perpetrator – Russia. Focusing on the fact that Russia
targets mostly countries that it considers rivals or such that are slipping away from its influence
and moving toward the West, diplomacy measures are among the first ones to be mentioned in
order to alleviate the tendency for Russia to feel threatened. Especially useful in this regard may
be c l
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of Russian culture and art and their

a eg ma be e e m e critical in former Soviet

states about which Russia feels that they are escaping from its influence, denying its importance
and the values it treasures. Through such diplomatic means, a strong message could be sent that
im lie ha R

ia im

a ce c

ld be ec g i ed i h

i ha i g o erase the influence of

the West. Thus, Russia will receive some certainty about its position in the minds of European
people, and at the same time will begin to see some of the countries, if not all, less as enemies
and more as entities that acknowledge R

ia c l

al legac . Additionally, this way it will be

harder for Russia to portray the West as an enemy that demeans Russian importance in Europe
and in the world. Evidence that shows support for the potential success of this strategy is the fact
that Russia perceives the EU as a coalition that refuses to acknowledge and treat it as a European
state when it comes to discussing matters pertaining to the continent 506.
As opposed to this defensive, diplomatic step, a more offensive measure that could be
undertaken regarding Russia as disseminator of disinformation is for state leaders of affected
countries to officially recognize disinformation as an imminent threat with severe consequences,
and Russia as a perpetrator, along with other entities that support its activities (nationalist parties,
etc.). It is essential that in official statements, the people executing the disinformation, the socalled trolls, are not vilified but humanized and described through their involvement in these
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operations mostly because of monetary and not political incentives. Currently, by vilifying not
only Putin and disinformation, as his weapon, but also the Russian people who generate it and
spread it, the West confirms its negative attitude toward the Russian nation and its population
rather than expressing disapproval only toward its leader and the oligarchs close to him.
The public statements distributed by state leaders should also be bolstered by evidence
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citizens that what they read in less-reputable sources may be a misleading content distributed as
part of the disinformation operation of Russia. This method will also serve as a prevention
strategy directed toward the consumers of disinformation, as it will increase their awareness of
the ongoing cognitive threat against them and their countries. Paul Goble advises that state
leaders expose disinformation as it represents al a

ac
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lic a d a
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policy agenda [and] not simply dishonestly of this or that official in response to a particular
e e

507.

Another weapon in the arsenal against disinformation is the information campaign that
was suggested as a measure in the fight with espionage. Maintaining a state that could be hardly
described as a democratic one, Putin has proven on many occasions that he fears democracy and
liberal rights for his citizens. The examples als i cl de he
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critics. In an effort to silence them, he even resorted to violence, as there are multiple cases
involving poisoned dissidents 508. Since democratic thinking and strong civic society are an
unwanted obstacle to Putin g al , according to his treatment of the opposition and the activists,
then this could be a key to a stable strategy to counter the problem. There is one difference
between the information campaign recommended for cases involving espionage and those
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involving disinformation. In the latter, there should be an emphasis on the Western consumers of
disinformation as victims, and not enemies, which will humanize them in the eyes of Russian
society. The information campaign may also focus on real stories of people reading
disinformation content: how they happened to read it and how it changed their thinking about
issues. Such accounts may lead to the Russian people making a parallel between their own
e e ie ce

ihP i

di i f ma i

a d propaganda machines in the face of state-owned

media, such as Russia Today (RT). Moreover, for this strategy, it will be crucial that Russian
Internet Research Agency employees are not vilified but portrayed, together as the consumers of
disinformation, as victims of P i

illibe al egime. The narrative should include that, on the

one hand the government forces people to take part in state-sponsored cognitive manipulation
campaigns against independent thinking because many Russian citizens are left without a job or
with an insufficient income, as this lack of choice leads them to join the Russian Internet
Agency. On the other hand, the victims of disinformation, innocent people who are involuntary
participants in political games, also suffer from Puti

a egic g al , j

a m ch a he e

le

employed to cause this harm, part of an operation designed by the Kremlin.
Measures toward the direct perpetrator – Internet Research Agency employees. A
continuation of the solution to the disinformation problem focuses directly on the Internet
Research Agency employees and mainly on the reasons they had to become part of it

money.

This strategy can be labeled as neither offensive nor defensive. It aims to deprive Putin of hiring
even more people who will execute his disinformation plan. NGOs and the private sector may
directly target employees of the Internet Research Agency through advertisements in Russian,
offering them alternative employment with a better compensation than what they would obtain if
they stayed with their current employment. Sources say that in 2014 an average employee at the
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Internet Research Agency made around $700 per month509

a salary that is below the minimum

wage in the U.S. for the same year ($1,160), for instance. Even if most of the employees have no
qualifications at all, their minimum wage, if employed by a U.S. entity will be higher. Evidence
shows, however, that not all of the labor in the agency was unskilled. Among the employees
working there were well-educated people such as journalists and writers510. Moreover, if it is
assumed that an information campaign for Russian people is indeed a viable strategy undertaken
by the West and its allies, then Russian-speaking people who know the Russian culture and the
primary sources of communication will be an essential part of the campaign. Thus, Internet
Research Agency employees would be discouraged from continuing to work for the Kremlin by
Western employers offering them better remuneration. Furthermore, these same employees can
be hired in campaigns to inform their co-citizens for their rights and benefits if the Russian
regime was more open to the world.
Measures toward the direct victims – the disinformation consumers. As digital
information and digital communication have become an integral part of life in the 21 st century, it
would be reasonably expected for educational systems to reflect the changes in technology and
society. While many countries already developed traditions in information literacy, it is still
mostly at the higher-education level rather than on an early-education level, especially in
countries with lower GDP. Moreover, as it was previously emphasized, Central and Eastern
European education systems rely more on memorization rather than on critical thinking.
Additionally, the post-Soviet influence in these countries is still active and seeks to change the
history in a way that assigns Russia a more prominent role in these societies, their history, and
their culture. Therefore, a vital step is implementing information literacy courses, lectures,
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activities and awareness in schools as these educational methods should begin at an early age
possibly when children start using computers, other devices, and social networks. Students
should be taught what disinformation is, how it differs from other phenomena, how to recognize
potential disinformation and what to do with it. This way, the children will be capable of
recognizing the seriousness of the problem and react in a civically responsible manner. As for the
education systems in Central and Eastern Europe, the EU, NGOs and other entities should
vigorously encourage implementation of critical thinking and a more comprehensive approach to
teaching history and other subjects. Quality education is especially important since many of the
textbooks, produced in the first years after the end of the communism, were written in a way that
does not reflect major world events (e.g., the Cold War). In countries with a large Russianspeaking population, it is also important consumers of all ages to be offered reputable media,
traditional and online, in Russian that will compensate for the disinformation and the propaganda
of Russian-owned outlets such as RT. An example of this practice was already given by Estonia
a country that according to external evaluations is doing a lot to deter disinformation,
moreover, successfully. In a broader context, the population i hi R
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broadcasting so that the US and the West can deliver messages to the peoples like the Russians
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follow the one from the Cold War times, mainly Radio Free Europe

511.

Such a strategy will

an informational tool that

proved itself very successful for the mission it set forth 512.
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A measure that can also bring some clarity regarding facts that are part of narratives of
Russian propaganda and disinformation would be the implementation of a state-owned website
in countries affected by disinformation. It should contain facts of significance that were falsely
presented in disinformation websites. This way, the state can establish a firm position on the
accuracy of reported as news facts, explain others, that are left vague and discredit propaganda
content that appears online. These tools can be concentrated in state-owned media that already
have established credibility and enjoy popularity among the domestic population. In addition to
the news reported by these media, there should be a section that focuses concretely on facts that
were inaccurately represented as part of a disinformation content. Such efforts are already
initiated by various countries, both on NGO-level and on state-level. However, with that many
resources, consumers may get confused as to where to double-check certain information.
Therefore, it is crucial for the source to be supported and maintained by the government, to enjoy
credibility, and to be already known to users. After adding the fact-checking section on the stateowned media website, the new implementation should be promoted as an accurate method of
delivering the news and simultaneously disproving any wrongful interpretations of them.
Measures toward the intermediaries – the traditional and social media. In terms of
restricting the Russian disinformation officially distributed through state-owned media (RT), the
U.S. made some particular steps already, however, with limited success. The Department of
J

ice f ced he RT U.S.-based company T&R to register under the Foreign Agent

Registration Act (FARA) 513 a a f m f a i g
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propaganda outlet. Legislation from the U.K. concerning impartiality of the media led to the
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courts fining RT514, as a result of inaccurate reporting, thus serving a similar deterrence purpose
as FARA. Regardless, neither of these state-enforced mechanisms are very efficient because they
are time-consuming and it is challenging to keep track of all disinformation outlets, especially
online. Therefore, a strategy different from the premises of FARA may be better even if it means
the implementation of an entirely new system for monitoring digital media. In particular, this
system should envision that the reputable news outlets should be invited to register, rather than
the ones disseminating information. With a state-registration, the media will receive a license
and the obligation to demonstrate through its website that is certified. The registration should
include information about the media ownership, other companies with which the owners are
associated and when the media was originally established. This way, monitoring the history of a
medium may be an indicator for its credibility. Newer media should be an object of close
observation until they establish themselves as renowned in time. State legislation should adopt a
definition of the term news outlet that will differentiate between websites with news content and
others (e.g. blogs) in order to delineate which websites are supposed to register and which do not
have to undergo a registration process.
In case a medium fails to register and fraudulently uses the certification logo that the state
will give to registered media, the legislation should incorporate fines. Moreover, websites that
are not registered as news outlets should be obligated to disclose on their website in a visible
way that they are not news agencies and the content does not necessarily have to be a subject of
journalistic standards for accuracy and objectivity. Non-compliant websites who present news
without registration or disclosure that they are not news sources should be deleted and the
owners fined. The registration of the media should be free of charge so that equality between
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them is guaranteed and any chance for discrimination eliminated. Thus, readers will be
immediately aware that they are reading content from either a registered source or one that is not
certified. The role of intermediaries such as Facebook is also vital. Social media should only
accept advertisements from other media that are compliant with the rules for digital news outlets.
An additional measure should be a state-sponsored campaign that seeks to discourage the
evolution of the attention-economy culture. Headlines that adopt a more neutral tone should be
preferred over such that subtly lead the reader to a conclusion directly with the headline, not
leaving them any room for independent fact-assessment and decision-making. To this campaign
should also be invited companies such as The New York Times and The Washington Post, who,
among other media, set the tone of the entire information culture. While both companies are
considered as renowned sources of information, they do not come free of charge. Instead, when
the online reader exceeds a certain number of articles per week, they are asked to pay a certain
fee to continue reading. Discouraged by the paid access, naturally, readers may turn to
alternative sources that are free, but not reputable, accurate, or complying to journalistic
standards. Therefore, it is essential that the states engage in a conversation about how to make
the content of reputable news agencies accessible to readers so that they do not resort to sources
that lack credibility.
The last measure that can have impactful consequences pertains to social media
advertisements. Political or issue advertisements concerning election candidates on social media
should be restricted unless they disclose the source of their funding clearly and directly through
social media515, without having to click on the specific advertisement. Furthermore,
political/issue advertisements funded by foreign sponsors or donors should be prohibited, the
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same way that funding from non-native donors/sponsors/citizens is not allowed in elections,
because ultimately both phenomena have the same effect

bolstering or diminishing a

ca dida e cam aig by a foreign entity. Also, social media should be obligated to track and
report to a state communications commission the number of clicks that political advertisements
receive so that the importance of social media as an arena for election campaigning is assessed,
at least approximately. Such regulation would be particularly useful so that their accountability
for election disruptions is out of doubt. Among other tracking measures that can be adopted, this
one can serve as proof for the major impact social media companies have on independent
thinking, voting, and democracy.

Countering cognitive threats in recruitment by radical Islamic organizations
While non-state actors appeared in cases of espionage and disinformation, along with the
main state-actors, in the case with the recruitment by ISIS, the central actor is a non-state one,
and the state-ones are playing a secondary role. The caliphate could be labeled as the main figure
in the recruitment process, but it is important to delineate who was executing the recruitment
operations in the name of ISIS. Those were mainly individuals who pledged allegiance to the
terrorist group and, of course, its leaders who made direct appeals to people to join the caliphate
and help develop it further. The case of ISIS recruitment is another example of how perpetrators
could be, initially, in the role of the victims. Many of the recruits were victims of manipulations
and deceit before they became recruiters themselves after they traveled to Iraq and Syria. Among
these perpetrators who were victims at first, were men, women, and children. However, the circle
of the victims does not end with just the people who chose to join ISIS. The families of all these
individuals that did not suspect that they may not see their beloved ones again suffered
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tremendous emotional shocks after discovering that their sons, daughters, sisters, brothers, nieces
and nephews joined the terrorist organization and pledged allegiance to its leaders. Moreover,
there is another figure among the victims in the case of ISIS recruitment

the states from which

the fighters came, and in many cases against which acts of terrorism were committed by their
own citizens. The number of state victims in recruitment cases is very high since almost every
country has anti-terrorism laws that could have been enforced against a captured ISIS-fighter,
exemplifying that the war against terror was multilateral, regardless of the concrete victim. The
state victims were not only professing Christianity and Judaism but were also Islamic and Hindu
countries 516. Therefore, the hypothesis that ISIS declared war only on Christian countries is not
ed b e ide ce f he e
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The three main conceptual relationships that surface are the non-state actors
actor(s), non-state actor(s)

individuals, and state actors

state

individuals. First, the relationship

between non-state actors and state actors. It is represented by ISIS, on the one hand, and the
states to which its violence was directed, on the other. These state actors include populations
with different religions. They are located on different continents and represent different socioeconomic conditions, and culture. As an enemy, ISIS was very dangerous mostly because it had
a practically unlimited number of enemies that could have been affected by terrorism at any
point. Moreover, since it was not officially recognized state entity but rather a state-like
organization without official recognition, diplomatic contacts and negotiations were not a
possible solution to resolving or alleviating the issue. Deterrence as a state policy is also a
limited option. Other non-state actors with significance in this case were the companies whose
products ISIS was using to communicate and recruit new members
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Twitter, WhatsApp, etc. While in other circumstances, these social media companies would have
been responsible to some extent for facilitating the recruitment process, in this case, the ISIS
recruiters were taking advantage of the main service these companies were providing. Their
primary purpose is interaction and exchange of information, something that neither the
companies nor the legislation are capable of restricting without any serious damages for the right
to information and free speech, except in cases involving examples of hate speech and
propaganda that were discovered by these companies and/or the law enforcement.
The next relationship is the one between the non-state actor(s) and individuals. The dual
capacity in which ISIS recruits acted makes this relationship particularly interesting. The victims
of ISIS in terms of cognitive manipulations began being the manipulators themselves after their
recruitment ended successfully as they joined ISIS. Attempting to provide services and goods as
a real state, ISIS resembled one a lot

it had a territory, population, some administrative

apparatus even if not well developed, schools, hospitals, and profits. However, it also lacked
various things, among which, the most central one was, the opportunity to provide to its people
citizenship, passports and stability, especially considering the fact that it was spending a lot more
than it could afford to pay. ISIS mai f ding came, according to the Financial Action Task
Force (FATF)517 from profits gained from the occupied territories; ransoms from kidnappings;
donations, fundraising and material support in other forms 518. As stated above, the difference
between Osama bin Laden

ii

f Al-Qaeda a d ISIS

de i leade

a ha he f me

aimed to destroy the Western order and to establish a strong caliphate only when it has already
gained local support and have built solid grounds for future development. As opposed to this
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strategy, ISIS rushed into declaring the Islamic State with an imposed order based on brutal
force. It had the mission to provide the survival of the caliphate and to simultaneously destabilize
the West. This was an ambitious task that, according to estimates, in the early years of ISIS cost
nearly $10 million per month only for the remuneration of 20,000 to 30,000 fighters, compared
to Al Qaeda's operations in Iraq from 2004 that were evaluated to roughly $10.4 million per
year519. De i e ISIS de i e to be perceived as a state, it was not, and this fact brought a lot of
legal issues when it was defeated, and its fighters had to return home with no passports and no
documents proving their identity, after destroying their old ones.
Other individuals who suffered from ISIS recruitment were the parents and the relatives
of the people recruited. They experienced emotional trauma after realizing their beloved ones
joined the organization. This shock came as a result of the little suspicion they had that members
of their households have any attachment to ISIS. Moreover, evidence shows that most likely
none or limited conversations were led at home about the radical organization before the
radicalization occurred. At the same time, the active ISIS propaganda on social media switched
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played an essential role in the recruitment that could not have been limited without censorship,
potentially unjustified persecutions, restriction of connections and possible lawsuits. Facebook
and similar channels for communication were very appealing to young people, they spent a lot of
time engaging with them, and this made them easier targets for recruitment.
The third relationship that could be observed in the ISIS recruitment case is the one
between state actors and individuals. It represents a complicated and challenging question: why
citizens of a particular country would leave it to join an organization that commits acts
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potentially against this very same country. The reasons embrace a multitude of cultural, socioeconomic and political factors, as it was discussed previously. Summarizing them leads to the
conclusion that some states failed to provide enough certainty and comfort to their citizens and
made them targets to recruitment. In addition, it is likely that the citizens did not feel attached to
the state to a degree that made the recruitment and the violence directed against the state, an
acceptable option. Further problematizing this question is another relationship that the states
have with the victims of terrorist acts executed by ISIS. The grief and the trauma from these
terrorist attacks gave rise to nationalist voices that demanded the state adopts further acts of
repression against Muslims worldwide and Muslim communities in the state itself. As the farright parties gained more and more supporters and seats in the national parliaments, many
popular state narratives started transitioning from a fight against terrorism to a fight against
Islam, which further alienated Muslims and exposed them to more opportunities for
radicalization and recruitment. Moreover, after the world declared a win against ISIS and its
members started returning home, many states refused to allow them to enter and even revoked
their citizenships

a measure that has an ambiguous meaning for deterrence. It sends a clear

message that for those who join terrorist organizations, there will be no coming back. While this
may deter to some extent potential recruits that are still hesitant about joining ISIS, it also makes
it impossible for newly added members to redeem themselves, to reintegrate society and to be
motivated to stop seeing their former state as an enemy.
It was clear since the establishment of the Islamic caliphate that the next goal of ISIS will
be to destroy the Western order. Its leaders sought this as well as its members. At the time, a loss
in the eyes of ISIS members was a defeat that led to territories lost, decreased incomes from
illegal trade, ransoms and drugs, and donations. Consequently, the more defeats ISIS suffered,
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the more significant the losses were in every regard including reputational, as the abilities to the
state-like formation to continue existing were under question. Another phenomenon that could be
considered a loss for ISIS, in a non-material sense, was the loss of supporters and the decline of
the faith in the ISIS ideas and goals. However, while non-material, it was still a very important
one, because ISIS may continue existing, at least ideologically, even without territories, funding,
and profits, but if it loses credibility and supporters, this would mean that the organization is
dead indeed. From another perspective, ISIS members suffered losses translated into the
disappointment of some ISIS-members by the fact that the conditions promised by the caliphate
did not match with reality. Moreover, for the families of the ISIS members, the losses of being
away from their children and potentially not seeing them again represent a significant emotional
burden, added to the realization of the fact their beloved ones joined a terrorist organization
responsible for many deaths and other atrocities. The shock in the community from the news that
people who previously did not express any attachment to ISIS or its ideas abandoned their
everyday lives and their families abruptly to support terrorism also brings disappointment,
sadness and even more questions.
As for the individuals or their close ones who were victims of ISIS violence, a win in
their eyes was mostly getting their beloved ones back home. Among other desirable scenarios
was the elimination of ISIS. Unfortunately, they did not realize that even without territorial
presence the ideas of ISIS may still survive. A loss for these people meant even more terror,
death and devastation. In terms of state wins and losses, the most significant damage is
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is, of course, in case the state has not suffered any terrorist attacks that will also bring losses of
lives and material damages. Moreover, a trauma from a terrorist attack in the minds of the people
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is something that does not heal easily and could persist across generations. To this extent, not
only the population of a particular country that has been victimized suffers a loss but potentially
humanity in general. While different individuals in a society will have different views on how an
ultimate win against ISIS looks like, in a broader context, a win for everyone opposing ISIS
would be every loss, in its varying degrees, for the radical organization

from decrease in

donations and profits from kidnappings to loss of territories and supports, and new recruits.
As already mentioned, the social media, in this case, had a supportive role as it
facilitated, unintentionally, the recruitment of new ISIS members. However, aside from the
social media and its consequences, a few other figures, who remained mostly in the shadows
during the investigations of missing people who allegedly joined ISIS, are also present in the
case. Studying ISIS recruitment shows that there was most likely a network of people who were
responsible for recruiting new members, support them materially and with guidance, provide
forged documents, and detailed itineraries for the trip to Iraq and Syria. Moreover, smugglers
who were not necessarily connected to ISIS or its goals also emerged as facilitating factors in the
recruitment operations, as their motivation to provide support was purely financial. The
opportunity that some smugglers were ISIS-affiliates should not be excluded. Regardless, the
focus of the investigations and the stories the media reported was on the ISIS recruits, rather than
on the numerous people who made the entire process possible. More media and scholarly
attention should be dedicated to such underground networks because, if their members remain
anonymous or at large, then they will continue working for dangerous clients like ISIS.
Most of the factors that influence the case of ISIS recruitment strategies were already
mentioned previously but still deserve to be highlighted to extract implications for prevention
strategies against this threat. First, the culture of antagonism toward immigrants and toward
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Muslims, in particular. Second, the family environment that shows in various cases with
radicalization that some tragic event happened in the family typically the loss of a parent.
Another component that is also evident in the cases regarding the family environment is the
possible views of a parent who expresses support toward radical Islamic groups. Thus, the
parental example and the experienced trauma to a large extent set the conditions for the future
radicalization of the household members. Interestingly, money is not among the most crucial
factors for radicalization, even though in some cases it is present as a powerful incentive. In
others, it was just a catalyzer that on the one hand, allowed young people to focus on spiritual
rather than monetary issues, and on the other, to make the trip to Syria and Iraq financially
possible.
As opposed to other cases described in this study, the one with ISIS recruitment could be
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war declared on terrorism. As recruitment is a direct source of human resources added to the
ISIS capital, it could be said that the states fighting ISIS have declared war implicitly on
recruitment as well, as the latter was recognized officially as a security threat of high importance.
The rules of wars were applicable in this situation which was further facilitated by the fact that
ISIS resembled a state-like entity but was, nevertheless, not an officially recognized state. Thus,
any legal justifications about military measures undertaken against them as a response to their
aggression were not necessary. However, as the destruction of ISIS could be perceived as a
powerful weapon against future recruitment and a hit on the ISIS reputation and ideology, the
recruitment itself cannot be fought only with conventional weapons, as many have already
realized since the physical defeat of Al-Qaeda did not stop recruitment or the ideational existence
of the organization.
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The political mechanism used in the case of ISIS recruitment is closely related to the
ga i a i

primary goal to destroy the Western liberal order and replace it with one

dominated by the Islamic norms. As this assumption appears in works of radical Islamic
ideologues, it was originally accompanied by another one

to create a caliphate after the end of

the Western value system. While Al-Qaeda planned to dismantle the Western order and then
create a caliphate, ISIS declared the beginning of the caliphate and turned eyes toward the
second task assigned by radical Islamist doctrine. Both Al-Qaeda and its somewhat similar but
ideological continuation

ISIS included recruitment as an important activity upon which the

future of the radical formation is dependent. Both Al-Qaeda and ISIS still have supporters,
although they have been defeated, at least territorially. The fact that they gain material and nonmaterial support for their goals despite their losses over the years shows that recruitment is still a
threat and will be as long as radical Islamic leaders believe in their idea and see the potential for
support in populations across the globe. The latter use religion, along with other factors, as a
main driving force for achieving political gains

the creation of a state that will fight against

other states in order to impose its, perceived as superior, ideological principles.
The recruitment operations led by ISIS were enjoying success mostly because of a few
psychological mechanisms. In all of the cases examined by researchers, and in the ones that I
used for this work, there is one element always present

the perceived loss f c
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life. The loss of control can be in one or more regards, including financial, spiritual, cultural,
emotional, etc. In some cases, this pattern was a result of a loss of a loved one, a crisis of
identity, and in others a cognitive dissonance produced by the conflict between the liberal
environment and conservative expectations in terms of cultural norms. Undoubtedly, the
persuasion of the ISIS recruiters was also a powerful force that contributed to adding more

e
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members to the ISIS-army of men, women, and children. However, the victims of recruitment
were vulnerable to this persuasion because some or all of the psychological conditions that I
mentioned have been present in their lives. For instance, in cases of recruitment of women, it
was at first glance evident that they were almost perfectly integrated into the Western way of life
they had good grades, they were even outperforming their peers, they were engaged in
extracurricular activities, they enjoyed the company of friends and family. Nevertheless, their
religion and their culture were composed of more conservative values, based on modesty and
obedience to senior family members who determined to a large extent the life of their children,
including marriage. At the same time, the West offered a sharp alternative to these traditions.
With the realization of how significant the contrast between Western society and

e

conservative community can be, the cognitive dissonance in people who later became victims of
ISIS recruitment started to grow. Psychological studies show as I outlined previously, that in
ime
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information needed to provide a solution to the problem increases. The human cognition when
operating under stress searchers for more information, as this often happens at the expense of
quality information. At the same time, ISIS recruiters offered pieces of information connected in
a narrative a desirable alternative for regaining control by rejecting the discomfort from
clashing values and lifestyles.
Measures toward the indirect perpetrator – ISIS. While the defeat of ISIS was a
powerful step towards future deterrence, ideologically, ISIS still exists and has supporters. In
peacetime, rather than when ISIS or similar radical organizations are on the rise, states should be
consistent with their deterrence tactics. Mainly, they should focus on discrediting the leaders of
ISIS, the more popular faces that appear in their propaganda videos, and the ISIS ideology
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altogether. The counter-narrative should be distributed through the same sources and using the
same means as ISIS when disseminating their messages

social media, hashtags that ISIS use, or

any other way through which the target-audience could be reached. The core nature of the ISIS
counter-narrative should be the illusionary picture that is drawn by ISIS recruiters, in material
and non-material terms. In this message, the main reasons for people to join ISIS should be
carefully considered. They should be addressed in a way that exposes the fallacy of the promises
made by ISIS. The goal of this campaign should be that potential recruits realize that they will
not regain control over their own life, but just the opposite

joining ISIS will be just a different

path leading to even more loss of control.
Measures toward the direct perpetrator and victims – current and potential ISIS
members, and the indirect victims – countries of origin/former residence of ISIS members.
Due to the highly intertwined nature of the problem, in which perpetrators are victims, and vice
versa, the measures focused on the remaining actors involved in the case will be listed together
in this section.
To counter cognitive threats that result from recruitment operations, it is essential that
ISIS members do not join the organization and do not become future recruiters themselves.
Among the strategies that could be used in this regard is the development of religious education
programs that will clearly distinguish between Islam and radical Islam. For this effort to be
successful, participants from academia, community, religious institutions, and policy-makers
should join efforts and work together. Religion by itself is not the force making radicalization
ible. I i

icall acc m a ied b

me l

i

he ec i

life a d i

he e m me

f

desperation, many people turn to religion, as a way to heal. Compensating for this loss of control
should be the main strategy against recruitment. It should envision programs that aim to provide
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monetary and emotional support for people who are vulnerable of becoming radicalized.
Moreover, individuals who have gone through a similar path and have considered joining radical
organizations should be included as an example of the illusionary world that ISIS promises.
Former ISIS members should not be deprived of citizenship because this way they will know that
they cannot re-integrate into society under any circumstances and may re-radicalize after they
returned from ISIS and found no place to go, no place to which to return. Re-entry programs
should be offered to such individuals, but not without the necessary caution. Making an enemy
of the West was the central premise on which ISIS commits violence by claiming it declared war
on Islam. To refute this assumption, the West has to prove that it has not declared war on Islam,
or Islamic people, even those who were misled by ISIS. If a way of re-integrating back to
Western societies is not offered, then any narrative portraying the West as not seeking to create
enemies will fail.
Especially for children who were raised in the West but spent time in the ISIS system of
terror, there should be resources for re-integration. Many immigrants, even those who have not
joined ISIS, have seemingly accomplished a successful physical adaptation to the environment
that their new location offers but not a mental one which reflects on their identity - the way they
see themselves. Policy-makers and societies should recognize the importance of the struggle for
mental migration that many immigrants experience in terms of culture. It is also one of the
central reasons why so many allegedly integrated young immigrants with impeccable school
records were easily victimized by ISIS recruitment. Their physical adaptation to the conditions of
the West was completed but not their mental one. These young people had questions, doubts, and
concerns that remained unaddressed. Therefore, a successful strategy in this regard will begin
from the home where adolescents can raise concerns in a safe environment, without judgment.
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Through such re-connection, older family members will be informed of the experiences of the
younger ones and thus will be alert if there are any signs of intended life-transitions such as
joining a radical organization. Moreover, since there may be an inevitable clash between the
liberal culture of the West and the more conservative culture of the East, family members should
be the ones to helping with the balance in the mind of their young sons, daughters, and siblings.
A balance that will eliminate the cognitive dissonance with which many of them struggle through
a secure channel of communication that will lead to openness, conversations and compromising
thus reducing vulnerability and potential recruitment by radical organizations.
Measures toward the intermediaries – people engaging with document frauds and
human trafficking. As smugglers and individuals issuing false documents are not among the
main actors in recruitment operations, they are still important figures for facilitating this process.
As most of the attention of the law enforcement, the scholars and the media is focused on
perpetrators and victims, somewhat peripheral remain figures of people who make the
recruitment possible. That said the law enforcement should engage in campaigns to identify,
discover and capture anyone who is involved in the recruitment chain from smugglers to those
h aid a d abe e

i

ga i a i

in any other way. Special laws should impose more

severe sanctions for these crimes. The issue is that some states have weak law enforcement
apparatus and judiciary. Therefore, the individual communities that are among the most
interested sides in preventing recruitment have to take responsibility for providing information
about smugglers and human traffickers to local but also international law enforcement agencies.
Traditional and online channels for communications between the communities and these
agencies should be established, especially in states that are corrupt and lack resources.
Smugglers and human traffickers may be considered a problem only of the state law enforcement
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agencies, but when it comes to terrorism, this should be framed as an international problem and
capturing such individuals and preventing them from making recruitment possible

a global task

of high importance.

Countering cognitive threats in cases of political profiling by companies
The case with Cambridge Analytica reveals events in which leading figures were nonstate actors, similarly to the case with ISIS. As opposed to the latter, however, the Cambridge
Analytica one involved not radical terrorist organizations but corporations, democratically
established entities in compliance with the existing laws. Moreover, Cambridge Analytica was
not looking to recruit people to help them achieve the c m a

goals. The people were already

recruited, or more accurately - they voluntarily posted their information on Facebook, from
where Cambridge Analytica obtain it contrary to regulations established by Facebook.
Cambridge Analytica could be identified as the main non-state perpetrator in this case, with
some help, to some extent by Facebook as the latter did not provide strong guarantees that the
e

da a will not be exploited by third-party applications. Interestingly, in this case, the direct

victims were deceived in not one but two ways. First, their information was stolen and used
without their permission. Second, this personal information was then skillfully used for the
construction of psychological profiling of political advertisements whose targets were the very
same people from which the information was stolen. While there is no obvious direct state
victim, in this case, the consequences from the cognitive victimization of individuals reflect on
the democratic processes in various states, mainly through disruption of the independently
formed political attitudes and behaviors. One of the central arenas for Cambridge Anal ica
profiling was the 2016 Presidential Elections in the United States, but the range of state targets
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also includes European and African countries as

well.
The role of the individuals, in this case, is also particularly intriguing. As some of them
were victims of the profiling, others were involved in the profiling algorithm and the marketing
activities of Cambridge Analytica. After the news about the political profiling broke, some of the
people collaborating with the company showed remorse ab

he c m a

strategies, and

others did not. Aside from potential political motivations for their involvement in Cambridge
Anal ica ac i i ie , heir primary incentive was undoubtedly financial, as all of them had been
associated with the company through employment or grants. As for the Facebook employees
who were aware of possible adverse consequences resulting from third-party applications, they
were m i a ed b
Faceb

k

he c m a

mai g al,

fi i ge e a ed h

gh ela i

i c ea e
hi

fi . It is unclear what amount of
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applications, but they are likely significant, considering the company reported around $40 billion
revenue from advertising in 2017 520.
There are three levels of relationships existing in this case: non-state actors
non-state actors
dyad perpetrators

state-actors; and individuals

individuals;

state actors. The first relationship represents the

victims, except for when individuals were employees of the non-state actor

(the corporation) involved in the case. The non-state actors perceived the individuals in this
scenario as a means to an end, and the individuals, while realizing that companies benefit from
the services delivered to them were nevertheless enjoying the free product left on their disposal
the social media platforms. However, as privacy concerns have always been a serious issue in
social media, it never escalated to the extent to which the users completely abandoned social
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media. Some of the users agreed their information to be utilized by third-party applications, for
research purposes, as suggested by Facebook, but the majority had no idea how their data will
actually be used, and they never consented to give it to anyone. The second relationship

that

between non-state actors and state-actors is a very complex one. The non-state actors typically
lobby before the state actors so that more comprehensive privileges are afforded to them,
assumingly leading to more profits. At the same time, democratic countries are free-market
societies in which companies, their development, and competition are encouraged officially by
the state. Considering this context, the specific legislation limiting the freedom of social media
la f m
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strong measures out of fear of being accused of authoritarianism and censorship. Moreover, due
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of personal data, because this could restrict a lot of their income from advertisements. The third
relationship illustrates the interaction between individuals and state-actors. Countries are
generally obligated to adopt laws in protection of the rights of the citizens, as they are cognizant
of its tremendous popularity among the users. They are also aware of the thin line between strict
measures and censorship, when it comes to media, and especially digital media

a grey area that

is still not very well regulated even in developed Western countries. Individuals, recognizing the
role of the state as a protector of their privacy and social media

ima

goal of profiting from

the services offered, were caught unprepared for a unanimous position on the issue. Most of
them blamed Facebook directly for the violations, that led to Cambridge Analytica collection of
their data for political goals 521. For others, leaving Facebook turned out to be a much more
difficult task, as many users have deleted their accounts only to go back to the platform soon
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after, realizing what significant part of their lives it occupied 522. Much like an addiction. An
addiction that studies confirm to exist. One study on the topic showed that correlations between
symptoms of addictive technology use and mental disorder symptoms were all positive and
significant

523.

Meanwhile, the voices of users that accused the states of lack of regulations that

led to the scandal were very few, perhaps realizing that the state was put in a very peculiar
position, as the digital privacy laws are still immature, and the freedom of speech and free
market economy initiatives should be protected at all cost. The states themselves were caught
somewhat unprepared at how easy it is for huge data breaches to occur in social media. A proof
for this is that the fines for them were, before the Cambridge Analytica scandal,
disproportionally small in comparison to their profits from advertisements.
When discussing what constitutes wins and losses for the sides involved in the
Cambridge Analytica case, the interests of the three central figures have to be considered. First,
non-state actors (Cambridge Analytica and Facebook), second, states whose ci i e

e

information was stolen and who were consequentially targeted by aggressive political
advertisements aiming to influence elections outcome, and third, the individuals who were the
direct victim of the data appropriation. For Cambridge Analytica, a win will mean to gain more
clients and popularity while at the same time maintaining a low profile regarding the c m a
preferred methods for winning elections, political disputes, and generating profits. As for
Facebook, their main end-g al i he ame a Camb idge A al ica a d imila

hem, he

have to maintain their clients (users) satisfied with the offered product in order to keep making
profits. That said Facebook skillfully maneuvered be
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regulations for privacy protection, a d he i c me f m ad e i e f
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invaluable tool for their own goals. In that sense, a loss for Cambridge Analytica and Facebook
will mean loss of profits, which could be a consequence from loss of clients (users) or from
another reason leading to the same effect. For states, wins and losses in this case would be
defined differently than the ones for the non-state actors. A win for states would be a wellbalanced environment in which companies thrive but not at the expense of selling users
information to third parties who will, in turn, use the information against them, turning them into
victims of coercive political persuasion. A loss for states, in this context, would be to lose the
balance between non-state actors and citizens, especially when this influences outcomes of
elections or other issues of national importance. As for the individuals who were victims of the
profiling a win would mean their privacy to be guaranteed on social media, to have control and
ownership over the content they post. A loss would be if social media withdraw or limit any of
these rights or mislead the users to believe their information will be used in a particular way
when it is in fact used for entirely different purposes.
Two of the figures that are not central for the case with Cambridge Analytica but still
have some role are the ones of politicians and researchers. Many politicians were more lenient to
Facebook because of lobbying. They were also the ones who were clients of Cambridge
Analytica or one of its subsidiaries and benefitted from their profiling methods. Furthermore, the
politicians using Camb idge A al ica services were not only from one country but from
different countries almost on every continent. Without politicians profiting from Cambridge
A al ica alg i hm , he e

ld be

ma ke f
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business for

companies like Cambridge Analytica. The other figure mentioned previously that has to do with
the case is the one of researchers. Their studies and conclusions, as one of the former Cambridge
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A al ica em l ee admi ted, contributed to a large extent to the development of the profiling
tool later used for the design of the digitally distributed advertisements. As e ea che

mai

task is to produce knowledge on a subject matter, very often circumstances lead to the production
of knowledge that serves to achieve undemocratic goals. Researchers produce science benefitting
all people, but i
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corporate profits, and politics. The creation of Facebook stimulated the growth of a culture of
oversharing in the digital space. As this was still a new environment, many users were unaware
of the results from posting online a large number of personal details and thoughts. This culture
got slowly incorporated into societies and gained the dimensions of an addiction that was
controlled by social media corporations. This dependency was created, stimulated and
perpetuated by Facebook in order to keep its current users and gain new ones. Having more users
generally translates into more profits for the company, as they form a broader audience that
could be easily reached and influenced by the right tools of persuasion. From the dawn of
political thinking and politics, persuasion has been the driving force between uniting and
dividing people over different issues of social interest. The case with Cambridge Analytica is a
bright example of the interaction between culture, society, profits and politics and how they are
intertwined in a way that reveals a long-known pattern: the losses for one actor are gains for
another thus leaving very little space for a compromise between the political interests of state,
non-state actors and individuals.
As this case represents one of the most recent types of cognitive threats, and currently
lacks even legal regulation, it can be claimed that it does not constitute a reason for war. None of
the traditional war weapons would be applicable in this case. The primary tool for reaction in
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cases of profiling for political purposes remains the adoption of laws and regulations serving as
deterrence. Moreover, because persuasion is still perceived as a non-invasive weapon that can
only slightly, if at all, influence thinking but not predetermine it altogether, targeted political
advertisements are still not defined as a serious threat. As argued previously, this could be
attributed to the difficulty of proving that independent decision-making could be violated by
coercive persuasion to the extent to which the decision make
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with what the author of the persuasion message desired. A lack of conclusive proof for this
causal relationship does not mean, however, that the causal relationship does not exist. It is just
difficult to be proven beyond doubt since it pertains to psychological processes. The fact that a
domestic or foreign entity has an invested interest in affecting the process of independent
decision-making by voters is a fact concerning enough to provoke concrete measures to counter
this threat. The fact that the perpetrator is a non-state entity (corporation), be it Cambridge
Analytica, Facebook or other social media platform, leads to the conclusion that the most
effective means to combat profiling for political purposes may be administrative, legal and
psychological, rather than military or foreign-policy oriented.
The political mechanisms making the case with Cambridge Analytica possible are the
following. First, for Camb idge A al ica

ge acce

e

da a, the latter existed within

Facebook, and the company collected them. Next, after Cambridge Analytica was in possession
of the data, it used them i a a
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generating profits for itself. At the same time, the individuals whose data were exploited for the
production of political advertising campaigns were losing the battle for control over their
personal information. As Cambridge Analytica scored wins, financial and reputational, so did
their clients who were supported by the political profiling algorithm developed by the company.
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As individuals were losing more and more privacy control over their own personal information,
the democratic process and independent thinking became endangered more and more.
As for the psychological mechanism for influence that led to the success of Cambridge
Analytica, there are few aspects to be considered. As mentioned, Facebook and other social
media created a culture of oversharing that gained quickly the dimensions of an addiction.
Addiction, that was orchestrated by social media and its tools to subtly persuade users to spend
more and more time on their platform so that they share more and more of their life. Getting
users to agree on posting something once, leads to them agreeing even more in the future. This is
a phenomenon in social psychology related to attitudinal commitment and behavior
consistency524. According to these principles, people want to preserve some consistency in their
future behavior. Thus, getting them to commit to something once, would predict a possible
pattern in their behavior for the future. That said Facebook initially asked users to provide basic
information about themselves, and as time went by, it was asking for more and more information
to be shared, with which most users complied. Moreover, Facebook was constantly offering its
users potential contacts, labeled as friends by the platform in an effort for the user to increase
their level of intensity of the communication and people outreach. This outreach also increased
Faceb
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shared a lot of information and had access to so many of their friends and acquaintances, leaving
Facebook was not so easy because it meant leaving commitment, leaving information flow,
leaving contacts.
While so many other means of communication exist, Facebook was connecting people in
a way that no other media did. Once adjusted to receiving and providing an increased volume of
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information from and to friends and acquaintances, it was difficult for users to delete their social
media profiles and resist the instinct to seek and exchange information. Facebook knew this, so
did Cambridge Analytica as well. The latter sensed that social circles on Facebook reveal
patterns that could be exploited for political gains, if appropriately conceptualized. Their
algorithm had hundreds of elements that were used for micro-targeting, a campaign that aimed to
send an individually designed message to a social perceiver, that will evoke a predictable
reaction in them, typically benefitting the sender of the message. Based on the likes on social
media, Camb idge A al ica alg i hm a able

e

ac i f ma i

ab

e

le ba ic

characteristics, name, age, race, income, and sexual orientation but the capabilities of the
profiling strategy were not limited only to this. Surprisingly, they could also predict attributes
such as childhood trauma, intelligence, political views, and other elements of a psychological
portrait that included
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In terms of its role in the U.S. elections, the accuracy of the model was very

high too, ranging from 85% accuracy for distinguishing between Democrats and Republicans
reaching 95% accuracy for distinguishing black users from white users526.
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for one candidate or another. What is not difficult to believe is that influence over particular
groups of the population was exercised in a way that made them more likely to prefer a particular
candidate and to vote for them

a fact that in close elections plays a significant role. Regardless

of the levels of exposure to Camb idge A al ica
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a strategy in political marketing, and threatens to stay and expand its influence, if measures are
not undertaken. As Facebook is undoubtedly part of the problem, it is not the only company that
makes profiling possible. Others, such as Netflix, Amazon, Google, and Uber527 also develop
their own prediction algorithms ba ed

e

da a. The common denominator between all of

them is the information that consumers themselves provide through their online searches that
give companies clues about their interest in different products. Such hints are often used across
multiple companies. It is only needed for a user to search for a single keyword in one search
engine/retailer so that others, with which this search engine/retailer collaborates, begin to microtarget the user with tailored advertisements based on the keyword entered.
In the following sections, I will address a few possible strategies to counter these threats
that are focused on the different participants in the case. First, measures toward the indirect
perpetrators in this case (Facebook and other related social media). Second, measures toward the
direct perpetrator

Cambridge Analytica. Third, measures toward the direct victims (the social

media users). Fourth, actions toward the indirect victims (the states whose democratic processes
were violated). Fifth, measures toward the intermedia ie ha made he e

l iai

f

e

data possible.
Measures toward the indirect perpetrator – Facebook and other social media. One of
the most reliable strategies pertaining to Facebook and other social media is that the state,
through regulations and sanctions forces them to provide more freedom for users to control their
information and how it is used. This control should be given through opt-in functions rather than
through opt-out functions, so that users are in charge of who sees their information at all times.
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Moreover, all guidelines and regulations of

e

ivacy should be explained in an easy,

understandable manner. Also, Facebook has to provide guarantees that chats between users
through the Messenger application are not recorded and used for any purposes by Facebook or
third parties.
Measures toward the direct perpetrator – Cambridge Analytica. As for measures toward
Cambridge Analytica and other companies using similar techniques for political persuasion, it is
needed that legislative measures regulate specifically the boundaries of their activities. State
authorities should obligate companies engaged with political campaigns to obtain written (digital
as well) consent from every user who receives targeted political advertisements through social
media, as this consent could be withdrawn at any time. Moreover, both social media companies
and those working on political campaigns should develop advertisements in a way that clearly
shows if the user seeing them is a subject of targeted advertising. An opt-out function should also
be provided.
Measures toward the direct victims – the social media users. Studies show that social
media users generally do not take advantage of more privileges presented to them regarding
online privacy. So far, however, these privileges have not been given in a way that makes them
practical to most users. The process of opting-out of some of the functions leading to marketing
and political marketing profiling is complicated and has to be executed every time a new interest
of the user was discovered and automatically added by Facebook. Thus, Facebook should be
bliga ed

clea l i dica e he a e i e e i added

he
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file, and such should

be identified only if the users add themselves a specific interest to their profile. Another option
for defense against political profiling is that digital users develop civil consciousness that
pertains to the online space. They should demand their online rights to be respected, protected
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and guaranteed by state- and non-state entities. Moreover, users should require legislative
changes that will lead to more control over personal information. They should also be prepared
to boycott social media in case the practice of selling and exploiting their data is not terminated.
Social media corporations know that their products are highly addictive, and they rely on this to
keep their users, even if they are not satisfied with how their data is being handled. Facebook
became so popular and hard to leave because people increased in number and
interconnectedness. If this is true, the same process can diminish the role of Facebook when
users start leaving and become less connected through Facebook. The latter will lose popularity
and usefulness. Moreover, as the need for communication and maintaining relationships is
apparent, an alternative to the known free social media should be developed. It could be paid or
free of charge, but offering users guarantees that their data will not be collected, sold or used in
any manner. Such transitions are not surprising considering MySpace Faceb

k
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.

People claim they left MySpace and migrated to Facebook because they found something that
the former did not have, but the latter offered 528. Considering this tendency, Facebook
shortcomings may also be the reason for another rising social media platform that will
c m e aef

Faceb
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its reputation. However, it is in the hands of the politicians to create conditions and in the hands
of the people to create the demand for a social platform that is better for both their needs and
rights than previous ones.
Measures toward the indirect victims – states whose democratic processes were
violated. As states have most power concentrated in their hands over both individuals and
companies, their obligation to limit the damages that political profiling inflicts should be
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commensurate to their ability to influence changes. As argued before, the fines for violations that
are made by companies are not proportional to their gains

thus devaluing the quality of the

future prevention measures. Consequently, fines should be designed in a way that reflects the
profits the companies register. Also, profits generated through the violation should be
c fi ca ed, de i e h
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from the prohibited activities. This principle should be established as a law standard in all
countries in which political profiling is present. Moreover, in serious violations, substantial
personal responsibility should be envisioned for senior executives in these firms, who knowingly
disregarded the law and allowed or encouraged the violation. Prosecutors and the courts should
carefully examine the extent to which senior executives knew about them.
Based on all of the described factors facilitating political profiling, it is evident that
contemporary society is in a desperate need of state regulatory apparatus of social media and
online communications in general. Such agency, on national, or on supranational level should be
engaged mostly with monitoring social media and if they comply with the norms regarding
privacy laws. The U.S. Federal Trade Commission executes similar functions, but its range of
responsibilities includes a lot more than just controlling media companies. As they are expanding
and growing stronger, there should be a regulatory agency established specifically for the digital
space, as it has been increasingly becoming an arena for political warfare.
Measures toward intermediaries – politicians and researchers. A few words about the
prevention mechanisms focused on politicians and researchers also have to be mentioned. First,
Cambridge Analytica was profiting from its algorithm that exploited Faceb
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because it had clients who requested this service. Therefore, politicians emerge as a figure that
knowingly or unknowingly encouraged the privacy violations. To prevent politicians aiming to
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influence voters on political issues, laws should mandate that political targeting based on
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the data was gathered without the permission of the user, then they should be criminally liable,
along with the company providing the service. As for researchers, especially junior faculty
members, they are a vulnerable target for companies needing their services because of the grants
the latter offer to the former. External funding is known as a highly treasured asset for a
successful career in academia. As the pressure for securing grants by faculty members increases,
the more agreeable they will become to contribute to studies whose results will be used for
unethical purposes that may represent violations or even crimes. Using science for unethical
purposes is not a new phenomenon in the history of humanity. It has been so far and to some
extent limited, however. For instance, a lot of the science behind

me f he

ld most

devastating weapons is publicly available, but this does not mean that people use it on a regular
basis to do harm. There are many reasons behind this, among which an appreciation of the threat
that such weapon can produce, and laws prohibiting even attempts for constructing or using these
weapons. Therefore, if legislation restricts the use of personal information in political profiling,
the knowledge produced by scholars working on grants will be still benefitting society. At the
same time, it will be in the public domain but not used for unethical purposes that could violate
the right of independent decision-making, free of any coercive persuasion.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS, AND THE ROAD AHEAD

Currently, Google shows more than 5 million results produced by the search of the phrase
cognitive hacking. While it refers mostly to hackers taking advantage of psychological
vulnerabilities of the human cognition, it shows that the problem has gained alarming
dimensions. Some identify it as a public health crisis 529, others as an issue of the cybersecurity
field530. However, very little attention the problem gathered as one of the overlapping points
between the public health discipline and the cybersecurity

politics. Cognitive threats have

always been present in the world history, and they were so well integrated and common in
warfare that there is almost no research that linked ancient espionage and deception practices to
political profiling of voters whose information is used against them in a way that exploits their
greatest fears. The problem has always been the same, but because of the level of technological
and political development of societies, it was manifesting itself differently. This psychological
exploitation of the mind was continuously present in peacetime and warfare because humanity
was helpless against threats that come from within the individual. Public health cannot label
influenced thinking as a disease because even the healthiest cognition is exposed to threats due to
the way it is constructed and how people are socialized. At the same time, legally, perpetrators of
these cognitive attacks are not committing a crime by influencing other individuals because this
has always been part of the interaction between people. It almost seems like cognitive threats are
not a problem at all or at least they are not officially declared to represent one. Yet they are, and

529
530

Leah Brown, "Why cognitive hacking is a public health crisis," TechRepublic 2017.
George Cybenko, Annarita Giani, and Paul Thompson, Cognitive Hacking, vol. 60 (2004).
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have always been, even if the causal relationship between an outcome of affected by coercive
persuasion decision-making and the coercive persuasion itself cannot be established beyond
doubt. The harm that has been inflicted by cognitive threats over the different historical epochs is
obvious

lost wars, executed monarchs, thousands of recruits of radical organizations, millions

of online users whose data and whose fears were used for material and non-material profits of a
politician, political party or even companies.
As adverse as the consequences of cognitive threats can be, I aimed to prove in this study
that through prevention strategies, their effects could be mitigated to some extent. To summarize
the findings, I followed the sequence of the questions from the analysis chapter. First, regarding
the perpetrators in the cases, as main actors appear states, non-state actors and individuals. In
a ic la , i Ma ia B i a ca e, the state was a perpetrator through the individuals who were
politically motivated to collaborate with Moscow. The state also conducted disinformation
campaigns through individuals, but here, they were not politically but financially incentivized.
The case with ISIS reveals a non-state actor as a perpetrator through individuals who were
politically motivated to collaborate and undertook the roles of both victims and perpetrators. As
for the case with Cambridge Analytica, the main perpetrator(s) were non-state actors, as they
achieved their goals through individuals who were not politically or financially motivated to
collaborate. Instead, they had little to no knowledge of how they contributed to the non-state
actor(s) goals. The individuals who voluntarily posted their data on Facebook were unknowing
c llab a

he e e a

aim b

also victims in this case. That said, all of the

perpetrators were achieving their goals through individuals who acted driven by different
motivations or no motivations at all as they were contributing unknowingly. Half of the
perpetrators represent state actors and the other half - non-state actors as direct perpetrators.
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In terms of the range of victims in the case studies, in the case of Maria Butina, the direct
victim was the U.S. as well as the individuals through which the damage was inflicted. In the
case of disinformation, the range of direct victims expanded to include other Western states, in
addition to the U.S. and such that are objects of Russian geopolitical interests. The following
case, that with ISIS recruitment showed an even enlarged circle of victims that practically
included countries of all religions, from the West, from the East, the North and the South.
Similar to the almost unlimited range of victims of ISIS recruitment is the case with Cambridge
Analytica as well. Victims were whatever countries and individuals a politician who hired
Cambridge Analytica wanted to influence. The number of victims, in this case, includes also the
Facebook users who, despite those who deleted their profiles in the social media, are still
billions.
The perceived wins by the actors could be summarized in the following way. In three out
of the four case studies that I explored, the gains of the perpetrators were related to the
destabilization of the enemy, establishment of influence over them, and achieving more power.
In the fourth case, involving Cambridge Analytica, the wins of the perpetrator were related to
profits, m e

e , a d e abli hi g i fl e ce

e hei clie

a ge a die ce. As for

Facebook, the wins still meant profits that could translate into power to lobby to maximize
profits even more. Losses, for all mentioned perpetrators, would mean any perceived outcome
that leads to decreasing the chances of wins (power/profits).
The analysis chapter in this study also included sections for other figures involved in the
cases, typically with a subsidiary role. Among them, emerge mostly individuals who knew what
the perpetrator wanted to achieve, and either supported them actively or implicitly through
complying with the ongoing threat, without resisting it. Another section in the analysis chapter
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delineated the factors that had a role in the case. In this regard, elements such as the pattern of
digital oversharing, the attention economy culture, overconfidence or insecurity in terms of
identity, the influence of the famil , em i al a ma a d e e f c

l

e

e life a ea

as essential reasons for the success of the cognitive threats.
Another aspect that informed the prevention strategies pertains to whether the cognitive
threats represent any potential for war actions or not. The majority of the case studies do not
reveal any potential for military measures because of the following reasons. First, in the case of
espionage, this cognitive threat is used both in wartime and peacetime. Second, in the case of
Russian disinformation, the threat is not even a crime. Third, in the case of Cambridge Analytica,
their actions were in the grey zone between legal and illegal. Only in the case with ISIS, the
cognitive threat represents some war potential but only because of the terrorist attacks of ISIS,
and not because of the recruitment itself.
Next, as I explored the political mechanisms making the cognitive threat possible, I
discovered that in three out of the four case studies, they are related to the antagonistic
relationship between perpetrators and victims, and because of overlapping interest between
individuals living in the enemy-state, and the perpetrators themselves. The only case that does
not correspond to these conclusions is the one with Cambridge Analytica, in which the political
mechanism, driving the cognitive threat is the desire for profits and the lack of legislation
eg la i g he c m a

allowed tactics for making these profits.

In terms of the psychological mechanisms bringing cognitive threats to life, the results
showed that in the case with Maria Butina, it was the concept of identity, that was among the
reasons for the infiltration along with persuasion and the ability to deceive and avoid suspicion.
In the second case, persuasion also appears as an engine behind the disinformation campaign
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along with the power of the confirmation bias and the construction of social networks that
contain predominantly, if not exclusively, like-minded individuals. In the case of ISIS
recruitment, the psychological mechanism was the ic im perceived loss of control over their
life. The addictive nature of social media, the culture of oversharing and psychological profiling
were the mechanisms through which Cambridge Analytica became successful in their political
campaign services. Except for persuasion, that was possible because of unique factors inherent
for each case, there is no other overlap between psychological techniques that were used in the
listed cases of cognitive threats.
Based on the findings from this research, some policy recommendations should be
outlined. The concrete prevention strategies against cognitive threats, produced by the analysis of
the case studies showed measures that have to be adopted in six categories. First, state and nonstate actors, supported by local communities should create alternatives to the incentive (e.g., a
product, a content, lifestyle or employment) offered by the state or non-state perpetrator of the
cognitive threat to the victims, or even to some direct individual perpetrators who are employees
of the state/non-state perpetrator. Second, the narrative about individuals who were either victims
before they become perpetrators themselves or the ones who were forced to collaborate to the
state- e e a

g al

f fi a cial ece i

ha

be cha ged. The

h ld

t be vilified

but described as victims of particular circumstances and political goals. Moreover, the narrative
should illustrate the downsides and the potential fallacy of the promises the perpetrators made to
the individuals in an attempt to fulfill their agenda. Third, the stakeholders involved in cases of
cognitive threats, especially states, should have unequivocal positions on what happened, why it
happened, who did it, and what will be done to prevent the threat in the future. Fourth, strong
legislative measures should be an integral part of a successful defense against cognitive threats.
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They should aim to regulate the actions in the digital space, including disinformation, political
targeting and any other adverse effects on the free, democratic processes. Besides, some
administrative agencies, such as a regulatory commission responsible for the digital space, could
also be established, as a result of introducing new pieces of legislation on a state or supranational
level. Fifth, another critical element in preventing cognitive threats is education about the digital
space, religion, and misinterpretations of religious readings and premises. Another component
that has to be addressed through education pertains to immigrants in the conditions of the
expanding globalization. Mainly, how to achieve a harmonious balance between physical and
mental migration, how to address differences between conservative and liberal cultures, between
emotional trauma that may lead to radicalization and grief that makes room for a healthy way of
healing. The sixth mechanism for countering cognitive threats is the awareness of them that
should be promoted by state and non-state actors (including the media and the academia). In
particular, they should address how cognitive threats occur, why they are harmful, and what are
their consequences for the individual, the community, the state and the democracy itself.
A few paragraphs should be dedicated to the limitations of the proposed strategies and the
conditions under which they have the potential to be effective. First, creating alternatives for the
victims of cognitive threats requires a large amount of funding that has to be invested in this
prevention mechanism to be successful. As states are the units with most authority to implement
measures against cognitive threats, and assuming they should be the ones investing the material
resources for this strategy, they may be incapable of allocating such funds or just reluctant to do
so. This outcome could be due to personal interests of politicians and their party affiliations with
various state and non-state actors, pressure by different lobbies, unstable economic conditions of
the state itself or merely because they do not recognize cognitive threats as a risk deserving of
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such significant amount of resources. Regarding the cultural aspects of creating alternatives for
the victim of cognitive threats, communities and families may be skeptical to having open
conversations about some conservative norms that older generations expect younger generations
to obey without any resistance or without questioning their rightfulness (e.g., religion, arranged
marriages at a young age, conversations regarding controversial events in the world).
Additionally, the strategy for creating alternatives may fail to produce the desired effects in cases
of espionage because the spies may feel as they have no other choice but to serve the state out of
fear for retribution if they refuse to cooperate. As for disinformation, the confirmation bias in
humans could turn out to be a tendency difficult to change, especially when the recipient of the
information has a predilection to the stance taken through this information. Thus, the goal to
reorient readers of deceitful information delivered by untrustworthy websites to other sources of
information containing proven facts could hide various caveats. The culture of oversharing on
social media, the addiction to these platforms and the predictable reaction of people experiencing
fear could also be challenging to overcome when it comes to cognitive threats. Moreover, the
civic consciousness of people regarding the digital space may not develop for many years or not
even at all unless they begin to perceive consequences from violations of their privacy in the
digital space the same way they assess harm in the physical space.
The second group of strategies that pertains to the recommended change in the narrative
about victims and perpetrators of cognitive threats also should be examined with some caution. If
intense hostility between states existed for extensive periods of time (e.g., the Cold War), it may
be difficult to change the narrative about the rival country or at least, it will be difficult for the
people of the vilified country to be persuaded that they are no longer seen as enemies. In
addition, a significant role in creating the public image of a rival state has the media. Obeying
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the contemporary requirements of the attention-economy culture, they may prefer to circulate
headlines that stimulate strong reactions in people, mostly pejorative in nature, because this
increases their attention and hence, their profits. Lastly, states, non-state actors and some
politicians may not be inclined to invoke a change in the narrative simply because they
ef ll

e e

le fea

f enemies for political gains.

Establishing unambiguous state positions on cognitive threats as a third strategy that I
suggest could also be a challenging task. This tendency is observed in cases when politicians and
party/parties in power have an interest in maintaining the status-quo, especially when the threat
comes from an entity that they are favorable of, supporting, or when the existing threat creates
more political gains for them than losses. Diplomatic considerations are also among the reasons
why many state officials abstain from taking a firm stance against cognitive threats made by
another state.
The same concerns also translate to establishing legislative measures about the digital
space. Pressure by lobbyists, personal investments of politicians or interest in maintaining the
current legislation beneficiary to some power structures (so that they can use cognitive threats
domestically or against opponents abroad) could reveal notable obstacles to creating and
implementing strong legislation for violations in the digital space. Another element that could
exacerbate the level of success of this mechanism is the possibility, existing with any law, that it
could be still somehow circumvented.
Education, as a prevention strategy against cognitive threats, also has some limitations
that should be mentioned. On the one hand, it would be most effective with young people who
still have not formed an established view on issues. For adults, on the other hand, education
could be effective only if the recipient of the educational content intentionally seeks it or they are

253
at least open to considering some information potentially contradicting some of their beliefs.
However, for people, especially such who are firmly convinced in the rightfulness of a specific
position or stance, education could not be an applicable mechanism for defense against cognitive
threats. Even for people who are open to obtaining new educational information, the
confirmation bias, their group identity, and their social networks typically consisting of likeminded people could be posing some obstacles to the success of this strategy. Undoubtedly,
some of them could be introduced to new educational information regarding cognitive threats
that they will accept even if it is not in full accordance with their current beliefs and those of
their peers. That said, education would be most effective when offered to younger people and
adults who could be persuaded to learn to recognize and resist attempts for cognitive threats by
malicious actors. At the same time, problems with implementing educational information could
also be encountered in the party responsible for distributing these educational campaigns

states,

non-state actors, and individuals. States may decide not to allocate the funding for such
campaigns or to choose to promote the message in ways that fail to reach the desired audience.
Besides, politicians may be reluctant to advocate for such campaigns because it would decrease
political benefits that they get from the existence of cognitive threats. Some NGOs may also fail
to promote the educational messages because of lack of resources (material and human), because
of flaws of the campaign itself or the way it is intended to reach the recipients.
Similar arguments and concerns could be repeated for the last strategy that I
recommended

bringing awareness of the problem. In addition to them, another considerable

obstacle for the applicability of this technique could be the relative lack of recognition of
cognitive threats as such and the need for their prevention in public policy and scholarly agendas.
For the first category, the problem with attribution of the act brings a diplomatic dilemma that
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may make state officials hesitant to attract attention to a problem without being capable of
providing evidence implicating the perpetrator. At the same time, due to the nature of this threat
and the fact it concerns the human cognition and psychological rather than material processes,
political scientists may be reluctant to focus on the problem and examine it. Influence,
information processing, and decision-making are categories that could hardly be quantified and
their causal relationship to politics and international security could hardly be proven beyond
doubt.
In light of these limitations, some strategies under some conditions, appear more useful
and applicable than others. The state as the most powerful figure among communities and
individuals has the most authority to counter cognitive threats on a large scale. Therefore, the
strategies based on state involvement have the most potential for combatting cognitive threats
and should be perceived as primary. In particular, creating alternatives for victims and
perpetrators of cognitive threats and establishing clear state positions and creating legislation for
regulating the digital space would be viable strategies only for states that have the material
resources to support such programs, states that are not dependent on actors who are benefitting
from cognitive threats and such that recognize the problem and have the determination to combat
it. Community participation in creating alternatives for victims and perpetrators of cognitive
threats could be dependent on various individual factors, and its impact will be significant only if
a large number of communities join efforts in creating a conversation about culture, religion and
religious formations, immigration, and adaptation. Changing the narrative about victims and
perpetrators of cognitive threats also includes many different actors with sometimes conflicting
interests. The process also takes a lot of time to produce the desired results. Considering these
requirements, it is less likely that strategies that do not require state involvement will succeed
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and to this extent, they should be perceived more as supplementary, secondary mechanisms for
mitigating cognitive threats. As such, education and awareness of the problem as strategies will
also become dependent on the level of state intervention in the fight against cognitive threats.
Since cognitive threats have always been an integral part of warfare and conflicts and in
more recent times also in marketing, it would be unreasonable to believe they will disappear
since they have been so successful. Advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the proliferation
of the Internet of Things (IoT) devices present practically endless opportunities for data
collection by companies whose users unknowingly provide large amounts of information through
smart devices. This fact is what makes cognitive threats even more severe issue than before. The
expectations are that societies will become more reliant on technologies, more interconnected.
Thus, the companies controlling the services in the technology and communications sector will
become even more powerful. Without a stable legislative framework and civic consciousness
about this changing environment, individuals will be increasingly exposed to digital privacy
violations. No state policy is capable of eliminating the problem completely, as advances in the
protection from cognitive threats will result in commensurate advances in the ways cognitive
threats are made and executed. However, a combination of state policies and actions, community
engagement, and the awareness of the pertinent threat posed to human cognition has a strong
potential to at least mitigate the threat.
So far, cognitive threats in their diverse manifestations are somewhat recognized as a
problem in various academic fields but not in politics. If academics identify cognitive threats,
first, as a weapon in the post-modern warfare, and second as a strategy, deeply integrated into
marketing and political marketing fields, state intervention will become more likely. Introducing
the problem in its entirety on a state- and even multistate level will help with limiting the
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harmful consequences from cognitive threats. However, if they keep existing only as an
anonymous enemy, conceptually ignored by the study of politics, and by policy-makers, the
eventual solutions to the problem will become more and more distant. I

hi ca e, h ma i

fate will be to relive the repercussions of the Trojan Horses in people cognitions again, and
again.
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